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US Foreign Policy and the Middle East

US Foreign Policy and the Middle East . Readings: COX AND STOKES CH 11 BEASLEY CH 9 and 10 Carter ch 4 Walt and mearsheimer , dershowitz , edelman et al, lindsay and takeyh. Guiding Questions . What big issues frame US foreign policy in the Middle East?

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US Foreign Policy and the Middle East

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  1. US Foreign Policy and the Middle East Readings: COX AND STOKES CH 11 BEASLEY CH 9 and 10 Carter ch 4 Walt and mearsheimer, dershowitz, edelman et al, lindsay and takeyh

  2. Guiding Questions What big issues frame US foreign policy in the Middle East? How has the Middle East peace process shaped regional policy? How do we classify US-Israeli relations? Is the relationship beneficial for US foreign policy? How do we classify US-Iranian relations?

  3. US-Foreign Policy in the Middle East • Truman Administration forms the basis of Cold War policy: • 1) Changed policy towards active engagement after WW2. • 2) Recognized Israel in 1948 • Establishment of a “special relationship” after Arab Israeli War of 1948 • Johnson/Six Day War 1967 and Nixon/Yom Kippur war (1973) • Walt and Mearsheimer 2006 • Domestic politics; The Jewish lobby was and is a powerful interest group. • Dershowitz 2006 • Democracies with similar cultures/histories • Drake 2002 • Guilt over failure to protect against the Holocaust • Connections between Israel and Turkey for regional stability “won out” over Arab countries. • 3) Peace key to normalizing relations with Arab nations • Act as an “honest broker”; two state solution announced during Bush administration. • US/Israeli ties raise questions about US ability to act as a honest broker.

  4. Movements towards Peace • Arieff 2009 • Camp David Accords 1978 • Signed by Israel (PM Begin) and Egypt (President Sadat) with assistance of US (President Carter) • Mutual aid package from US • Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979: mutual recognition, withdrawal of Israel from Sinai, and a self governing authority for West Bank and Gaza Strip • Jerusalem left out of negotiations • Oslo Accords 1993 • Signed by Israel (PM Rabin) and the PLO (Yasser Arafat) with assistance of US (President Clinton) • Called for: Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and West Bank, PLO administration in Palestinian territories, democratic elections • Negotiate permanent peace agreement in five years

  5. Movements towards Peace (cont.) • Arieff 2009 • Oslo Accords 1993 • West Bank and Gaza divided into three zones • Mutual recognition of Israeli right to exist and legitimacy of the PLO. • Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty 1994

  6. Movements towards Peace • Arieff 2009 • Roadmap for Peace 2003 • Goal driven attempt to restart the peace process initiated under Oslo • Phase I: End Palestinian violence, reform Palestinian political institutions, push for Israeli settlement freeze and Israeli withdrawal from West Bank and Gaza • Target: May 2003 • Phase II: International conference on Palestinian economic recovery, establishment of official process leading to independent state. • Target: December 2003 • Phase III: Permanent agreement ending conflict including ending of 1967 Israeli occupation, definition of Palestinian right of return, and resolution of situation with Jerusalem. • Two states living side by side • Quartet created to monitor actions by both sides and build trust

  7. Sticking Points • Borders and right of return • Palestinians seek a right of return to lands held prior to 1948 declaration of independence • Viability of state currently offered is questionable • Status of Jerusalem • Israelis fear demographic and security issues • Land swaps and limited right of return likely. • Settlement growth • Palestinians seek an end to the building of settlements on land which is part of a future Palestinian state • Israeli government has been reluctant to rein in settlers.

  8. Sticking Points • Acceptance of Israel by Hamas • Divide between Fatah and Hamas hampered negotiations • Reconciliation rejected as long as Hamas refuses to admit Israel’s right to existence • Israel concerns over Iranian nuclear program. • Connections between Iran and Hamas/Hezbollah require solving Iranian situation before embarking on peace

  9. Israeli Foreign Policy • Drake 2003 • Objectives: • 1) Preservation of a Jewish majority in Eretz Israel. • Demographic constraints. • Cannot control more territory than their numbers can support. • Policy of separation: grant autonomy to densely populated Palestinian areas but maintain areas surrounding them. • Policy of closure: permit system to provide access between zones. • Requires a willingness to fight against those who make rival claims (i.e. Palestinians).

  10. Israeli Foreign Policy • Drake 2003 • 2) Normalize relations with surrounding Arab states and the international community. • Founding is a subject of concern. • 3) Aggressive policy towards those who do not accept Israel’s legitimacy. • A. “Offense is defense” • Given its size, Israel cannot afford to be attacked (Suez conflict and Six Day War). • B. Excessive retaliation • Shock and awe to deter future aggression • C. Maintain the nuclear option as a last resort. • D. Preserve support of the US.

  11. Constraints on Israeli Foreign Policy • Drake 2003 • Regional context: • Foreign policy is created in response to support/opposition from regional powers. • International context: • US can theoretically constrain action. • International institutions more frequently ignored. • Ideational context: • Zionism; protection of a Jewish homeland in the Middle East. • Domestic politics: • Fragmented coalitions can give small parties excessive influence. • Example: Yisrael Beitenu • Public opinion matters; citizen army can limit aggression.

  12. Evaluating the US-Israeli Relationship • Mearsheimer and Walt 2006 • US-Israeli relationship is the “centerpiece” of US-Middle Eastern policy • Neither strategic nor moral imperatives account for US support • The special relationship with Israel is counterproductive • Israeli military cannot assist the US in the region • Israeli support is a “liability” in terms of terror policy • Treatment of Palestinians cannot be supported by the US • Middle eastern rogue states are not a threat to the US • Israel is not a “loyal” ally to the US • The “Israeli Lobby” is responsible for steering US policy • Well placed to influence policy through connections to politics, media, public opinion • Not all Jewish Americans or Israelis support this lobby • Neo-conservative elements and allies a part of this lobby • Typically allied with US/Israeli right • Although this “Lobby” is politically strong, US (and Israeli) foreign policy would be well served to stand up to this lobby • US: Would stay out of conflicts • Israel: Could find a solution for peace

  13. Rejoinder • Dershowitz 2006 • AIPAC and other organizations are politically effective, but are just one of many lobbying groups within the US • Not as “sinister” as suggested by Mearsheimer and Walt • Contends that the authors make serious errors • 1) Misuse quotations • Quotations and sources from Israeli politicians ignore context • 2) Erroneous facts • Comparing Israel to apartheid South Africa is a false equivalence • Use discredited information to support their case • 3) Poor logic • US adherence to the relationship is because Israel and the US see “eye to eye” on many issues • Israel is not the aggressor in the region • Iran and the Palestinians also create headaches for the region • Support for the Israeli Lobby does not constitute treason • Nor does it subvert US foreign policy interests • Questions the motivations of scholars who rely on research typically cited by anti-Semitic groups

  14. The West and Iran: Current Tensions • Terrorism cited as the biggest threat to Western countries • WMD’s (particularly nuclear or chemical) in the hands of terrorists often cited as a “nightmare” scenario • International community has attempted to reduce the proliferation of nuclear weapons to prevent the possibility of these weapons falling into the wrong hands • NPT treaty signed entered force in 1970; 189 states are signatories • Iran has been reluctant to cooperate with attempts to verify compliance with NPT • Iran argues it is their right to enrich uranium • West argues it is delaying until it can announce it has nuclear capabilities • Iran as the “rogue” • Ahmadinejad’s election (and re-election) reduced hopes for a rapprochement. • Has denied the occurrence of the Holocaust. • Has called for the elimination of Israel. • Is committed to nuclear fuel enrichment. • Has close connections to the Shia community of Iraq.

  15. Historical Context • Hoyt 2003 • Iran as the “pillar” • Iran critical to both the US and the USSR during the Cold War. • Mossadeq Crisis: US removes the PM and installs the Shah. • Iran becomes central to US “Twin Pillar” strategy in the region until 1978. • Iran as the “prophet” • Iranian Revolution rooted in ‘White Revolution’ reforms of 1963. • Religious leaders saw increased government role as too intrusive; government exiles the Ayatollah for being too vocal in opposition to the regime. • Declining economic situation coupled with political instability weakens the Shah. • 1979: Shah leaves; forces supporting the Ayatollah fill the vacuum.

  16. Historical Context • Hoyt 2003: • Iran as the “rogue” • Neither “East nor West” • Ditches the relationship with the US (The Great Satan). • Also rejects ties to the USSR (Lesser Satan) • Fight with Iraq ends without much territorial movement. • Arab countries support Iraq. • US sanctions add to isolation. • Iran as the “reformer”? • Election of Mohammed Khatami created hope that the regime could liberalize. • Never came to fruition • Role of the president is fairly constrained.

  17. Iranian Foreign Policy: Structural Factors • Hoyt 2003 • Power: • Pawn during the Cold War • 1979-present: desire for regional hegemony • Prompted competition with Iraq • Push for nuclear weapons seen as critical for regional authority/prestige • Interdependence: • Oil reserves promote conflict during the Cold War era. • Oil reserves give the Iranians leverage in the post CW era. • Ideas: • Non alignment • Anti-westernism, anti-colonialism, and promotion of Islam • Maintaining Islamic nature of regime. • Confront corrupt Middle Eastern regimes where Shia are being oppressed. • Iran: 89% Shia and 9% Sunni

  18. Iranian Foreign Policy: Political Factors • Sultanist regime: Supreme Leader is the main actor • Traditionalism reigns; strong role for the military. • Executive: • Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Khamenei) • Selected by the Assembly of Experts (Hashemi Rafsanjani) • President (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad). • Legislature: • Majlis • Council of Guardians • Selects candidates for the Majlis • Judiciary: • Islamic Revolutionary Court. • Reviews acts seen to counter the Islamic nature of the regime. • Political parties exist but opposition is restricted. • Limited ability for public opinion to constrain action

  19. Complications and Containment • International sanctions have not been successful in deterring Iran’s nuclear ambitions • And relationships between Iran and the West (particularly the US) are weak • As the Iranian regime gets closer to obtaining nuclear weapons, containment has been re-evaluated • Many contend that Iranian production of nuclear weaponry is all but inevitable • Lindsay and Takeyh 2010 • Containment may be the “best response” to a bad outcome • Others argue that Iran must be prevented from obtaining nuclear weapons • Edelman et al 2011 • Containment may be the prevailing wisdom but it has not been thought out.

  20. Who Should the West Engage? • Ganji 2008 • Iranian politics is very opaque • Focusing on who wins presidential elections will not change outcomes • Change will only come when the sultanistic nature of the regime is undermined. • Transition must work through social movements which transform the regime from within. • US must end talk of regime change. • Restore relations with Iran but do not undermine the position of Iranian dissidents.

  21. Accepting Containment • Lindsay and Takeyh 2010 • Iran is determined to get nuclear weapons • Does not care about international sanctions • Military strike would only temporarily delay the inevitable • A nuclear Iran is a massive defeat for US Middle Eastern policy • May make nuclear conflict with Israel more likely • May push a nuclear arms race in the region • NPT treaty would collapse • But it may not be a catastrophic defeat

  22. Responding to a Nuclear Iran • Lindsay and Takeyh 2010 • US/Israeli response is key • Not easy; politics are not transparent • Iranian regime is not “irrational” • Recognizes that nuclear balance of power favors Israel • Deterrence is key to ensuring containment • Push “red lines” but do not increase US military presence in region • No initiation of conventional warfare against other countries • No transfer of nuclear weapons, technologies, or materials • No support for terrorism/subversion • US should threaten military retaliation including the use of nuclear weapons should these “red lines” be violated • “Trip-wire” may be necessary to protect Israel

  23. Opposing Containment • Edelman et al. 2011 • Accepting the “inevitable” ignores weaknesses in the strategy of containment • Would destabilize the region • May result in bandwagoning rather than balancing Iran • Places Israel at risk • US/USSR is not an appropriate model • Two actors reduce the possibility of miscalculation • Multipolar context creates risks • New nuclear powers lack a second strike capability • Promotes possibility of pre-emption • Lack of safeguards on weapons likely • Raises possibility that materials get into the wrong hands • Assumptions that Iran would act reasonably are questionable • 1) Opacity of governing structure makes predicting behavior difficult • 2) Inflammatory rhetoric and support for “proxies” raises the stakes

  24. Opposing Containment • Edelman et al. 2011 • Concept of “red lines” too simplistic • 1) Why would an Iran who was not deterred prior to gaining nuclear weapons suddenly respond to pressure? • 2) Requires US ‘security umbrella’ • Can the US credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons in the region? • Would US fight to save Riyadh? • Arms reductions commitments would put a strain on US resources • 3) US Congress might be reluctant to pledge to support Arab nations. • 4) Biggest threat is from connections to terrorism not from a conventional attack • Three track approach: • 1) Continue to apply diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran • 2) Sabotage the nuclear program; may buy time • 3) US should bolster military capabilities and maintain a presence in the Middle East

  25. Conclusions: US-Iranian Relations • Iranian domestic politics central to any fundamental change in the relationship between Iran and the West • Political system is under strain • Human rights abuses, economic stagnation, deteriorating public services, and contested state legitimacy all indicators of state failure • Also suggests growing human insecurity • Iran “going nuclear” would complicate Western foreign policy in the Middle East • Unclear if Iranian citizenry supports this move • Obama careful to parse words during the “Green Revolution” • Good cop/bad cop between US/EU continued under Obama • Ahmadinejad’s re-election thwarted engagement • Obama’s election initially made it more difficult for the regime to demagogue the US.

  26. Next Unit • Theme: The Transatlantic Relationship • Readings: • Cox and Stokes CH 12 • US-British, French, German Foreign Policy • Beasley CH 2-4 • Kagan • Moravscik • Brzezinski

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