IP2: Social Regulation of Emotion and Conflict Resolution

1. IP2: Social Regulation of Emotion and Conflict Resolution Klaus Scherer, Benoit Bediou Swiss Center for Affective Sciences

2. Motivation • ContextESF-ECRP Grant (IP2): Emotion regulation in conflict and conflict resolution • AimSubjective perception of (in)justice and its role in conflict and conflict resolution • Study 1Investigate the impact of entitlement on emotions and behavior in social interactions, focusing on negotiation

3. 1 2 3 Literaturereview Study Perspectives

4. 1 2 3 Literaturereview Study Perspectives Justice / Fairness Entitlement Negotiation

5. 1 2 3 Literaturereview Study Perspectives Background & Aim Paradigm & Design Results & Discussion

6. Injustice as expectation violation • « People experience injustice when there is a discrepancy between what they expect based on salient or appropriate normative distribution rule and what they obtain” (Greenberg & Cohen, 1982).

7. Values & Norms in distributive justice • Different values & norms (distributive justice)e.g. equality, equity, need (Deutsch 1975) • Inter-individual differencese.g. egalitarian, meritocratic, libertarian (Frohlich et al. 2004; Cappelen et al. 2007)

8. Dicator Game with joint production • Equity (41%) • Equality (26%) • Selfish (19%) Productivity? Effort? Effort? Productivity? Frohlich et al 2004

9. Values & Norms in distributive justice • Intra-individual variabilitye.g. Rodriguez-Lara & Moreno-Garrido WP2010 • Self-serving biases e.g. Messick & Sentis 1979 • Bargaining impassese.g. Thompson & Loewenstein 1992

10. Summary of previous findings • Context • Framing as Buyer/Seller (Hoffman et al. 1994) • Initial Ownership (Leliveld et al. 1998) • Entitlement • Earning the position (Guth & Thietz 1986; Hoffman et al. 1994, 1996; Schotter et al 1996; Schurter & Wilson 2007) • Earning the pie (Ruffle, 1998; Cherry, 2001; Cherry et al. 2002; Oxoby & Spraggon 2008)

11. Dicator Game with joint production • Equity (41%) • Equality (26%) • Selfish (19%) Productivity? Effort? Effort? Productivity? Frohlich et al 2004

12. Paradigm & Design • Production: mental calculation (effort + skills) • Distribution: negotiation (Ultimatum Game)

13. Production screen 20 CHF 4 + 8 + 2 + 9 23 Player A Player B

14. Production screen 20 CHF 4 + 8 + 2 + 9 23 Player A Player B

15. Distribution – Proposer screen PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION X CHF 20-X CHF 20 CHF A B A B

16. Distribution – Responder screen PRODUCTION DISTRIBUTION 7 CHF 13 CHF 20 CHF Accept 7/13 Reject 0/0 A B A B

17. Paradigm & Design • 2 x 4 design • Production: better, worse (than other player) • Distribution: proposer; equity, equality, unfair • Measures • Decisions: P’s offers and R’s decisions • R’s judgments of satisfaction (and fairness)

18. Experiment design & predictions DISTRIBUTION N=33 PRODUCTION

19. Room A Room B

20. Room A Room B

21. Proposer – % Offered % OFFERED to Responder % PRODUCED by Responder

22. Proposer – % Offered R=0.35; p<0.01 % OFFERED to Responder % PRODUCED by Responder

23. Proposer – % Offered Equity? Equality? Equity OFFERED to Responder (% total) Equality Selfish PRODUCED by Responder (% total)

24. Proposer – % Kept Selfish Equality? Equity? Equity % KEPT by Proposer Equality % PRODUCED by Proposer

25. Equality rule? * NS % Kept Equality <50% >50% % Produced

26. Equity rule? * % Kept - % Produced Equity * <50% >50% % Produced

27. Responder – Accept decision (188 obs) Offer: F(2,181)=109.88, p<0.001 Frequency <50% >50% % Produced

28. Responder – Satisfaction (N=27) Offer: F(2,16)=67.79, p<0.001 Production * Offer: F(2,32)=15.83, p<0.001 Satisfaction <50% >50% % Produced

29. Responder – Fairness (N=12) Fairness <50% >50% % Produced

30. Fairness vs Satisfaction (72 obs) Satisfaction Fairness Fairness

31. Conclusion • Individuals perceive and apply fairness norms flexibly depending on the context • Selfish bias due to biasedentitlement/expectations? • Low production => equality • Own effort > Other productivity • High production => equity with generous adjustment to avoid rejection • Own productivity > other effort? • Strategic use of perspective taking to adaptoffers to conflictingentitlement/expectations

32. 1 2 3 Literaturereview Study Perspectives Background & Aim Feedback & Discussion

33. Social Regulation of Emotion? • Injustice and Emotions e.g. Mikula et al. 1998; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996 • Impact of norms violations on emotions?

34. Social Regulation of Emotion? • Injustice and Emotions e.g. Mikula et al. 1998; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996 • Impact of norms violations on emotions? • Injustice as expectation violation e.g. Bicchieri et al. 2008 • Prediction error signal in the ACC?

35. Social Regulation of Emotion? • Injustice and Emotions e.g. Mikula et al. 1998; Weiss & Cropanzano 1996 • Impact of norms violations on emotions? • Injustice as expectation violation e.g. Bicchieri et al. 2008 • Prediction error signal in the ACC? • Impact of third-party ADR (e.g. mediation, arbitrage)e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010 • Can we modify expectationemotionbehavior?

36. Changing expectations in the UG • Study 1 shows that people’s norms are flexible • Study 2 will seek to modify people’s norms • 2 phases: • Induction • Production (quiz) • Distribution (3rd-party UG - responder) • Measure • Production (quiz) • Distribution (2nd-party UG - proposer)

37. BASELINE. Offers made by 2nd party (proposer) MEASURE. Offers made by neutral 3rd party 1 2 DISTRIBUTION (Responder) Accept/Reject + fairness ratings DISTRIBUTION (proposer) Offer + self fairness ratings PRODUCTION PRODUCTION • X3 low prod / X3 highprod • No Arb. (group IV) X1 low prod / X1 high prod INDUCTION. Offers made by neutral 3rd party MEASURE. Offers made by neutral 3rd party 1 2 DISTRIBUTION (Responder) Accept/Reject + fairness ratings DISTRIBUTION (Proposer) Offer + self fairness ratings PRODUCTION PRODUCTION • X3 lowprod/X3 highprod • Egalitarian (group I) • Meritocratic (group II) • +CONTROL (group III)? X1 low prod/X1 high prod 2 (intra Low/High prod) * 4 (inter NoArb., Arb.Egalitarian, Arb.Meritocratic, Arb.Control)

38. Room A Room B

39. Room A Room B

40. The arbitration Control condition: Two of the participants will be randomly chosen and brought to another room to generate the offers[In fact, they will make ratings (emotions + fairness) of pre-determined offers] Options: • Other task? e.g. fake arbitration • Non social? e.g. a computer will randomly generate a proposal • No arbitration? e.g. use baseline (offers made by 2nd party) as control • Other idea?e.g. 3rd party Dictator, passive viewing?

41. The arbitrator Third party: [One of the participants] is observing the production phase and will make a proposal to both agents about the [A fair?] division of the pie. You can Accept or Reject his offer and you will also rate their fairness of hisoffers. […] will be paid according to your ratings, so he has an incentive to make fair offers. Options: • Give him a form of power? (expertise? Legitimacy? Other types of power?) e.g : An highly skilled and experienced arbitrator or mediator • Give him a « norm compliance » function? e.g. [Player XXX] will ensure optimun fairness • Give him a personnal goal? e.g. the arbitrator’s goal is to ensure that both of you are satisfied • Give him a name and/or a face? : e.g. Picture or (fake) webcam recording… • Different (participant) arbitrator in each round? (greater social influence)

42. Predictions • Arbitration (attribution) R’sFairness/Satisfaction shouldbehigher for (unfair) offers made by 3rd parties vs 2nd parties?(e.g. Blount 1995) • ConformitywithprimednormParticipant should follow the norm of the arbitrator(e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010) • Effectsshouldbegreaterarbitrator’swhoseproposals are ratedhigh on fairness • P’s ratings of self-fairnessshouldbegreater if conformedwithabitrator’snorm,

43. Predictions • Arbitration (attribution) R’sFairness/Satisfaction shouldbehigher for (unfair) offers made by 3rd parties vs 2nd parties?(e.g. Blount 1995) • ConformitywithprimednormParticipant should follow the norm of the arbitrator(e.g. Cason & Mui 1998; Yamamori et al. WP; Shram & Charness, ESA 2010) • Effectsshouldbegreaterarbitrator’swhoseproposals are ratedhigh on fairness • P’s ratings of self-fairnessshouldbegreater if conformedwithabitrator’snorm, Social modulation of appraisal

44. Methodological considerations • Type of third party? • One of the participants? • Power? Legitimacy? Expert or peer? • Same or different in each round? • Other ideas: passive viewer, dictator?

45. Methodological considerations • Type of induction task(induction, priming, anchoring, conformity?) • Control arbitration condition?e.g. random norm, social or computer, nonexpert? • No arbitration? (anchoring, reference) • Other idea: participants could be passively observing UG rounds in which one or different P’s would (in)consistently use the same norm while their emotions would be recorded?

46. Methodological considerations • Other questions and suggestions • Induction phase: Participant always Responder? • Test phase: Participant always Proposer? • Better (e.g. continuous) DV than R’s A/R decision? • Playing for a group? Inclusion/Exclusion? • Repeat interaction with same player? • 3rd party could emphasize value vs norm? • Games on aggression?