Lessons Learned from Other Countries

1. Lessons Learned from Other Countries Paper by: Ezra Hauer, VHB Consultant

2. Warnings • Interpretation of time series: • All that glitters is not gold • Not every change in a time series of fatalities is due to the most recent intervention

3. Fatality “mountain” is natural

4. Effect of rising travel and declining risk per mile

5. History First fatality-reduction goal in 1997, but no change in programs Major political “shift” in 2002 with new programs France

6. France -- Lessons • Public support for safety changed, quickly followed by change in highest level political will – good timing! • President Chirac had public support, made safety an issue, and had functioning government machinery to act intelligently and with resolve. • Not clear whether safety researchers were involved in decisions, but facts developed shaped public debate and therefore politics • No infrastructure initiatives – but probably because chosen behavioral programs pay for themselves

7. France – Lessons (cont) • Seat belts and helmets work (but had already been emphasized) • 99% percent usage • Speed enforcement is important and works, particularly if automatic! • In 2005, each driver monitored 7 times per month • Average speed of passenger cars decreased from 82.2 km/hr to 80.4 km/hr (2006 to 2008) • Percent above speed limit – 42.9% to 32.3% • Percent 10 km/hr above limit – 16.7% to 10.9%

8. Norway • History • Vision Zero part of National Transport Plan 2002-2011 • VZ interpretation: Not likely to reach zero fatalities or serious injuries but should see continuous reduction toward zero • By 2020, reduce number of fatalities and serious injuries by at least one-third as compared with 2005-2008.

9. Norway

10. Norway – Lessons • Safety as part of National Transport Plan • Safety takes natural role as cost of mobility, not as independent or overriding goal • Land use, transport and safety plans should be developed together – integration • Hauer – don’t confine search to “new programs/actions”, but ask how prevailing arrangement need to be modified • E.g., attention paid to rural vs. urban safety

11. Norway – Lessons • Quantitative safety targets? • Norway has speed limit compliance, seat belt use and bicycle helmet use 2020 targets • Positives • Communicates importance of safety, motivates stakeholders, holds managers accountable, shows government is serious • Negatives • No clear evidence they matter in success • Difficult to predict “baseline without change” -- what would happen in future with current policies • Possible dangers to safety programs of perceived failure • Conclusion • Overall quantitative target may not be necessary, but actions that bring about change is • Measures to be changed should be carefully chosen based on benefits and costs.

12. Sweden • History • 1994: New Minister for Transportation declared safety as priority • 1997: Bill on Traffic Safety included “Vision Zero means that eventually no one will be killed or seriously injured within the road traffic system.” • 2007: Initial goal not met (i.e., 50% fatal reduction), so new goals and objectives set • Management by objective – new interim “action” goals and annual analysis and conference • E.g. – Speeds, driver BAC, belt use, helmet use

13. History Sweden

14. Sweden – Lessons • Shift from “blame the user” to “producer is responsible for safety of the product” • New allocation of responsibility • Designers of system are responsible for design, operation and use, and thus safety of system • Users are responsible for following rules of use • But if user fails and injuries occur, system designers must take necessary steps to reduce harm

15. Sweden – Lessons • Based on simple rules (most related to speed) • Pedestrians not exposed to cars > 30 km/hr • Car occupants not exposed to right angle collisions with cars exceeding 50 km/hr or head-on with cars exceeding 70 km/hr • Etc. • These rules then lead to policies on speed limits, roundabout use, barriers, etc.

16. Sweden – Lessons • Paradigm shift for U.S. • From benefit/cost analysis to “whatever it takes to reduce fatalities” • From limited attention on speed enforcement to speed management and design changes • To infrastructure changes based on speed “rules” (e.g., separation of high-speed two-lane roads to “2+1” design concept) • So do we need TZD or just better benefit/cost based planning?

17. Holland • History • 1987: First long-term safety plan – traditional treatments/countermeasures, 50% fatal reduction by 2010 • 1996: Plan modified to include “Sustainable Safety” – leave inherently safe road environment for future generations • Still more emphasis on B/C analysis than in Vision Zero • 1998-2002: First wave of programs • Major change – lots more km classified for lower speed limits • 9.7% reduction in fatalities and 4.1% in severe injuries • 2008: New 2020 plan places more emphasis on behavioral treatments paid for by the violator

18. Holland • History

19. Holland – Lessons • Wide-spread support for SS, but implementation seems to have stalled. Why? • Concept coined by scientists – but decisions by politicians and they change over time • For long-term TZD success, must have support of both US parties • Continue use of BC analysis as kingpin – parties can change both acceptable ratio and value of life • For long-term TZD success, must rely on and thus train road professionals in safety (planners, designers, traffic engineers, others)

20. Holland – Lessons • Must decide which generation will pay for major changes in system – ours or future ones • Look to environmental debate • Dutch emphasis on safety in residential areas and urban areas – will we shift to do the same?

21. Holland – Lessons • Independent research institute (SWOV) is instrumental in Holland success due to influence on policy. • SWOV is grant funded and has internal control of its programs • US has no independent institutes – all dependent on contracts with topics chosen by others. No long-term grants. • Prestige and knowledge of US institutes are not well used. • US model may be due to commitment to laissez faire competition, but attraction may be in that it gives funders control over questions asked and, to some extent, advise given. • His conclusion: As demonstrated by SWOV, there is another model for consideration.

22. UK • History • UK has long, strong history of safety programs • E.g., driver licensing, roundabouts, safety engineer training, mandatory safety audits, etc. • 1987: First numerical goal – 33% casualty reduction by 2000. • Had 39% fatality and 45% serious casualty reductions by 1998 • 2000: New goals for 2010 (e.g., 40% fatal/serious injury reduction, 50% child fatal/serious injury, etc.) • 10 themes with progress review each 3 years (but really done annually)

23. UK • History

24. UK • History • 2009: First mention of “vision” – “safety roads in the world” (i.e., better than Sweden and Holland re fatalities/100k population). • “A vision is not a substitute for safety strategy” • New goals for 2020 (e.g., 33% fatal reduction, 50 percent reduction in ped and bike KSI rates) • 13 “Key Performance Indicators”

25. UK – Lessons • No new “breakthroughs” • Continued reliance on cost-effective treatments perhaps with some new measures (e.g., lower speed limits on two-lane rural roads) • Continued reliance on professionalism and cooperation between research, civil service and elected representatives • No Zero Death vision • Achieving target no longer taken for granted and new approaches might be needed in Netherlands and Sweden • Intensified application of existing measures thought to be sufficient in UK • Where is US

26. UK – Lessons • Setting targets and monitoring progress is challenging and requires resources • Must predict what would be the case in the future under current program (baseline), which is difficult • Must define cost-effective program of initiatives and predict its impact • Must set up system for monitoring progress

27. UK – Lessons • In UK, safety had to fit between poles of increased mobility and improved environment • If US road safety is to be elevated and based on BC basis, estimates of dollar value of time and life need to be re-examined • TZD allies are more likely to be in environmental camp than in mobility camp • Both transportation planner and traffic engineers are primarily mobility oriented • Must find out what needs to be changed to make them friends of TZD

28. Questions?