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The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution

The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution. Kenneth Mori McElwain University of Michigan kmcelwai@umich.edu Prepared for Conference: “Is Japan’s Constitution Suitable for the 21 st Century?”, University of Michigan, April 15 th , 2011. Explaining the infrequency of amendments.

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The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution

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  1. The Brevity of Japan’s Constitution Kenneth Mori McElwain University of Michigan kmcelwai@umich.edu Prepared for Conference: “Is Japan’s Constitution Suitable for the 21st Century?”, University of Michigan, April 15th, 2011

  2. Explaining the infrequency of amendments • Japan’s constitution is relatively VAGUE • Covers fewer topics, and in less detail • Allows for more statutory change • However, it is also becoming EASIER to amend • Electoral reform has increased size of Diet majorities • Public opinion backs reform, although fickle Prognosis: Public support linked with (unstable) foreign policy concerns. Revision more likely if bicameralism + decentralization become focal issues

  3. Data: “Comparative Constitutions Project” • Elkins, Ginsberg, and Melton (2009) • General data: 860 constitutions, 198 states (from 1789) • Birth / expiration dates • Number + year of amendments • # issues covered • Specific data: 184 current constitutions • 13 categories  61 topics  ~800 variables • Codes WHETHER constitution specifies a particular provision • Codes WHAT the constitution says about provision

  4. How detailed is Japan’s constitution? • Measuring “Scope” = % of issues mentioned

  5. Guarantees: Education (4 var.)

  6. Guarantees: Civil Rights (15 var.)

  7. Mentioned: Religion (4 var.)

  8. Mentioned: Judiciary (16 var.)

  9. Mentioned: Political Institutions (27 var.)

  10. Propensity for future amendments? • Japan has benefited from peace and prosperity • Cold War minimizes global / regional conflict • Constitutional legacy of Meiji (never amended either) • Low social / cultural heterogeneity, high economic growth • Political consistency under LDP • But the constitution has also been stretched pretty thin • Article 9 • Malapportionment & electoral fairness • Decentralization of fiscal / administrative powers

  11. Is the amendment process prohibitive? Referendum process only determined in 2007

  12. Why institutional structure matters1947-1993: MMD-SNTV • Semi-proportionate electoral system • Small changes in vote share  medium changes in seat share • Encourages parties to splinter  multi-party system • 1955: Liberals and Democrats merge  LDP • 1956: Hatoyama tries to switch the electoral system • Wants to amend Article 9 • First-past-the-post would generate large super-majorities

  13. Why institutional structure matters1994- : “mixed-member majoritarian” • More disproportionate electoral system • Small changes in vote share  large changes in seat share • Less malapportionment • Plurality party should win 50%, plausibly 66% of seats • 2005: LDP = 61.7% • 2009: DPJ = 64.2% • Caveat: hurdles remain in Upper House, which produces more proportional results

  14. LDP 2005 proposal: Making amendments easier! • Article 9: Peace Clause • Maintain a Defense Army (not “SDF”) • Permit forces abroad to… • Protect Japanese lives • Participate in internationally-coordinated actions • Article 96: Amendment Rule • Diet hurdle reduced to absolute majority • Keep 50% in voter referendum

  15. So what’s the prognosis? • Partisan differences appear relatively small • Plurality of LDP, DPJ supporters have backed revision • Diet members strongly support revision (70-80%) • Caveat: easy to support in abstract

  16. Revision will be linked to LDP’s fate • If amendment hurdle stays at 50%, then revision more likely under LDP • LDP supporters more amenable to reform • DPJ in coalition w/ SDP  against Article 9 change • What issues will drive revision? • Foreign policy  fluctuates too much to be reliable • Fiscal decentralization  central to current political debate • Bicameralism  majority supports revision

  17. Research agenda for constitutional analysis • What are the appropriate comparison groups? • Common histories, e.g. military occupation, civil war • Mimicking • Inception date  changing roles of state, human rights norms • One alternative: compare texts • Data: “scope” from CCP • Method: Coarsened Exact Matching (Iacus, King, Porro 2008)

  18. Rate of overlap with Japan [5+ yrs old]

  19. Bases of Comparison • Are there causal relationships underlying similarities? • Why so many island countries? • Why E. European nations on civil rights? • Parallel evolution, or conscious copying? • Do textual similarities matter? • Constitutions set parameters for legislative / judicial actions • But if same actors control all branches, then do constitutions function as institutional constraints??

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