Leadership, Organization, and Management for National Security Space

1. Leadership, Organization, and Managementfor National Security Space NSS Independent Assessment Panel Report Tom Young, Chair LTG Edward Anderson VADM Lyle Bien Gen Ron Fogleman Keith Hall Gen Les Lyles Dr. Hans Mark September 2008 Institute for Defense Analyses

2. Outline • Conclusion • Congressional Direction • Context: Significant Developments Since the 2001 Space Commission • Importance of National Security Space (NSS) to the Future Security of the United States • Findings and Recommendations • Conclusion

3. Conclusions • Space capabilities underpin U.S. economic, technological, and military leadership • Our leadership is in jeopardy today because • Global access to technology is leveling • Potential adversaries are gaining competitive military capabilities • Essential elements of NSS leadership, management, and organization are ineffective – developments since 9/11 have weakened the management focus on space • Without significant changes in NSS management and organization, U.S. Space leadership will erode to the extent that it ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage • Leadership can reverse this trend • This call to action should be assigned the highest level of urgency and requires assignment of responsibility for implementation

4. Congressional Direction (a) Independent Review and Assessment Required- The Secretary of Defense shall select an appropriate entity outside the Department of Defense to conduct an independent review and assessment of the organization and management of the Department of Defense for national security in space. (b)Elements-The review and assessment required by this section shall address the following: • The requirements of the Department of Defense for national security space capabilities, as identified by the Department, and the efforts of the Department to fulfill such requirements. 2. The actions that could be taken by the Department to modify the organization and management of the Department over the near-term, medium-term, and long-term in order to strengthen United States national security in space, and the ability of the Department to implement its requirements and carry out the future space missions, including the following: a) Actions to improve or enhance current interagency coordination processes regarding the operation of national security space assets, including improvements or enhancements in interoperability and communications. b) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship between the intelligence aspects of national security space (so-called “black space”) and the non-intelligence aspects of national security space (so-called “white space”). c) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in which military space issues are addressed by professional military education institutions d) Actions to create a specialized career field for military space acquisition personnel, to include an emphasis on long-term assignments, that could help develop and maintain a professional space acquisition cadre with technical expertise and institutional knowledge.

5. Significant Developments Since the 2001 Space Commission • Growing utilization of Space • Increasing threat of a Space Pearl Harbor • U.S. world space leadership eroding at an alarming rate • Emergence of China and others as space powers • Global leveling of access to emerging technologies • Organizational changes that weaken NSS management • Continued delays, cost overruns, and/or failures have impacted the ability to deliver next generation NSS capabilities, while experiencing increasing frailty of existing systems • Continued consolidation of U.S. space industrial base

6. NSS Leadership Will Remain Vital for National Well-Being • Space capabilities underpin our world leadership • U.S. military strategy, concepts of operations, and force structure and employment predicated on superior space capabilities • Space-based capabilities underpin arms control and strategic deterrence • Space enterprise is embedded in the fabric of our nation’s economy, providing technology leadership, preeminence, and sustainment of the industrial base • Weather and environmental monitoring provide invaluable military and civil support At the same time, space has become a contested environment

7. Findings and Recommendations National Space Strategy Leadership Organization & Management Other Noteworthy Observations Included in Our Report Space Vulnerabilities Consolidation of the Industrial Base Many Positive Activities

8. National Space Strategy • No overarching National Space Strategy to achieve the goals of the National Space Policy • NSS involves • Military space -- Commercial Space • Intelligence Community (IC) space -- DOE • NASA -- NSF • NOAA -- USDA/USGS • DHS -- Allies • Interagency planning and coordination of space activities is fragmented and unfocused • Space preeminence is critical to the national security of the U.S. • Strategy must be accompanied by a leadership mechanism to assure funding and implementation

9. Recommendation • Establish and execute a National Space Strategy • Assures U.S. space preeminence • Integrates the various participants • Establishes line of authority and accountability • Delineatespriorities • The President should lead the effort, and re-establish the National Space Council, chaired by the National Security Advisor, with authority to implement the National Space Strategy, assign roles and responsibilities, and adjudicate requirements and resources.

10. Leadership • “No one’s in charge” • No single authority responsible for NSS below the President • Within DoD - authorities and responsibilities spread across OSD (USD(I), ASD(NII), USD(AT&L), USD(P)), USAF, USN, USA, USMC, MDA, DARPA, and NRO • Short of agreement between the SecDef and DNI, there is no effective mechanism to arrive at a unified budget, priorities, or program plan for NSS across DoD and the IC • Diffused direction from multiple sources greatly complicates NSS implementation and assures inefficiency

11. Leadership (Cont’d) • Stewardship • In the face of competing demands, Air Force stewardship for NSS does not enjoy the same priority as other traditional Air Force missions • Cultural Divide • Intelligence space and military space have strong legacy cultures that make integration extremely difficult • Commercial Capabilities • Commercial space communications capabilities are treated as a resource available on the “spot” market as opposed to an integral element of NSS

12. Recommendation • Establish a National Security Space Authority (NSSA) • The Director will be a newly established Undersecretary of Defense for Space and Deputy DNI for Space, reporting to the SECDEF and DNI • Will be the EA for Space and the NSS acquisition authority • Shall have Milestone Decision Authority and be responsible for defining and formulating Major Force Program (MFP)-12 and will be the focal point for interagency coordination on NSS matters • Provides single authority with responsibility and accountability for the planning and daily execution of the NSS program, including budget • Provides single authority to integrate macro requirements, conduct trade studies, and determine most effective solution to a defined need. • Analytical and technical support from a National Security Space Office (National Security Space Office)-like organization augmented with IC expertise is required to effectively execute this responsibility.

13. Organization & Management • Personnel • Insufficient number of experienced space acquisition personnel and inadequate continuity of personnel in project management positions • Diminished ability (and availability) to attract the nation’s best and brightest • Requirements • Requirements process does not assure requirements are consistent with available resources

14. Organization & Management (Cont’d) • Acquisition Practices • Failure to implement proven acquisition practices continues to result in technical performance problems, cost growth, and schedule delays. Proven practices include: • Experienced, “cradle to grave” project management personnel in adequate numbers • Requirements consistent with available resources • Requirements rigorously controlled • Budget to most probable cost including reserve • Robust systems engineering capability • Lack of Innovation • Some on-orbit systems are experiencing technical difficulties and most constellations are aging and fragile • Terminating legacy programs before new replacement programs are past their most risky development period • NRO failures have created a situation where legacy systems are required to provide continuity of service • As a result, NRO innovation has eroded

15. Recommendation • Create a National Security Space Organization (NSSO) • Assign to it the functions of the National Reconnaissance Office, the Air Force Space and Missile Systems Center, the Air Force Research Laboratories Space Vehicles Directorate, the operational functions of the Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and other Service organizations now providing space capability. • The merged organization will be the single space capability provider reporting to NSSA for requirements and acquisition and to AFSPC for organization, training, and equipping responsibilities. • Spacecraft command, control, and data acquisition operations as well as launch will be the responsibility of the National Security Space Organization (NSSO) and the appropriate DNI organizations.

16. Recommendation Change DoD and Intelligence Community human resource management policies to emphasize technical competence, experience, and continuity • Establish a career education, training, and experience path for the development of engineers and managers who are space acquisition professionals. • Establish as the norm that space project management personnel be in a given position for sufficient time to maximize project success—four+ years without adverse effect upon an individual’s career • Support the current Space Cadre management and training program being implemented by the Services, as exemplified by the U.S. Air Force through AFSPC and Air Education and Training Command • To be designated as a space acquisition professional, individuals must complete a multi-month space acquisition educational program, such as that offered by the Defense Acquisition University

17. Conclusions • Space capabilities underpin U.S. economic, technological, and military leadership • Our leadership is in jeopardy today because • Global access to technology is leveling • Potential adversaries are gaining competitive military capabilities • Essential elements of NSS leadership, management, and organization are ineffective – developments since 9/11 have weakend management focus on space • Without significant changes in NSS management and organization, U.S. Space leadership will erode to the extent that it ceases to provide a competitive national security advantage • Leadership can reverse this trend • This call to action should be assigned the highest level of urgency and requires assignment of responsibility for implementation

18. Where Are We Today?

19. Additional Materials

20. Tasks • Review and assess the organization and management for National Security Space • Assess the importance of National Security Space to the security of the United States • Define actions required to correct identified deficiencies in NSS management and organization including: • Actions to improve or enhance interagency coordination • Actions to improve or enhance the relationship between Intelligence space and military space • Actions to improve or enhance a career field for space acquisition personnel which includes long term assignments and maintains a professional space acquisition cadre including necessary training • Actions to improve or enhance the management of NSS programs

21. Approach • Examined and received briefings on previous studies • 2001 Space Commission Report • 2003 Acquisition of National Security Space Program Report • Rand study, “Developing Space-Based Capabilities: Has DoD Lost the Recipe?” • National Research Council study, “Pre-Milestone A and Early-Phase Systems Engineering: A Retrospective Review and Benefits for Future Air Force Acquisition” • Multiple Government Accountability Office (GAO) Studies • Others • Conducted Structured Reviews and Site Visits with key NSS organizations • Conducted interviews with stakeholders across the NSS • Conducted periodic discussions with Congressional Staff • Panel Deliberations • Subjected Findings and Recommendations to Senior Peer Review chaired by Dr. John Hamre

22. Congressional Direction (a) Independent Review and Assessment Required- The Secretary of Defense shall select an appropriate entity outside the Department of Defense to conduct an independent review and assessment of the organization and management of the Department of Defense for national security in space. (b)Elements-The review and assessment required by this section shall address the following: • The requirements of the Department of Defense for national security space capabilities, as identified by the Department, and the efforts of the Department to fulfill such requirements. 2. The actions that could be taken by the Department to modify the organization and management of the Department over the near-term, medium-term, and long-term in order to strengthen United States national security in space, and the ability of the Department to implement its requirements and carry out the future space missions, including the following: a) Actions to improve or enhance current interagency coordination processes regarding the operation of national security space assets, including improvements or enhancements in interoperability and communications. b) Actions to improve or enhance the relationship between the intelligence aspects of national security space (so-called “black space”) and the non-intelligence aspects of national security space (so-called “white space”). c) Actions to improve or enhance the manner in which military space issues are addressed by professional military education institutions d) Actions to create a specialized career field for military space acquisition personnel, to include an emphasis on long-term assignments, that could help develop and maintain a professional space acquisition cadre with technical expertise and institutional knowledge.

23. Fact-Finding Congressional Staffs, GAO OSD, Joint Staff STRATCOM NRO SECAF (EA for Space), AFSPC, SMC, National Security Space Office Services NSA, NGA, DIA, CIA NOAA, NASA Commercial Space Independent Experts Study Liaisons Brian Green & COL Patrick Frakes, USD(P) Larry Burgess & Cynthia McKinley, USD(I) Brig Gen Don Alston, USAF Brig Gen Edward Bolton, NRO Chuck Alsup & Shishu Gupta, DNI Brig Gen Mark Owen & Lt Col Darren Johnson, STRATCOM Steve Huybrechts, ASD (NII) Rodney Liesveld, NASA Participants IDA Study Team: David Graham, Charles Cook; HT Johnson; Marshall Kaplan; Margaret Porteus; Jim Thorne; David O’Reilly

24. Military Space Satellite Systems Satellite Operations Launch Space Ranges DARPA MDA Intelligence Space Satellite Systems Satellite Operations NOAA Weather Remote Sensing Commercial Space Communications Remote Sensing NASA Technology Project Management Other Department of Energy/National Labs Department of Agriculture (USDA)/U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)/LANDSAT Department of Homeland Security/National Applications Office National Science Foundation (NSF)/Space Weather Allies What is National Security Space?

25. NSS Organizations Today Legend Legend Oversight Oversight President President Funding, Priorities Funding, Priorities Coordination of Operations Coordination of Operations Vice President Vice President Congress Congress Other (labeled) Other (labeled) Dual hat (for Dual hat (for JFCCs JFCCs ) ) OMB OMB NSC NSC OSTP OSTP SECDEF SECDEF DHS DHS … … DNI DNI Commerce Commerce NASA NASA State, Other State, Other Milestone Milestone CIA CIA NOAA NOAA Authority Authority Military Advice Military Advice CJCS CJCS SecAF SecAF SecNavy SecNavy SecArmy SecArmy USD(P) USD(P) USD(AT&L) USD(AT&L) ASD(NII) ASD(NII) USD(I) USD(I) (EA for Space) (EA for Space) communication communication Milestone Natl SecSpace Office Authority Chief Chief SMDC SMDC of Staff of Staff STRATCOM STRATCOM Service Service components components functional functional (org, train, (org, train, equip,) equip,) comp. comp. JFCC JFCC - - ISR ISR DIA DIA Dir DIA Dir DIA AFSPC AFSPC AFMC AFMC DISA DISA JFCC JFCC - - GSI GSI NSA NSA 8th AF 8th AF JFCC JFCC - - IMD IMD SMDC/ARSTRAT SMDC/ARSTRAT JFCC JFCC - - NW NW NGA NGA Dir NSA Dir NSA JTF JTF - - GNO GNO Dir DISA Dir DISA Acquires Acquires Acquires Acquires comms comms imagery imagery CTF 214 CTF 214 Missile Missile AFRL AFRL 20th AF 20th AF AFRL AFRL SMC SMC PEO PEO Commerc Commerc . . Commerc Commerc . . Defense Agcy Defense Agcy comms comms imagery imagery NRO NRO JFCC JFCC - - Space Space 14th AF 14th AF ORS DARPA DARPA MUOS SPO (NAVY) NOAA NOAA Adv ISR Adv ISR NASA NASA JSpOC JSpOC NROC NROC Coordination of Operations Coordination of Operations

26. The Proposed NSS Authority SECDEF DNI • National Security • Space Authority (NSSA) • Assigned as • USD(Space) and Dep DNI for Space • Joint/ Interagency Staffing • (USAF, CIA, USN, USA, USMC) • Integrating Functions: • Policy • Investment Strategy and Plans • Technical Architectures • Requirements • Milestone Decision Authority • Budgeting (MFP-12) • Inter-agency Programmatic Coordination • Space Infrastructure and Industrial Base Advanced ISR Coordinating Relationships DIA DISA NGA NSA NASA DARPASpace Missile Defense Agcy NOAA Capability Providers (NSSO)

27. President Vice President National Space Council (Chaired by National Security Advisor) Commerce, NASA, DoD, IC, DHS, State, Others SECDEF DNI MilitarySpace Operations IntelligenceSpace Operations USSTRATCOM USN USA USAF National Security Space Authority (NSSA) assigned as USD(Space) and Dep DNI for Space Liaison/Coordinate CIA SPAWAR SMDC AFSPC Adv ISR DIA DISA NGA NSA NASA DARPA MDA NOAA Provide People & Forces Components Organize, Train, & Equip NSS Policy, Requirements, Acquisition, & Budgets Provide People & Forces IC Tasking (NSA, NGA, CIA,Other) National Security Space Organization (NSSO)Military or Civilian Director (Three-Star Equivalent) Joint/Interagency Staffing(USAF, CIA, USN, USA, USMC) JFCC Space Data & Products to Principal Users Integrates Functions: KEY = Policy, Requirements, Acquisition and Budgets= Organize, train, & equip = Operations = Provide People and Forces CIA DIA NGA NSA Services COCOMS Others JSPOC • Mil Space Ops • NRO Ops • NRO Acq • AFRL/SD • NRO S&T • ORS • SMC • Navy Space • Army Space

28. Space Vulnerability • The risk of a space “Pearl Harbor” has increased markedly, resulting in: • Concern for the vulnerability of on-orbit assets • Critical need for space situational awareness • Necessity to devise credible deterrence and response options • USSTRATCOM and Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) are beginning to address this important issue

29. Space Industrial Base • Failure of industry to consistently implement proven management and engineering practices • Export controls (e.g., International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR)) have had the unintended consequences of limiting U.S. space industry competitiveness

30. The Proposed NSS Organization • The Director will be a Uniformed 3 Star or a Civilian 3 Star Equivalent • Reporting to AFSPC/CC for organize, train, and equip matters and to the NSSA for Policy, Requirements, and Acquisition matters • A Joint Interagency Staffed Organization -- • comprised of the current Acquisition and Launch Resources assigned to the SMC, NRO, ORS, NRO S&T, AFRL/SD, USN, USA • To Facilitate Life Cycle Program Management Military Space OPS currently assigned to the Services and NRO Ops will be assigned to this organization. • The IAP strongly believes that essential operating relationships will not be undermined through the consolidation of the military space and intelligence space operational centers. • To this end, the IAP advocates that existing operational tasking relationships be retained • Tasking for military space would remain with US Strategic Command by way of the Joint Force Component Command for Space. • Tasking for imaging would remain the responsibility of the National Geospatial Agency. • Tasking for signals intelligence would remain with the National Security Agency. • Any subsequent realignments in operational relationships should be made only after careful study involving the customer communities and NSSO

31. Positive Activities • There are pockets of excellence and positive trends • Support to national leadership and warfighters • Launch • Commercial communications and imagery • AFSPC future plans • USSTRATCOM focus on space • Implementation of acquisition corrective actions at the program level