Civil Conflict PUBLG 080

1. Civil Conflict PUBLG 080 External Factors & Civil Conflict Lecturer M. Rodwan Abouharb Ph.D. Dept. of Political Science

2. Contribution Joint Impact of Human Rights Consequences of World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs on Civil Conflict Conditionality Programs Worsen Violence Through Negotiations Effects Short Term Implementation Effects Longer Term Cumulative Effects Importance of Selection Effects Higher levels of civil conflict one of the major predictors of human rights violations as government respond to anti-government violence with repression. Part of a Larger Research Project 2

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4. The Question • Do World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs increase or reduce levels of civil conflict? In Particular: • Anti government protest • Riots and • Rebellion

5. Negotiation Effects of World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programs on Civil Conflict • The act of going to the World Bank or IMF in need of a programme is a mark of particular government weakness • Governments in economic difficulty more likely to seek programme. • Opposition groups will use this signal of weakness as an opportune time to engage in politically motivated rebellion. • Example: Nigeria, going to the IMF was viewed by the public with ‘vehement popular antipathy’ (Callagy 1990: 269) resulting in a military coup when the government entered into a conditionality programme with the IMF.

6. Implementation of Conditionality Programmes on Civil Conflict • Short Term • Policy Changes mandated by the Bank & Fund increase peoples uncertainty about economic future • leading to more protest and low levels of violence as opposition parties utilize widespread opposition for their own political gain. • Longer Term • Cumulative failure of these programmes to promote broad based economic growth generate feelings of relative deprivation and grievance towards government increasing likelihood of civil conflict. • Civil Conflict Consequences of Structural Adjustment Programmes • Neo-Liberal Perspective: SAPs promote • Economic growth wealth generation domestic peace less repression • Critical Perspective: SAPs worsen • Harsh policies cutbacks and lower economic growth worsen situation for most protest more repression

7. The Need for a Selection Model in Implementation Arguments • Systemic Relationship: • World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programmes are Non-Random. • The Determinants and Consequences of Conditionality Programmes are Linked. • May be that the underlying factors that increase the likelihood of receiving an Conditionality Programmes such as poverty economic difficulty also change likelihood of civil conflict

8. Hypotheses • Negotiations Effects • H1: The successful negotiation of an Conditionality Programmes increases the probability of rebellion onset. • Implementation Effects • H2: Short Term implementation effects of Conditionality Programmes increases the likelihood of Civil Conflict • H3: The cumulative implementation effects of Conditionality Programmes have a ‘u’ shaped impact on the likelihood of Civil Conflict

9. Results: Negotiation Effects of Conditionality Programmes on Civil Conflict

10. Results: Cumulative Effects of Conditionality Programmes on Civil Conflict

11. Results Summary • Negotiation of a Conditionality Programmes + Rebellion (Predicted Probabilities +44% Increase in likelihood of Rebellion • Short Term Implementation Effects + Anti Government Demonstrations (+32% likelihood) + Riots (+45% likelihood) • Cumulative Implementation Effects +‘U’ shaped relationship between Conditionality Programmes implementation and likelihood of rebellion

12. Conclusions What do we know? World Bank & IMF Conditionality Programmes increase likelihood of civil conflict in loan recipient countries. Links to human rights violations, civil conflict significant predictor of human rights repression. International Financial Institutions domestic political effects in developing countries beyond issues of economic growth or decline. 12