Geography and Demographics

1. Geography and Demographics • 6 republics: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovinia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia • 2 autonomous regions in Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo

2. Geography and Demographics • Many ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, etc. • Serbs largest in country, but not majority • Complications: boundaries of ethnic groups not the same as boundaries of republics!

3. Geography and Demographics

4. Geography and Demographics

5. Ancient History • Prior to WWI: Area dominated by Austro-Hungarian (in NW) and Ottoman (in SE) Empires. • No history of fighting, groups not enemies.

6. First Yugoslav State • Formed at the end of WWI. • Marriage of convenience, entered into willingly by all parties.

7. First Yugoslav State • BIG challenges: • Economic • Political: what would this new state look like? • Serbs: wanted strong, centralized state to protect Serb minority populations in other regions. • Others: wanted decentralized state to protect against Serb domination.

8. First Yugoslav State • Solution: a strong, centralized state • Serb preferences won out (this time). • Other groups not happy, but try to work together to iron out problems.

9. WWII • Hitler invades Yugoslavia in 1941 • Installs puppet regimes in Serbia and Croatia. • Croat state (Ustasha): cleanse Croatia of Serbs. • Serb paramilitaries (Chetniks) organize and fight Ustasha. • Horrific fighting, bitter memories. Irony: Ustasha not popularly chosen.

10. WWII • Tito and the Partisans • Communists. • Integrating force. • Fought with Allies • Fought civil war against Ustasha and Chetniks • Won, took power at close of WWII

11. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Inherited a tough situation: • Economic devastation • Bitter memories of civil war • Demographic snake pit: what to do about Serbia?

12. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Use the CP as an integrating force. • Promote ideology of growth and development. • Stomp out nationalism. • Rely on personal popularity and charisma.

13. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Give republics autonomy over own affairs, veto power over central decisions. • Make Vojvodina and Kosovo autonomous regions, give them veto power also. • Consociationalism: keep the power of the largest group (Serbs) in check.

14. Tito’s Yugoslavia • Happy Days: • Country experienced economic growth into the 1970s. • Peace! • But: costs of stifling alternative political voices, vacuum when Tito died.

16. Post-Tito • 1980s: Economic slowdown • CP bureaucrats paralyzed by crisis: • What was good for one region was bad for another. • Regions used veto in Federal Presidency to block any policy that hurt them. • Stalemate!

17. Post Tito • Political crisis also: • Serbian leaders unhappy about status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. • Tried to address problem legally, but were blocked by veto power of other republics. • Deadlock!

18. Moves by Serbia • Serb politicians look for way around the deadlock: appeal to Serb grievances in Kosovo. • Serbs a minority in Kosovo (largely for economic reasons). • Kosovo: historical significance to Serbs. • Politicians: Serbs are being run out of their homeland! (exaggerated claim, but effective).

19. Moves by Serbia • Enter Slobodan Milosevic • 1988: President of Serbia, Ivan Stambolic, sends Milosevic to Kosovo to hear out the complaints of the Kosovo Serbs • Was supposed to stick to CP anti-nationalist line.

20. Moves by Serbia • Instead, took the side of the nationalists. • Famous words, addressing crowd: “You will not be beaten again.”

21. Moves by Serbia • “Rallies for Truth” • Orchestrated by politicians • Demanded end of autonomy of Vijvodina and Kosovo • Dramatized situation of Serbs in Kosovo • Non-Serb leaders continue to refuse to negotiate with Milosevic.

22. Moves by Serbia • Milosevic topples leaders in Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro, installs men loyal to him. • Radical effect on balance of power in Yugoslavia: Milosevic now controls 4 out of 8 votes in the Federal Presidency.

23. Response of Slovenia and Croatia • Leaders of Slovenia and Croatia very nervous, set about trying to weaken the federal authority of Yugoslav state. • Slovenia: • Backed Albanian resistance in Kosovo • Refused to allow rally for truth • Pulled out of Yugoslav CP

24. Response of Slovenia and Croatia • Croatia: • At first: try to broker compromise, preserve Yugoslavia • Strategy changed abruptly with election of Franjo Tudjman in May 1990.

25. Response of Slovenia and Croatia • Tudjman and cronies: provocative nationalists. • Checkerboard flag. • Serbs: secondary minority status. • Talked big about taking Croatia out of Yugoslavia.

26. Escalation • Serb minority in Croatia: scared. Fears played up by Serb politicians. • Summer 1990: Serbs in Krajina (area of Croatia) armed themselves and declared self-rule. • Tudjman: formed own paramilitaries

27. Escalation • June 1991: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. • Serbia lets Slovenia go without fight.

28. Escalation • Not so Croatia. Serbia, plus Yugoslav National Army (JNA), fight to keep it in. • Large-scale war erupts in Croatia. Fighting spread from there to Bosnia.

29. Implications for Ethnicity Theories • Contrary to expectations of Primordialism, war in Yugoslavia not the result of ancient hatreds. Peace, not conflict, was norm. • And yet, the population responded quickly and emotionally to the provocations of politicians. Ethnicity was a “hot button.” Hard for instrumentalism to explain why.

30. Implications for Conflict Theories • Yes, grievances existed. However, they were nothing new. Why did they suddenly flower into conflict? Societal explanations important, but insufficient.

31. Implications for Conflict Theories • Politicians played a critical role: whipped up emotions, initiated conflict. • At national level, change in political leadership important: Tito suppressed nationalism, his successors encouraged it.

32. Implications for Conflict Theories • But also key: the weakness of the Yugoslav state after Tito. • Communist Party: unable to cope with challenges. • Veto power of republics => deadlock. • State unable to contain nationalist politicians, gave them critical window of opportunity.