Chilean Education System Reform School and Teacher Incentives

1. Chilean Education System ReformSchool and Teacher Incentives Emilio Chávez-Herrerías and Kate Place with Isabel Bescos Source: MINEDUC

2. Research Question • How have education reforms after the return to democracy (1990) altered the incentives for schools and teachers to address (or not) quality and equity issues in basic education?

3. Working Hypothesis • Pinochet regime (1973-1990) established the foundation of the system and its structure of incentives. • The Concertación governments (1990-2010) maintained that system, but introduced gradual changes to the structure of incentives to improve the quality and equity outcomes. • Overall, the incentives for teachers and schools have resulted in quality gains, but have also exacerbated inequality.

4. What are Incentives? • Factors that motivate or induce agents (school administrators, teachers) to opt for particular behaviors or courses of action that align with the interests of principals (policy-makers).

5. Analytic Classification of Incentives These distinctions might be blurry in practice!

6. Main Assumption • Incentives are important: successful implementation of policies depends on the right structure of incentives.

7. However… … there can also be perverse incentives that induce undesired behaviors, that hinder the principal’s interests or generate unintended consequences. … constant multidimensional reforms (such as in Chile) can obscure their actual impacts. … incentives are not all that matters! There are other important reforms (that we do not address) and non-policy factors (such as values and political culture). … notice that all this is based on a top-down conception of educational policymaking and implementation, and an instrumental view of most actors in the system.

8. What we Attempt to Do • Characterize baseline structure of incentives and performance of the system (Pinochet’s legacy) • Analyze the changes in the structure of incentives introduced by the legal and policy reforms between 1990 and 2010 • Analyze the trends in the main performance indicators (quality and equity) and identify possible correlations with incentive reforms. • Review studies that assess the impacts of these reforms (causality?) • Sources of information: (i) general assessments of the Chilean education system and its reforms, (ii) statistics on the performance of the system, (iii) laws and policies, (iv) impact evaluations of reforms.

9. Incentives are not a New Thing • In 1920 the law 3.645 (compulsory primary education… schools could be public, municipal or private) provided: • School incentives: • Subsidies to municipal schools and free private schools, with formulas that incentivized attendance (Arts. 42 – 44) • Sanctions for non-compliance with subsidy requirements (Art. 45) • Teacher incentives: • Salary ladder that rewarded years in tenure and exam approval (Art. 50, 65) • Mandated all municipalities to grant monetary awards to their best male and female teachers (Art. 93) Source: Ley 3.654 de 1920, que norma la educaciónprimariaobligatoria.

10. Concertacion Salvador Allende Michelle Bachelet 06-10 Pinochet Dictatorship Patricio Aylwin 90-94 Eduardo Frei 94-2000 Ricardo Lagos 2000-06 Eduardo Frei SebastiánPiñera 1980 Constitution Source: Source: ERS International Macroeconomic Data Set, Retrieved from www.usda.gov

11. School-Level Incentives

12. Law of Subsidies to Private Schools (1980) • Purpose: Regulate public subsidies to private schools that provide free primary or secondary education (Art. 1), aiming to create, sustain and expand schools with an "adequate educational and cultural environment" (Art. 2). • Municipal schools may also receive subsidies (Art. 18). Source: Decreto de Ley 3.476 de 1980, que norma a los establecimientos de enseñanza particular subvencionados por el Estado.

13. Law of Subsidies to Private Schools (1980)

14. School Subsidies (1998) • Increases subsidies for schools that comply with the complete day of school (jornadacompleta). • For rural and isolated schools the per-student subsidy is multiplied by a factor that is higher for smaller schools (Art. 9 and 12). • Creates co-financed schools (“de financiamientocompartido”) • For private schools (municipal and corporation only secondaries) • These can charge monthly per-student fees of up to 4 subsidy units (USEs), though some students may be exempted by SES criteria. Subsidies decrease with higher such fees (Arts. 23-34). • Creates subsidy (“de refuerzoeducativo”) for schools that implement remedial courses for bad performing students (Art. 39) • Creates subsidy for “excellent” schools totally for teachers (Art. 40) • Creates “special additional” subsidy for all subsidized schools (Art. 41) • Establishes clearer sanctions and oversight procedures (Arts. 43-50) Source: Decreto con Fuerza de Ley 2 de 1998, sobresubvencion del Estado a establecimientoseducacionales. Modifies DFL 2 of 1996.

15. Law of Preferential Subsidy (2008) • Purpose: Creates a preferential subsidy (SEP) to improve the quality of municipal and private schools that have priority students (of low SES) in pre-primary and primary levels (Arts. 1, 2 and 7). It complements the “Ley de Subvenciones” of 1998. • Classifies schools that receive SEP in 3 categories (Art. 9 ): • “autonomous” - show good student performance • “emergent” - have not shown good student performance • “in recovery” - reiterated bad student performance • Mandates special assistance to rural or isolated schools with few teachers (Art. 11 ). • Establishes an additional subsidy for "concentration of priority students" (SCAP), that increases with higher percentages of priority students –up to 60% (Art. 16) Source: Ley 20.248 de 2008, que establece subvención escolar preferencial.

16. Law of Preferential Subsidy (2008)

17. Source: MINEDUC

18. Source: MINEDUC

19. Publicity of Information as Market Incentive High correlation between performance and SES! Source: MINEDUC (2011), http://www.simce.cl/mapas/

20. Teacher-Level Incentives

21. Classification of Teacher Incentives GOAL: Improve education equity and quality through teacher incentives that:

22. Classification of Teacher Incentives

23. Teacher-Level Incentives: The First Reform • TEACHER’S STATUTE I (1991) • Redefined and re-established the teaching profession • Established job security and tenure for teachers • Increased teaching salaries and centralized control • National minimum starting salary • Experience: 6.67% of base salary per year of service; 100% after 30 years • Professional development: up to 40% of salary can be determined by successful completion of programs • Bonus for difficult conditions: up to 30% of base for hard-to-staff locations • Provided professional development & established it as a right • Preferential access to P.D. for teachers of low performing schools • Established working condition requirements • Holidays, sick days, personal days, work-day length Source: BibliotecaCongresoNacional. Ley 19.070 (1991)

24. Teacher-Level Incentives: Scholarships • SCHOLARSHIPS FOR QUALIFIED CANDIDATES (1996– ) • Goal: Attract strong candidates to the profession • Incentive: Tuition and stipend scholarships for the most qualified teacher candidates • Details: • Current program • If students score a minimum of 600 on the college entrance exam, they are eligible for the scholarship • Must give a 3-year commitment to teaching after completing degree http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCiNGnt8-as&feature=player_embedded MINEDUC (2011)

25. Teacher-Level Incentives: Individual Bonus • BONUS FOR DIFFICULT WORKING CONDITIONS (1991—) • Goal: Attract and retain quality teachers in rural and high-poverty schools • Incentive: 4 -30% of the National Minimum Pay provided as a bonus to work under challenging conditions in municipal or subsidized schools • Details: Characteristics to determine bonus: • Isolation of the school • Characteristics of students the school serves • Risk level of population and neighborhood (average number of students in a class, crime rate in neighborhood, and poverty level of neighborhood). • From 2006-2008, 84.4% of the schools were urban, 1,351,519 students attended schools included in the program (39% of total), 76.1% of the schools selected were municipal schools Source: MINEDUC (2011)

26. Teacher-Level Incentives: Group Bonus • SYSTEM OF MERIT AWARDS TO SCHOOLS (SNED) (1996—) • Goals: Improve quality of teaching, recognize excellence, encourage collaboration within schools, provide information to parents • Incentive: Two-year bonus for teachers for excellent performance on school level to top 25% of each of 125 “homogeneous” subgroups of municipal and subsidized private schools within the 15 regions • Details: Based on overall SIMCE scores (37%), improvement in scores (28%), initiative of school (6%), improved working conditions (2%), equality of opportunity (22%), parental feedback (5%) • In 2010-2011, 2,656 schools were recognized and 58,597 teachers benefited; average bonus approximately $1,500 per year. Source: MINEDUC (2011)

27. Teacher-Level Incentives: Teacher Evaluation • TECHER PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM (2004– ) • Goal: Improve the quality of municipal teacher performance • Incentive: 4 Result categories with incentives at each level • Outstanding, Competent, Basic, Unsatisfactory • Details: Every municipal teacher is evaluated every 4 years; Based on self-assessment (10%), Portfolio (60%), Interview (20% ), Recommendation (10%) MINEDUC (2011)

28. Teacher-Level Incentives: Teacher Evaluation Source: MINEDUC (2011)

29. Teacher-Level Incentives: Individual Bonus • AWARD FOR INDIVIDUAL PERFORMANCE (AVDI) (2004—) • Goal: Retain best teachers with one-time bonus & recognition • Incentive: Top applicants receive award, bonus payment of up to $2300 (sliding scale as % of base national salary) • Details: Municipal teachers who score “Outstanding” or “Competent” in evaluations can take written exam on pedagogy and content within 3 years of their evaluation; those who receive “Outstanding”, “Competent”, or “Sufficient Scores” receive bonus • In 2010, 7,769 teachers took the exam; 4% Outstanding, 32% Competent, 50% Sufficient, 13% Unsatisfactory Source: MINEDUC (2011)

30. Teacher-Level Incentives: Individual Bonus • AWARD FOR EXCELLENCE IN TEACHING (AEP) (2002—) • Goal: Retain teachers with salary bonus, recognition of excellence, career ladder • Incentive: Top applicants receive award, 7-8% bonus for 10 years (if they stay in the system), opportunity to become a Master Teacher Network • Details: Year-long process; municipal and subsidized private school teachers eligible; teachers take an exam and submit a portfolio; review by an independent committee • In 2010, 258 teachers received the recognition • 17% of the total applicants • 61% from private subsidized schools; 37% from municipal schools Source: MINEDUC, 2011

31. Teacher-Level Incentives: Teaching Career • TEACHER PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1991– ) • Goals: Improve teaching performance, advancement of profession, retention • Incentive: Some pay increases tied to participation in professional development; scholarships to for overseas study trips • Details: Ongoing, intensive professional development • Primary: 800-875 hours of professional development over 13-18 months • Curricular: Intensive 2-week workshop, sessions throughout the year, classroom visits, etc. MINEDUC (2011)

32. Teacher-Level Incentives: Outcomes Teacher salaries in private subsidized and municipal schools, in 2001 Chilean pesos, 1990-2002 Salaries, in 2001 pesos Year Source: Mizala & Romaguera, 2005, from MINEDUC; note: salaries include bonuses and benefits

33. Teacher-Level Incentives: Outcomes Basis of teacher salary allocations 2002-2003 Source: Mizala & Romaguera (2005)

34. Impact of Reforms Source: MINEDUC

35. Teacher-Level Incentives: Outcomes Average scores on college entrance exam for teacher candidates, compared to national average, 1998-2003 • New education candidates declined 43% 1980-1994; rose 39% 1997-2001 Source: Mizala & Romaguera (2005), from OECD data, obtained from Universidad de Chile

36. PISA Results Source:

37. PISA Results Source:

38. Drop-Out Rates, 1991-2008 Source: MINEDUC, 2008

39. Impact Evaluations • School Incentives • Examination of effect of the voucher system on the quality of schools, as measured by student performance (Barrera-Osorio, Patrinos & Wodon, 2009; Mizala, PilarRomaguera, and Miguel Urquiola, 2007; Bellei, 2009; McEwan & Carnoy, 2000) • Inconclusive results; bias in the studies & different effect estimates; SES explains large amount of variation in test scores • Teacher Incentives • Examination of effect of teacher incentives on student performance (Contreras, Flores, Lobato, 2003; Carnoy, Brodziak, Molina, Socias, 2007); entry into profession & quality of applicants (Mizala & Romaguera, 2005) • Positive impact on teacher morale, entry into profession; Inconclusive results on effects of bonuses on performance • Consensus that most incentives are not impacting education for poorest & most vulnerable

40. References • Barrera-Osorio, F., Patrinos, H.A., & Wodon, Q., Eds. (2009). Emerging Evidence on Vouchers and Faith-Based Providers in Education: Case Studies from Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDEVDIALOGUE/Resources/EmrgingEvidenceVouchers.pdf • Bellei, C. (2009). “The Private-Public School Controversy: The Case of Chile”. In Paul Peterson, P. & Chakrabarti, R. (Eds.). School Choice International, MIT Press.  • Carnoy, M., Brodziak, I., Molina, A., Socias, M. (2007). The limitations of teacher pay incentive programs based on inter-cohort comparisons: The case of Chile’s SNED. Education Finance and Policy Summer 2007, 2(3). pp. 189–227. • Contreras, D., Flores, L., Lobato, F. (2003). Monetary incentives for teachers and school perfromance: The evidences for Chile. Universidad de Chile, Department of Economics. • Cox, C. (1997). Education reform in chile: Context, content and implementation. Washington DC: PREAL. Retrieved from http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/PREAL%208-English.pdf • Delannoy, F. (2000). Education reforms in Chile 1980-1998. Country-studies. Education reform and management publication series. Washington DC: The World Bank. • McEwan, P. J., & Carnoy, M. (2000). The effectiveness and efficiency of private schools in Chile's voucher system. Educational Evaluation & Policy Analysis, 22(3), 213-239. • McEwan, P., Urquiola, M., Vegas, E. (2009). School Choice, Stratification, and Information on School Performance: Lessons from Chile. Economia. • McMeekin, R. (2000). Implementing school-based merit awards: Chile's experience. Technical notes. Country studies: Education reform and management publication series. 3(1). Washington, DC: World Bank. • Minsterio de Educacion. Ley de Subvencion Escolar Preferencial § Ley Num. 20.348 (2008). Retrieved from: http://www.bcn.cl/ • Ministerio de Educacion (2010). Indicadores de la Educacion en Chile: 2007 - 2008. Retrieved from http://w3app.mineduc.cl/mineduc/ded/documentos/Indicadores_2007-2008.pdf • Ministerio de Educacion (2011). www.mineduc.cl • Mizala, A. & Urquiola, M. (2007). School Markets: The Impact of Information Approximating Schools' Effectiveness. NBER Working Paper No. 13676. • Mizala, A. and Romaguera, P. (2005). Teachers' salary structure and incentives in Chile. In Vegas, E. (Ed.) Incentives to improve teaching: Lessons from Latin America. Washington, DC: World Bank., pp. 103-150.  • OECD (2010). Iberoamerica in PISA 2006: Regional Report. Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/37/42/45753892.pdf • OECD (2010). PISA 2009 at a Glance, OECD Publishing. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264095298-en • OECD (2010). PISA 2009 Results: Learning Trends: Changes in student performance since 2000 (Volume V). Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264091580-en • Patrinos, H. A., Barrera Osorio, F., & Guáqueta, J. (2009). The role and impact of public-private partnerships in education. Washington, DC: World Bank. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099079934475/547667-1135281523948/2065243-1239111225278/Role_Impact_PPP_Education.pdf