THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

2. “OLD” v. “NEW” LEFT • Old Left (1940s-1980s): sought to seize power through armed revolution; adhered to Marxist ideology; sought to impose radical social programs; most successful against retrograde dictatorships (Batista in Cuba, Somoza in Nicaragua) • New Left (1990s-present): seeks to win power through democratic elections; promotes a vague agenda of “social justice” and radical reform (not revolution); most successful under conditions of glaring social inequality (e.g. Venezuela, Brazil)

3. THE NEW LEFT: ORIGINS • Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus • Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption; possibility of victory • International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

4. MEMBERSHIP • Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006, 2011, 2014) • Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) and Dilma Rousseff (2010, 2014) • Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007, 2011) • Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005, 2009, 2014) • Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006, 2011) • Manuel Zelaya, Honduras (2006)* • Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006, 2010) • Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008)* • Mauricio Funes and Salvador Sánchez Cerén, El Salvador (2009, 2014) • José Mujica, Uruguay (2010) • Ollanta Humala, Peru (2011) • Near-Miss: • Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006) • *ousted by “constitutional coup”

6. THE NEW LEFT: GOALS • Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction • Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony (and opposing FTAA) • Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

7. CLARIFICATION • Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠ • Voters for pink tide candidates ≠ • Leftist candidates for office ≠ • Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠ • Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠ • Hugo Chávez • Notes: • Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized • Rivalries and defections

9. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO • Used language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech • Sat atop petroleum • Put money where his mouth was • Broke established rules of the game • Played off resentment of Bush, U.S. power • Challenged Washington Consensus • Went for high stakes • Sought rearrangement of prevailing world order • And now…? With changes in leadership?

10. U.S. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA • Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right • Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States • Unified—under U.S. leadership • Peaceful—in view of unanimity • Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

11. REALITY CHECK • Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” • Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA • Ideology = diversity rather than unity • Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong among large share of population (slight improvement with Obama) • Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game

12. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS • The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy • The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena • Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield • The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

13. The End.