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Pacific Southwest Disturbance of September 8, 2011

Pacific Southwest Disturbance of September 8, 2011. CAMS /RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Eric H. Allen eric.allen@nerc.net

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Pacific Southwest Disturbance of September 8, 2011

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  1. Pacific Southwest Disturbance of September 8, 2011 CAMS/RRPA Panel Session Mitigation and Prevention of Cascading Outages: Methodologies and Practical Applications PES General Meeting, Vancouver, Canada July 24, 2013 Eric H. Allen eric.allen@nerc.net Robert W. Cummings bob.cummings@nerc.net

  2. OUTLINE 1. The impact of the blackout on September 8, 2011 in southern California, Arizona, & Mexico 2. [Very brief] Summary of sequence of events 3. Root causes and recommendations for system planning and operations IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  3. Impact of September 8, 2011 blackout • 11 minute cascading outage in Pacific Southwest • 2.7 million customers out in AZ, S.CA, MX, some up to 12 hours • Initiated when single 500 kV line tripped, but not sole cause IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  4. Sequence of events (1) • 15:27:39 Hassayampa-N. Gila 500 kV tripped • Path 44 picked up 77% of H-NG flow • Path 44 flow increased to 5,900 A • Coachella Valley 230/92 kV transformers loaded aboverelay setting IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  5. Sequence of events (2) • 15:28:16 CV #1 and #2 transformers tripped • 15:32:10 Ramon transformer tripped • 15:32:15 Two 161 kV into Niland tripped • IID voltage collapse and UV load shedding • Path 44 flow increased to 7,200 A IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  6. Sequence of events (3) • 15:36:40 Yuma load isolated onto single tie • 15:37:55 El Centro-Pilot Knob 161 kV tripped • 15:38:02 S-Line RAS operated, isolating IID • Path 44 flow increased to 8,700 A IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  7. Sequence of events (4) • 15:38:21 SONGS separation scheme operated IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  8. Sequence of events IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  9. Sequence of events IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

  10. Recommendations and Key Conclusions Weaknesses in two broad areas: • Operations planning • Real-time situational awareness Contributing factors: • Not studying impact of sub 100 kV facilities parallel to EHV • Failure to recognize external facilities and contingencies • Failure to recognize IROLs • Not studying/coordinating effects of interaction of protection systems and RASs during contingency scenarios • Not providing effective operator tools and instructions for reclosing lines with large phase angle differences IEEE Boise, Nov 16, 2012

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