White Paper on Defence and Defence Review “Defence Update 2005”

1. White Paper on Defence and Defence Review “Defence Update 2005” Portfolio Committee on Defence: 17 May 2005

2. Introduction & Overview WP&DR Process Changed Strategic Environment Collective Security South African Approach to National Security Role, Functions, Objectives & Missions Overview of Report 2 Mr Tsepe Motumi Nick Sendall Mr Sagaren Naidoo Dr Phenyo Rakate Mr Sagaren Naidoo Col(dr) Willie Wagner Nick Sendall Scope of Presentation to PCD

3. WP & DR Macro Process

4. Required Results of Defence Update 2005 RESULT #1 Renewal & Modernisation DWP DR WP&DR Update MISMATCHRESULT #2 (RISKS) Alignment MTEF MTEF 1996 1998 2005 2009 2014 RESULT #3 Consolidated Defence Vision

5. Defence Update 2005 Architecture • Ministerial Foreword • Introduction • Chapter 1: The Changed Strategic Environment • Chapter 2: Collective Security • Chapter 3: South Africa’s Approach to National Security • Chapter 4: Defence Role, Functions, Objectives, & Missions • Chapter 5: Required Defence Capabilities • Chapter 6: Required Defence Resources • Chapter 7: Defence Governance • Conclusion

6. Status of the WP&DR Chapters

7. Chapter 1: The Changed Strategic Environment Chapter 2: Collective Security Chapter 3: South Africa’s Approach to National Security Chapter 4: Defence Role, Functions, Objectives, & Missions Chapter 5: Required Defence Capabilities Chapter 6: Required Defence Resources Chapter 7: Defence Governance Completed (CPP) Completed (CPP) Completed (CPP) Completed (CCS) Partially completed (CCS) Not commenced (CFO) Completed (CPP) Status of Chapters (1)

8. Status of Chapters (2) • Chapter 5: Required Defence Capabilities • CCS to present the Force Design Proposal to the PDSC on 20 June 2005. • CCS will submit Chapter 5 to the editing committee one week thereafter. • Chapter 6: Required Defence Resources • CFO will present the Financial Instruction for the costing of the Force Design to the DSC on 30 May 2005. • CFO will present the Force Costing Proposal at the PDSC on 18 July 2005. • Submission of Chapter 6 to the editing committee will be one week thereafter, i.e. 25 July 2005. • Report 2 • The Editing Committee tasked to prepare Report 2 for presentation at the PDSC of 15 August 2005.

9. CHAPTER ONE A CHANGED STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

10. Introduction • A main determinant for an update of the WP and DR is the changing nature of the strategic environment. • The contemporary strategic environment depicts a world confronted by non-traditional security threats, new actors, and non-conventional methods of destabilisation and destruction.

11. The Global Context General Trends • Intra-state Conflict • The Contribution of Non-State Actors to insecurity • The Rise of International Terrorism • Possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) • The Military Capacity of States • Unilateral Acts of Force • Competition over Scarce and Strategic Resources • Mercenaries and Private Military Companies • Negative Effects of Globalisation • North-South Disparities • Regionalism • Information and Communication Technology

12. The Continental Context • A new section to previous chapter in 1996 WP. • The establishment of the African Union is a milestone achievement. • However, conflicts have continued – some longstanding others of a recent occurrence. • Causes: • Weak and non-functional states; • Poor political and economic governance; • The politicisation of ethnicity; • Armed competition over scarce and strategic resources; and • Unconstitutional changes of governments. • Accordingly, the AU and its mechanisms for resolution of conflict • i.e. PSC, ASF, the CEW, CADSP and the PAP; are critical for a peaceful and stable continent.

13. The Regional Context • Resolution of long standing internal conflicts and the institutionalisation of democratic practices. Post-war reconstruction poses a challenge. • However, much of the region continues to be stricken by chronic underdevelopment and the attendant problems of poverty, illiteracy and unemployment in addition to the spread of killer diseases, environmental degradation, and a proliferation of small arms. • Therefore, the Operationalisation of SADC security structures and institutions is of critical importance. • Another development to further regional peace and security is the SADC Mutual Defence Pact (MDP).

14. The Domestic Context • The domestic security environment is affected by: • Endemic crime influenced largely by foreign and local criminal syndicates. • Exacerbated by the availability of small arms. • The spread of killer diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, and environmental degradation. • Acts of Terror. • The domestic situation remains stable.

15. Conclusion • The inter-relatedness and transnational nature of many contemporary security threats dictates that solutions are beyond the control of any single state. A resolution to many of the present days security threats require collaborative action among states within multilateral fora and collective security mechanisms at the international, continental and regional levels.

16. CHAPTER TWO COLLECTIVE SECURITY

17. Introduction • A changed strategic environment compels a collective response to non-traditional security threats, new actors, and non-conventional methods of destabilisation and destruction. • Our security as a country is inextricably linked to the region and the continent. • Therefore, there is a need to strengthen regional and continental structures – SADC and AU

18. Approach to Collective Security • The 1996 WP on Defence does not replace ‘state security’ with the adoption of a human security approach. The two are inextricably linked. This approach is supported by the UN Report on Human Security(2003). • Security is no longer viewed in national terms. Most of the non-military threats that face South Africa have regional, continental and international implications. • The DOD is but one instrument that may be employed to promote national, regional, continental and global security.

19. Collective Security Developments • Peacekeeping-The UN experience with peacekeeping in Bosnia and Somalia. • Brahimi Report- to undertake a thorough review of UN peacekeeping. • A purely military approach to peacekeeping which ignores human security aspects does not produce a lasting peace • UN Stand-by arrangements to be linked to regional co-operation – Member states to make available a brigade type force.

20. Reforming the UN SC • UN membership has grown threefold. • UN SC decisions to be legitimate, credible and effective. • Report of the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenge and Change (2004). • Representation will provide Africa with a forum to shape and influence the international security agenda.

21. Continental Security Mechanisms • The objectives of the PSC supported by concomitant structures (ASF, MSC, Early Warning, Panel of the Wise, Peace Fund) is to provide peace, security and stability in Africa. • ASF envisages a brigade-size force per region for each of the five regions. • Early Warning System is to provide political, economic, social, military indicators to be used to analyse developments in the continent. • CADSP provides a framework for a common vision of defence and security on the continent and will inform future developments related to non-aggression and mutual defence pacts.

22. Regional Security Mechanisms • Institutionalisation of the objectives of the OPDSC particularly the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ(SIPO) • SADC Mutual Defence Pact (2003) to prevent conflict between and against SADC member states. • Operationalisation of the SADCBRIG and the Early Warning Centre is currently underway –Modality Report.

23. Collective Security Management • Poverty and Underdevelopment • Eradication of poverty is central to ensuring security of all people and the security of the state (Human Security Report). • SIPO lists 14 security challenges and it includes the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment in the SADC region. • South Africa remains committed to the NEPAD process and the UN Millennium Development Goals.

24. Collective Security Management • Unconstitutional Changes of Government • AU-Algiers Decisions on Unconstitutional Changes of Government(1999) and the Lome Declaration (2000) • Constitutive Act of the African Union reject unconstitutional changes of government. • SADC Protocol on Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections (2004)

25. Collective Security Management • Mercenarism • Mercenary activities undermine the values of human rights and international law as expressed in the Constitution. • Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act 15 of 1998 prohibits South Africans from participating in national and international armed conflicts • South Africa is not party to the UN & AU Convention on Mercenarism

26. Collective Security Management • International Terrorism • Although international terrorism will continue to dominate the global security agenda poverty and underdevelopment remains a challenge for developing countries (MOD Comments) • South Africa has implemented UN SC resolutions on terrorism – IDWG on terrorism • Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 33 of 2004.

27. Collective Security Management • Disarmament and Arms Control • Threat of WMD between major powers continues to decline. However, the use of WMD cannot be discounted. • Pelindaba Treaty – preserve Africa as Nuclear free zone. • Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 87 of 1993. • Conventional Arms Control Act 41 of 2002 – creates the NCACC to regulate trade over conventional arms.

28. Collective Security Management • Small Arms and Light Weapons • South Africa has participated in regional, continental and global initiatives aimed at the eradication of illicit small arms and light weapons • SADC Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials (2001) and the Bamako Declaration(2001) • Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000

29. Collective Security Management • Anti-personnel Landmines • Anti-Personnel Mines Prohibition Act 36 of 2003 • Surrender, forfeiture to the state and destruction of anti-personnel mines • Co-operate with UN and other organisations to clear landmines in SADC

30. Conclusion (1) • The broadening of security to include human security suggests a need to forge a new approach to collective security • Global threats posed poverty, mercenarism, terrorism, arms proliferation etc are interconnected and transnational in nature and cut across departmental responsibilities. • These threats are addressed (inter-alia) through multilateral structures at regional, continental and global levels.

31. Conclusion (2) • South Africa will support regional, continental and global security arrangements and initiatives such as the AU PSC and the operationlisation of its concomitant structures • South Africa will support the implementation of the SADC SIPO, and the SADCBRIG etc

32. CHAPTER THREE SOUTH AFRICA’S APPROACH TO NATIONAL SECURITY

33. Introduction • South Africa’s National Security Policy (NSP) has undergone a marked overhaul since the end of apartheid. • In a democratic South Africa “national security is an all-encompassing condition in which all citizens live in freedom, peace and safety; participate fully in the process of democratic governance; enjoy the protection of fundamental rights; have access to resources and the basic necessities of life; and inhabit an environment which is not detrimental to their health and well-being.” • Accordingly, South Africa’s national security is no longer viewed as a predominantly military and police problem. It has been broadened to incorporate political, economic, social, and environmental matters.

34. INTRODUCTION (Cont..) • The objectives of South Africa’s NSP thus entail: • Consolidation and maintenance of democracy. • The achievement of sustainable economic development. • The pursuit of social justice. • Ensuring a peaceful and safe environment by addressing the levels of crime, violence and political instability. • Achieving security within the principles of collective security, non-aggression and peaceful settlement of disputes.

35. Foundations of SA’s National Security Policy • South Africa’s NSP is based on constitutional principles, the country’s national interests, and governmental priorities as espoused through the Cabinet Makgotla and the Ministerial and Director General Cluster system of governance.

36. Constitution principles that govern the NSP • SA’s NSP must reflect the resolve of South African’s, as individuals and as a nation, to: • live as equals, in peace and harmony and to be free from fear and want, to seek a better life; • resolve to live in peace and harmony precludes any South African citizen from participating in armed conflict, national or internationally, except as provided for in-terms of the constitution and national legislation; • National Security must be pursued in compliance with the law including international law; and • National Security is subject to the authority of parliament and national executive.

37. South Africa’s National Interests • The security and survival of South Africa, its values and institutions and the safety of its people; • Sustainable economic growth and development in South Africa and the region; • A peaceful and stable international environment; and • International engagement with and participation in the international community;

38. Governmental Priorities from the Cabinet Makgotla and the Cluster System of governance • Transform the foreign, defence and intelligence organisations; • Crime prevention and combating organised crime; • Ensure South Africa’s acceptance into the community of nations and establish relations with other countries; • Promote international peace, security and stability (including international crime prevention and management); • Prioritise commitment to the interests and development of Africa; • Promote South-South co-operation and the transformation of North-South relations; • Reform and strengthen the multilateral rules-bound political, economic, security and environmental organisations in order to advance the interests of developing countries. 

39. Challenges for Defence-related Priorities • Support the AU PSC in its efforts to contribute to conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace keeping in Africa. • Promote and strengthen multilateralism at regional, continental and global levels. Play and active and leading role in the implementation of NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism. • Ensure AU structures and programmes are implemented, operationalised and consolidated. • Enhance the capacity of the intelligence structures, and the SANDF; • Improve efficiency in both ports of entry and in respect of border control; and • Improving intelligence, visible policing and social partnerships, particularly in dealing with priority crime.

40. Implications for the DOD • National security is viewed in a broader context as an all-encompassing condition, which includes the safeguarding of South Africa and its people against a wide range of threats, many of which are non-military in nature. • National security policy and priorities thus imply that government will require the DOD/SANDF to participate in and contribute to the combating of a range of non-military threats to security. These may include crime, terrorism and the effects of natural disasters. • South Africa’s national security policy and cluster priorities also reflect a strong commitment to regional and continental peace, stability and development. This manifests in government’s commitment to NEPAD, the AU and SADC and their structures and mechanisms.

41. Implications (2) • Government’s commitment to international peace and security and its manifestations at regional and continental levels consequently imply a long term DOD/SANDF involvement in collective defence and security including participation in security structures, peace missions, standby arrangements and other defence co-operation. These include the PSC, ASF, Continental and Regional Early Warning, and the SADC Brigade. • South Africa’s national security policy and priorities thus have clear implications for the role, functions, objectives, missions and capabilities of the SANDF.

42. CHAPTER FOUR ROLE, FUNCTIONS, OBJECTIVES & MISSIONS

43. ROLE (1) • Role & Functions • “The primary object of the defence force is to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people…” * • “The primary role of the SANDF shall be to defend South Africa against external military aggression.” ** • “The primary function of the SANDF is to defend South Africa against external military aggression.” *** • * Constitution, Ch 11, Art 200(2). • ** White paper on Defence, Ch 2, par 11.9 • *** White paper on Defence, Ch 5, par 2

44. …to defend and protect … implies ROLE (2) Engage in war Protect against Environment Non-state threats Peace Missions Military Diplomacy ROLE “primary object” …to defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its people…

45. Influences on Defence Functions FUNCTIONS (1) Terrorism WMD Weak States Non-military Threats • Collective Security • Bi/multi-lateral arrangements • Peace Missions POSTURE Non- threatening Defence Support to the People of South Africa Collective Security Offensive Capabilities remain Right to Self-defence Regional security

46. Defence Functions* Determines the size, design, structure and budget of the SANDF FUNCTIONS (2) • Service in the defence of the Republic, for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity Primary Function** REVIEW Concept of Primary and Secondary Functions and Defence Objectives and Missions Change in environment and focus “no need for a conventional capability” Secondary Functions • Service in compliance with international obligations of the Republic with regard to international bodies and states • Service in the preservation of life, health or property • Service in the provision or maintenance of essential services • Upholding law and order in support of SAPS • Support to departments of state for socio-economic upliftment; * Act 200 of 1993 ** White paper on Defence, Ch 5, par 3

47. Defence Objectives DEFENCE OBJECTIVES 1. To defend and protect the territorial integrity of the Republic and supporting its people 2. To contribute to global security Military Strategic Objectives 5. To ensure continuous improvement of defence capabilities 3. To ensure good governance Missions 4. To implement the One-Force Concept

48. MISSIONS Function 1 Function 2 Function 3 Function 4 Function 5 Function 6 Heterogeneous Executive Level …………… Mission1 Mission2 Mission 3 Mission n Own Approach Own Force Design Homogeneous Collection of Tasks …………… Task Task Task Task Task Task

49. MISSION HIERARCHY Defence Strategy Constitution White Paper Defence Review Role Missions Functions Mil Strat Objectives Defence Objectives

50. DEFENCE CONCEPT • Shape • Co-operation • Common security regime • Regional defence co-operation • Contain • Mediation & Arbitration • Diplomacy • Respond • SANDF • As ordered by government, expected by the people .