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Offense Presentation for AdJail. Stephen Duraski and Allen Zeng. Motivation for Implementation?. A class of rogue ads, those that involve social engineering, depend on the content of the ads.
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Offense Presentation for AdJail Stephen Duraski and Allen Zeng
Motivation for Implementation? • A class of rogue ads, those that involve social engineering, depend on the content of the ads. • Content such as fake anti-virus scanners etc, are not actually prevented by this system, which has no controls on the content of the ad. • The New York Times example
Difficulty for each publisher to implement • This system requires a significant rewrite for the ad portion of a publisher's page. • Is the time spent on the implementation worth it since any mistakes would threaten the publishers ability to make money from their site.
Rendering a shadow page for each ad? • Every ad will need a separate shadow page with a unique URI, this increases complexity and difficulty of maintaining a site. • Sites often use multiple ad networks simultaneously, AdJail would require potentially managing a large number of extra domains for proper use of the Same-Origin Policy
Overhead Time • Paper states that rendering time is increased by 1.69% • NOT an insignificant amount of time • ~400ms to ~700ms for Google Ads • Advertisers will not appreciate their ads being rendered slowly, and may react negatively • Amazon loses 1% of sales for every 100ms delay: • http://www.exp-platform.com/Documents/IEEEComputer2007OnlineExperiments.pdf • Google: “Experiments demonstrate that increasing web search latency 100 to 400 ms reduces the daily number of searches per user by 0.2% to 0.6%.” • http://services.google.com/fh/files/blogs/google_delayexp.pdf • Google revenue dropped 20% in an experiment that slowed the page down by 0.5 seconds • http://glinden.blogspot.com/2006/11/marissa-mayer-at-web-20.html
Usability and Scalability Issues • Currently uses Regular Expressions for textual transformation • Cannot possibly do this for the hundreds of existing Ad Networks • Will ultimately work for some but fail for most
Real - Shadow Page Communication • "To facilitate voluntary communication between the two pages, we leverage the window.postMessage() browser API. postMessage() is an inter-origin frame communication mechanism that enables two collaborating frames to share data in a controlled way, even when SOP is in effect" • What prevents the ads from using the same API call to send its own data?
What happens with bad ads? • Ad contains code with "unallowed" javascript code • Gets rendered on Shadow Page - is anything communicated to the Ad Network / User that content was blocked? • Does ad network get charged? • Unclear in paper
Evaluation Issues • What test pages were used? • No examples given • Parameters of tests were modified for each Ad Network such that it would work