Police

1. Police Overview

2. History • Early “policing” informal, watch systems, volunteers, few paid personnel • Or, military • Professionalized police forces with the advent of the Industrial Revolution • Urban migration, unrest • Structure

3. History • Police officers tended to be poorly trained with little check on power • Often used to break up labor disputes • Corruption was visible and common • Resented by the poor, particularly immigrants

4. Wickersham commission • 1931—lack of efficiency, honesty, discipline, lack of equipment • Recommended education and training, job security • IACP had been developed in 1892, became the leading voice for reform in the 20th century

5. IACP • Development of civil service, removal of political control, central organizational structure, development of record keeping systems, specialized units • Vollmer, O. W. Wilson—argued for a professionalized force, tough, trained, rule-oriented, paramilitary force

6. 1960s and 1970s • Turmoil and crisis • Civil rights movement, Supreme Court decisions, riots and demonstrations • Growing crime rate • Consequences: increased spending on technology, federal funding • LEAA, LEEP

7. Police role • Functions of police • Crime fighter vs. order maintenance • Styles of policing (crime fighter, watchman, public servant, legalistic) • Considerable disagreement over these roles

8. Major issues • How many police are needed? • When there are no police, there is often chaos (the thin blue line) • Although not always—the most recent blackout • Faster response times • More detectives

9. Issues • Targeting career criminals • Eliminating technicalities • Increasing arrest rates • Using problem solving techniques • Using the results of deterrence research to deter criminals

10. Adding police • KC patrol experiment • Why wasn’t patrol effective? • Patrol is spread thinly in the best of circumstances • Many would-be criminals do not see it as a threat • Nor do they always act rationally

11. Adding police • Majority of murders and assaults, about 50% of rapes occur between people who know each other, in the heat of passion and often indoors, where police presence will have no effect • Outdoor crimes theoretically could be impacted by more police

12. Adding police • About 100,000 officers were added as a result of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994 • Not much effect—why? • Crime is concentrated in large cities, which received only 23% of the funding • Many hired had desk jobs

13. Faster response time • Commonly believed that faster response times will catch more criminals • About 75% of crime-related calls involve crimes that occurred some time ago (“cold” crimes) • About 25% of crime-related calls involve a confrontation

14. Faster response time • Even then, it frequently does not make a difference • People often delay before calling the police. • Victims compose themselves, call a family member • Witnesses often hesitate (cell phone might make a difference)

15. Faster response time • Response time might make a difference in a small number, perhaps 3% (Police Executive Research Forum). Commercial robberies • Faster response time may improve public relations • Too much hurry could result in danger to others

16. More detectives • Police clear about 21% of all index crimes • Belief that we could clear more with more detectives • Most crimes that are cleared are easily solved, such as acquaintance crime • 60-80% of arrests made by patrol rather than detectives

17. More detectives • Information about the suspect most important • A study in LA indicated that police cleared 86% of cases in which a suspect was immediately identified • Cleared 12% cases without an identification

18. More detectives • Skills or training help clear a case only where there is evidence • Of course, lack of training can hurt a case

19. Targeting career criminals • Following high rate offenders (Wolfgang’s research) • Repeat Offender Project • High rate offenders placed under surveillance • Highly intensive

20. Targeting career criminals • 58% of the target group were arrested within a year • Conviction rate 37% • Questions about the cost-effectiveness of the program

21. Eliminating technicalities • Rationale: police have been restricted in their efforts to catch criminals • Exclusionary rule • Motion to suppress: <5% of cases • Successful in .69% of the total • More likely to make a difference in cases involving drugs and weapons

22. Technicalities • Other types of cases often cleared through other means, primarily information about the suspect • One study found that 70% of cases where evidence was suppressed were convicted on other charges (small N)

23. Technicalities: Miranda • Rate of confessions has declined by 16% (Cassell)—however, was declining prior to Miranda • Estimated that confessions needed in 24% of cases • Some of those cases get convictions anyway

24. Technicalities: Miranda • Many suspects waive their rights—2/3 in one study, 80% in another • Police confronted them with evidence and/or appealed to their self-interest about 80% of the time • About 1/4 appealed to suspect’s conscience

25. Increasing arrests • Arrests should increase certainty of apprehension • Arrests take police off the streets, decreasing visibility • Effects of arrest and patrol presence have not been systematically compared

26. Increasing arrests • Avoidance of arrests, “peacekeeping” • Arrests as escalation of a dispute • Whether arrests are effective may be situational

27. Problem oriented policing • Risk analysis: determining where the problems and problem areas are and focusing resources on those areas • Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Experiment • Showed statistically significant effects

28. POP • Frequent rotation of personnel in this study was more effective • Longer the police stayed, the longer the hot spot was crime free, up to a point (about 10 minutes in this study) • Merely driving though had little effect • What police do at a hot spot may be important

29. POP • Look at problems in areas—hot spots • Repeat criminals • Repeat victims • Repeat calls for service

30. POP: examples • Crackdowns: most successful in the short run, only a few studies show displacement • Must be unpredictable to avoid displacement • Residual deterrence and the “phantom” effect

31. POP • Effect of field interrogations positive, if done correctly • A Kansas City study found that aggressive gun seizures reduced violent crime • Gun tips and buybacks did not • Use of trespasser laws

32. Risk analysis and risk control • Analyzing the problem, and then constructing barriers in high risk situations • Analogy to driving—safety devices • Ad hoc nature of these efforts

33. Risk analysis and control • Deterrence theory indicates that perceptions of certainty of apprehension most likely to have an effect • Analyze high risk areas • Control high risk situations by constructing barriers

34. Risk control • Analogous to care safety devices • Altering physical environment • Natural surveillance, establishing territoriality • Studies indicate that these factors affected by another variable, i.e., willingness of those surveying to intervene

35. Other efforts • Better lighting, barriers and cul-de-sacs • Results ambiguous, apparently community dependent • Broken windows • Policing disorder and incivility