COLOQUIO “LA CRISIS GLOBAL Y AMERICA LATINA” 19-21 de enero de 2009

1. COLOQUIO “LA CRISIS GLOBAL Y AMERICA LATINA” 19-21 de enero de 2009 Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana Iztapalapa, México, D.F.

2. Hegemonía norteamericana, hegemonía militar: Desde Presidente Bush hasta Presidente Obama James Martín Cypher • Profesor-Investigador en Economía, Doctorado en Estudios del Desarrollo, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, México • Profesor Emérito, Universidad Estatal de California, EUA

3. Régimenes de Hegemonía • Nueva Hegemonía • Crisis Hegemónica ↗ • Hegemonía ↗ Tiempo→ Fuente: Kindelberger

4. Teoría de Estabildad Hegemónica • Economía Nacional Dominante × • Poder Dominante en Comerico Exterior × • Sistema de Producción Dominante × • Moneda Clave nivel Mundial √ ? • Control del Centro Financiero Mundial ? × • Sistema Nacional de Inovación Dominante √ ? • Control de la Mercancia Clave (petroleo) × • Poder Militar Dominante √ Fuentes Keohane/Cypher

5. Hipótesis sobre los EE. UU. • El poder militar es un elemento clave en la construcción/mantenamiento del su hegemonía • El poder militar es una VENTAJA COMPETITIVA • El poder militar es una medida para compensar por debilidades en la producción y el comerico exterior en un sistema de rivalidad entre naciones y extraer concessiones económicas

6. Contratendencias • Con más de 700 bases militares en otros países y con flotas ultramar hay riesgo de “extralimitar imperial” • En frente de una crisis financiera 2007-2009 el intento de aumentar los gastos públicos resulta en déficits fiscal y deuda pública sin precidente [deuda > 100% GDP en 2010??] • El financiamiento fiscal de los gastos militares se aumenta la deuda pública y se frena el poder militar en el futuro mediano

7. Contratendencias al las Contratendencias • En la busqueda de proyectos “palas listas” de infraestructura y gastos públicos en 2009-2010 hay una estructura lista y capaz de absorber rapidamente inyecciones fiscales→”El Complejo Militar Industrial” ya acostombrado de gastar miles de millones de $$$ por día • La idea comunalmente aceptado en que los efectos multiplicadores de los gastos militares son pocos no tiene fundamento

8. Bush vs. Obama: Política Militar • DesdeHalcónesAdventurosos y Tropes • a HALCÓNES DISFRAZADOS Y LISTOS Con “poder Suave”/“poderAgudo” • NO se niega, sinoque se complementa el podermilitar • Nuncaprometió Obama de reducir la capacidad de “proyectar el poder” y el intentoes de aumentarestacapacidad • Es creyente en el “EXCEPCIONALISMO EUA”

9. El Estado de Seguridad Nacional • Es el estado adentro del estado nacional • Es la estructura estatal primordial en el intento de reconstruir la hegemonía de los EE. UU. • Para entender la política actual de este Estado hay que conocer los “actores” claves→Secretarios de Defensa y Estado→Asesor de Seguridad Nacional→los “Intelecutales de la Defensa” claves

10. Robert Gates, Secretario de Defensa de Obama: Experiencia • El primero Secretario de Defensa de ser directamente renombrado, antes nombrado por Bush [Dic. 2006] • 2002-2006 Texas A&M University Presidente • 1999-2001 Texas A&M University, Interim Dean George Bush School of Gov't • 1991-1993 Central Intelligence Agency Director

11. Robert Gates • 1989-1991 Executive Office of the President , DeputyNational Security Advisor • 1986-1989 Central Intelligence AgencyDeputy Director • 1967-1969 Dept of Air ForceSecondLieutenant • 1966-1974 Central Intelligence Agency • Gates is a pragmatist not a unilateralist: • “US cannot kill or capture its way to victory” • “kinetic operations should be subordinated” to “efforts to address grievances” • Fuente: Foreign Affairs (January 2009)

12. Robert Gates, private sector • Parker Drilling Co, Board of DirectorsMember • American Council on Education, President • Boy Scouts of America NationalExecutiveBoard • The Fidelity Funds Chairman of Trustees • NACCO Industries, Inc Board of Directors • Brinker International, Inc Board of Directors • SAIC # 10 Military Contractor, 2007, Board of Directors

13. William J. Lynn III, DeputySecretary of Defense # 2 DOD Job • formerUnderSecretary of DefenseunderPresident Clinton • 2001-2002 he was an executive vice president of DFI International (consulting on national security policies) • Center for a New American Security, BoardMember • Senior Vice PresidentforGovernmentOperations and StrategyfortheRaytheonCorporation [the # 5 Pentagonmilitarycontractor in 2007] • lobbyistforRaytheonuntilthesummer of 2008,

14. Michele A. Flournoy, UnderSecretary of DefenseforPolicy, Puesto # 3 • Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Clinton Administration • Key participant in the creation of the QDR, 1997 • Leader of the QDR 2001 National Defense University Working Group

15. Michele A. Flournoy, UnderSecretary of DefenseforPolicy, Puesto # 3 • FormerMember of theDefensePolicyBoard • Member Council onForeignRelations • President & Co-founder of the Center for a New American Security • Center forStrategic and International Studies

16. Michele A. Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • “The US must prepare for a broad range of future contingencies, from sustained small-unit irregular warfare missions to military-to-military training and advising missions to high-end warfare against regional powers armed with weapons of mass destruction and other asymmetric means.” P. 1 • TestimonytotheHouseArmedServicesCommitteeFeb 14, 2008

17. Michele A. Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy • “The United States is a global power with global interests, and we need our armed forces to be ready to respond whenever and wherever our strategic interests might be threatened. The absence of an adequate strategic reserve of ready ground forces must be addressed on an urgent basis.” P. 2 • TestimonytotheHouseArmedServicesCommitteeFeb 14, 2008

18. Michele A. Flournoy, PolicyRecommendations: • “Increase the Supply of ground Forces. Grow the Army, marine Corp and Special Operations Forces. • Seek to reestablish a larger ready reserve of ground forces to enable rapid US response to other contingencies. • Increase the percentage of the Army that is deployable. • Invest in recapitalizing and modernizing aging Air Force and Navy fleets to ensure readiness for future missions. • Increase the deployable operational capacity of civilian agencies to reduce the burden on the US military.” P. 8 Ibid.

19. General James Jones, Obama’sNational Security Advisor • 40 year US military career: • Marine Corp, Vietnam War participant • Marine Corp, Gulf War participant • Commandant of the US Marine Corp • Supreme Allied Commander, Europe • A director of the Boeing Corporation in 2007, #2 Pentagon Contractor

20. General James Jones, Obama’s National Security Advisor “The new security menace is transnational, characterized by enemies without territory, without borders, and without fixed bases. Today’s security environment includes threats such as the export and franchising of terrorism, eroding control of weapons of mass destruction, narco-trafficking, unanticipated and uncontrolled refugee flow, and illegal immigration. Many of these threats are nurtured in misgoverned or even ungoverned regions as terrorists and extremist organizations seek to find new havens from which to operate. We must change our posture to reflect the realities of the 21st Century” SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE 23 SEPTEMBER 2004

21. General James Jones, Obama’sNational Security Advisor • Described as a “Center-Right” or “Moderate” Advisor • Considered a Pragmatist • Advocate of “Soft Power”

22. President Barak Obama “Ver el poder estadounidense en declinación terminal", escribió el entonces candidato presidencial en Foreign Affairsdurante la campaña, "es ignorar la gran promesa y el propósito histórico de Estados Unidos en el mundo".

23. President Barak Obama • increase the overall size of the U.S. military by 92,000 troops • increasing the number of U.S. (20-30,000) and allied troops sent to Afghanistan • Use U.S. military force in Pakistan [un poder nuclear]

24. Fallas en el papel hegemónico • Failure to exercising responsibility for global macroeconomic stability, for example through encouraging a balance between domestic savings and consumption and fostering discipline in the government budget. • Failure to exercising responsibility for the supervision of capital markets, particularly as financial instruments became more and more complicated. For example, the United States was slow to respond to the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997, and the recent financial meltdown arguably will exacerbate the current global recession.

25. Fallas en el papel hegemónico • The failure to use force only in circumstances where it was absolutely necessary and with careful regard for the consequences. • Competent provision of public goods domestically. Fuente:On the Eve of Obama's Inauguration: American Soft Power, Brookings (January 2009) http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/01_asia_bush.aspx

26. La nueva tactica: Poder Suave • “According to Joseph Nye, soft power, it is the ability of a country to wield influence • through cooptation rather than command, • through attraction and agenda-setting • rather than coercion or payments.

27. Poder Suave • a country that has the legitimacy to set the international political agenda by establishing norms and institutions that guide the actions of others for an extended period • has exercised power in a way that is efficient and less subject to challenge.”

28. a country can co-opt the cooperation of others • because its culture, political ideals, institutions, • and broad domestic and external policies are attractive; • the country will have to exert less political capital than if it had to use coercion or payments. • On the Eve of Obama's Inauguration: American Soft Power, Brookings (January 2009) http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2009/01_asia_bush.aspx

29. Hillary Clinton, Obama’s Secretary of State • US foreign policy will be led by diplomacy Smart Power means: • 1. National Security = Defense + Diplomacy + Development • 2. US policy = Principles + Pragmatism • Senate Confirmation Hearing, 13 Jan. 2009

30. ¿Obama’s cambio de la política exterior? • El pragmatiso ES una ideología • El poder suave/poder agudo no se niega El poder duro • El equipo de Obama no van a ir lejos del “Realismo Historico en el ejercicio del poder del Estado”

31. ¿Obama’s cambio de la política exterior? • Con la nueva tactica hay posibilidades de ganar tereno • pero al mismo momento el colapso del sistema bancario y el caos financiero/fiscal socava las capacidades del EE.UU. • La muerte del NEOLIBERALISMO (2008) es importante→ se abre nuevas posibilidades de crecimiento económico autónomo en la periferia→minando el proyecto hegemónico

32. ¿Obama’s renovación de una política hegemónica en Am. Latina? • Ni “benigna negligencia” ni cambio profundo esta en la oferta para Am. Latina • Va a ser “una recalibración de condiciones y políticas correspondente” en cuanto a Am. Latina • Tiene México “que recognizar que esta visto como un problema de seguridad y llegar a aceptar” esta • Fuente: Mund Group, Opinion and Policy Report, Series 9 no 2 Jan 15, 2009 p. 3

33. ¿Obama’s renovación de una política hegemónica en Am. Latina? • El enfoque estratégico del los EE.UU. quedará en el Medio Oriente y Asia Central [en factores geopolíticas] • y en la construcción de una NUEVA ORDEN PETROLERO llevando grandes consequencias para México, Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Ecuador y Venezuela • Fridtjof Nansen Institute: “A petroleum order is a particular (historical) configuration of economic factors of control by companies and petro-political strategies by governments, where a leading group of these actors succeed to impose rules of the game on the others and so control market behaviour.