120 likes | 242 Views
CONFIDENTIAL. STATUS OF SECURITY. PRESENTATION TO THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS 18 SEPTEMBER 2012 GC Khwela. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Purpose Background Number of DHA offices Private security guarding In-house security Threat and Risk Assessments Implementation plans
E N D
CONFIDENTIAL STATUS OF SECURITY PRESENTATION TO THE PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS 18 SEPTEMBER 2012 GC Khwela
TABLE OF CONTENTS • Purpose • Background • Number of DHA offices • Private security guarding • In-house security • Threat and Risk Assessments • Implementation plans • Integrated Electronic Security systems • Training of office Managers • Provincial representation • Challenges • Way forward
Purpose of Security at DHA The purpose of the Chief Directorate: Security Services in DHA is to create and provide a safe and secure environment through the application of conscious measures and the effective and efficient utilisation of resources at our disposal.
Number of DHA facilities The total number of DHA facilities stands at around 777, and they include the following, viz. • Ministry and Head Offices [8] • Provincial offices [9] • District Management Operations’ offices • Large, medium and small offices • Port of entries [73] • Hospitals
Guarding Services The Department is currently utilising the services of both in-house and private security officers to guard our offices, the spread of private security companies and the corresponding provinces is as follows, • Mafoko [LP,NC,WC and NW], initially NC and WC were guarded by Chippa Sec Services which has since requested to be released from these services due to their business refocus. • Sidas [MP] • Best Secure [GP] • Ulwazi [KZN and FS] • Eastern Guard [EC] Total number of private guards is 605 at a cost of R6 918667.40 annually
In-House Security The total number of DHA appointed Security Officers at Head Office is 85. These officers are responsible for the provisioning of security in its entity, including the following activities, viz. • Threat and Risk Assessments; • After-hour office inspection; • Close protection services [ e.g. Cuban project, etc.]; • Escort duties; and • Guarding.
Threat and Risk Assessment A number of our offices have been subjected through a process of security risk assessment and many were found to be below the required minimum standards as per the requirements of both MISS and MPSS. An intervention strategy is in the process of formulation and will include the following items, viz. Training of office managers as force multipliers on security issues; Establishment of a working relationship between DHA and SANDF [reserve force]; and Resuscitation of installed electronic systems, etc.
Integrated Electronic Security System Electronic security systems have been installed in 57 offices nationally. However, systems are at different stages of functionality (see attached list). The following offices are at different stages of receiving the required interventions, viz. • Wynberg recently completed and commissioned • Barrack street resuscitation commenced • BVR procurement processes completed, awaiting appointment of the prospective provider Scope of work for the rest of the remaining 20 offices for the current financial year has been completed and the process is at an advanced stage in provinces such as the NC, FS, GP[ Marabastad]
Provincial Representation The Branch is currently represented in provinces by one ASD in GP and six Control Security Officers on level eight [8], the spread is as follows, • 2 x GP [8] • 1 x NC [8] • 1 x NW [8] • 1 x LP [8] • 1 x MP [8] • 1 x KZN [8] The remaining provinces do not have any supervisory representation of physical security officials, bar the security guards who were appointed in Port of Entries at level 3, the process to migrate these guards to full time security officers is underway
CHALLENGES • The biggest challenge experienced in the Chief Directorate centers around the appointment of persons in the provinces at an appropriate level - at least level 12 [Deputy Director]. This argument is informed by the high levels of staff turn over due to incumbents [CSOs] being promoted to higher levels at other institutions or within other government departments; • Non-implementation of recommendations of Threat and Risk Assessments conducted by respective offices. This is partly due to competing priorities or perception of security as a “by the way” issue and not necessarily a priority; • Insufficient resources, particularly vehicles and photographic equipment, which are prerequisites to fulfilling any security work; • Over-dependency on private security guards, whose allegiance is at times doubtful; and • Insufficient specialised technical security practitioners to alleviate our dependency on private security companies installing electronic security systems.
Way Forward • Appointment of security managers at level twelve in respective provinces should go a long way in alleviating the stress; • Designing and formulation of implementation plans for corresponding recommendations of the TRAs; • Procurement of dedicated vehicles for security practitioners in provinces; • Augmentation and capacitation of our technical team; • Possible registration of a front company to deal with our security requirements, particularly on technical matters; and • Training of Office Managers to be responsible for fulfillment of security matters in their respective offices.