Situational Analysis (Group 1)

1. Situational Analysis(Group 1) Whathappened? Where? Why?

2. Whatreallyhappened? • Itbegan in Guatemala in 2010 • All non-resistantvarieties are affected, somesigns of attackon catimors too (evidence of resistancebreakdown?) • 2012: worsteverattack in Guatemala (sameforothercountriestoo?) • But, do wehave a historical record of previousepidemics in Central America? • Notenoughwarning (butitstarted in 2010, in facttherewassomewarning) • Hencecomplacency, a problem of perception, notunderstandingthatsomehow ‘thegamehadchanged’ • However, well-managed and fumigated plantations have had low damage

3. Learning from the Colombian experience • Situation similar to Colombian epidemic? • It started in 2008 ( but FNC reports for that year didn’t mention it) • It was 2010 when it really hit hard • Good meteorological data helps to explain what happened • E.g. Huila – Comiteinforme de 2010: • Durante 2010, las alteraciones climáticas presentaron nuevos retos al caficultor Huilense. • “Después del prolongado invierno de 2008 y 2009,en el primer semestre de 2010 llegó un intenso verano que disparó los niveles de broca y afectó principalmente gran parte de la calidad de la cosecha del norte del Huila. • Mas adelante, con las primeras lluvias, llegaron las florescencias más abundantes de los últimos tiempos, que hicieron presagiar una gran cosecha para el segundo semestre. Sin embargo, se presentaron severos ataques de roya, que encontraron un ambiente propicio en las variedades no resistentes, verdadero talón de Aquiles de la caficultura Huilense.

4. High temps, low rain, high sun Huila Low temps, high rain, low sun Villamil met. station Huila 2009 - 2011

5. Similar evidencefor Central America? • Relativelylittle data availableto date (isthere more available?) • ButsomeHonduran data issuggestive:

6. Mostly lower max. and higher min. temps in 2012

7. Mostly lower max. and higher min. temps in 2012

8. We need more data • 2012 was climatically not a very unusual year – neither strong Niño or Niña occurred • 2010 was very wet – was this a contributing factor - like Colombia in 2008-9? • But we know that the Central American climate has been changing – Aguilar et al. (2005): • Temperatures increasing everywhere – with increasing diurnal range (this is a surprise – needs further clarification) • But, the wet season is warming more than the dry season • Heavy precipitation events are increasing in the region. • Need to know: • Possibilities for early warning of similar situation in the future • how unusual recent weather patterns have been

9. Probable Causes (1) • Climate has changed – warmer conditions, higher minimum temperatures with rainy conditions are good for rust – it reaches to higher altitudes than previously • 2011-2012 provided ideal conditions (not too hot, not too cold, not too wet, not too dry) but needs further data (it takes more than one year to get a big rust epidemic started??) • Good flowering – heavy bearing trees are more susceptible to rust • More aggressivestrain? (Colombianevidencesuggestsnot)

10. Probable Causes (2) Economic issues: • Historically insufficient economic resources to deal with the rust • Spraying is costly ($250/year) why do it if it has not been a problem? • Insufficient farm practices (poor infrastructure – very bad roads after storms in 2010) • Migrantworkers – bringingrustsporeswiththem? • Problem wasunderestimated– somewarningsignswerethere (butwhathappenedsurprisedeveryone, includingscientists) • Thereforecomplacency and ineffectivecommunication • Ineffectiveapplicationtechniques(dropletsize, frequency & timing of applications) • And gotusedto ‘just-in-time sprayingratherthan ‘just-in-case’) • Insufficientcommunication • Conflicting advice: farmers mostly have susceptible coffee varieties – conflict of advice between technologists (resistance) and roasters (susceptible vars. for quality)

11. Similar/Differentsituationsbyorigin? • No majordifferencesdetectedacross Central America -similar impact in mostcountries? • Maindifferences are relatedtotheresistance of varieties in each country(?) and differentmicroclimates, orplantingdensity & shadelevels? • Promecafé has collected data regardingdamages (do wehave a standard samplingmethodologyforthefuture?)

12. Similarities / Differencesbyfarmsize? • Plantationsizeisnotrelevant. Damageiswidely spread. • Big and well-managedfarms, surroundedbysmaller and notwell-managedones can getrusttoo. • Butsmallfarmershavefewerresources so they are hit harder– maygive up coffeefaster as a consequence? • Widespreadeconomicdifficulties of workers: in thepast, when a fewplantationswereaffected, workers moved tootherfarms. Todaythisisnotpossibleduetothebroadgeographicalextension of affectedareas.

13. Rust is not the only problem • Ojo de Gallo has been getting worse – in Costa Rica, Colombia, Panama etc. • Catimors are (highly?) susceptible – another reason why farmers don’t want to plant them • Need surveys for ojo de gallo and other problems so that we are not caught by surprise again

14. Summing up: the rust machineAvelinoet al’s model, the state-of-art rain • Positive effect on disease progression (solid lines); negative effect (dashed lines); • with an optimum (dotted lines) • 4 out of 6 processes influenced by weather/climate • 9 out of 15 influences linked to weather/climate temperature • soil moisture fruit load • rainfall soil moisture air temp. leaf wetness duration • wind speed stomatal density • radiation • leaf area

15. Summing up – it’s complicated No single cause • A climate component (roya attacks at higher altitudes now) • A knowledge component (lack of awareness, complacency) • An economic component (costs of regular spraying are high) • A technology component (lack of varieties, neglect of long-term research) • Institutional problem (lack of support for routine disease monitoring and awareness raising, training) • A lack of agency (poor following up, implementation) due to chronic weakness/underfunding of support institutes • So where’s the science on this? • We need more systems’ approaches (like Avelino’srust machine)

16. Recommendations of workinggroup 1Prioritizelimitedresourcestodealwith actual situation and loweritsimpact in futureyears • Collectinformation: systematize, analyse, and distribute. • Share statistics: withproducerstoprevent and takecorrectiveactions • Getinformation, do researchon: • Weather: temperature, amount of rain and rain patterns, relativehumidity, solar light and shade, El Niño y La Niña • Levels of infection, incidence, and severity • Satellitemaps • New cropvarieties • Test/improvequality of catimors • Socioeconomicinformation • Monitoringotherdiseases (e.g. Ojo de Gallo) • Renovateplantations • Topography • Altitude • Soiltype • Soilconditions • Physical and chemicalsoilanalysis

17. Priorities • More diagnostics • Monitorsforearlywarningalarmstotriggerimmediatecorrectivetreatments • Use of technology (cellphones) • More permanentresearchtoimprovetechnology, more diversity of varieties • Trials on farming systems: tree density changes & shade modification to increase resilience of coffee plantations • More studies on rust – its genetic variety and virulence • Improvefinancialresources • Developbetterfarmingpractices • Createinsuranceprograms • Improveproducers’ networking • Attitudechangeneededbyallstakeholders • Extensionservicesbetterequippedforknowledge and technologytransference • Bettersoil use and conservation

18. A new start Storms & hurricanes (CEPAL) 1990-2008 • We are playing under new rules - climatic conditions are more extreme now • We can’t go on as we have been – must be more proactive, less reactive • This means upgrading all farms to a more resilient condition • More research and extension will be needed • More innovation • More diverse farming systems 1970-1989