Chapter 3 Marriage & the Family

1. Chapter 3Marriage & the Family • Focus on 3 issues: 1) Race differences in marriage and family structure: * changes over time; * economic explanations. 2) Male marriage premium • 3) Divorce: • * economic analysis; • * economic consequences.

2. Race Differencesin Marital Status • Table 1: Year 2000 • Figure 1: Shows changes over time: • Big divergence by race in 1970s; • Now a 20% difference in proportion married. • Figure 2: Race difference driven by differential growth in % never married. • Why Care? • Key is family income and poverty. • Table 2: see similarity between white mother-only and AA two-parent.

3. Economic Explanations • Three Explanations: • 1) Changes in marriage markets • 2)   Changes in wage rates • 3)    Role of the welfare system. •  Probably all 3 played a role, some for all women; some for specific groups of women.

4. Marriage Markets • William Julius Wilson: The Truly Disadvantaged and When Work Disappears. • Decline in marriage: reflects declining marriage prospects of AA women (resulting from declining labor mkt position of AA men) • Key: in 1970s, dramatic decline in real wages and employment rates of less skilled/less educated men; hit AA men particularly hard; this trend continues to today but biggest hit in 1970s. 

5. Continued • Result: for AA men: for those who work, lower real wages; lower employment rates. •  So less attractive as marriage partner since cannot support family.

6. MMPI • Male Marriageable Pool Index: MMPI ratio of # employed men to # of women (calculated separately by race and age; also could do by education) • MMPI = [# empl men / # women] • Balance in marriage market: if MMPI  1, poor prospects for women • At birth: MMPI = 1. • But what if MMPI falls?

7. More on MMPI • Reasons for  MMPI: • 1)   # empl men • 2)   incarceration rates • 3)   mortality rates • Evidence from Great Depression supports idea of men’s ability to support family as being important in marriageability. • See Table 3: • Shows MMPI for 1950s to 1980s; • MMPI shown as # empl men per 100 women. • Rate always lower for AA; AA decline over time.

8. MMPI and Female-Headed Families • See Table 4: Shows changes from 1960 to 1980: • Links racial pattern in %  MMPI and % proportion of families headed by female. • Most regions/races have  MMPI; • Always bigger  for AA than whites. • Biggest  in NE and NC (where blue-collar job loss the worst) • Big  MMPI associated with big  female headed HH. • MMPI changes are NOT only thing (see % female heads in west) •  Also: other researchers note big  marriage for employed AA men too.

9. Importance of Women’s Wage Rates • Gains from trade model: • As women’s wages rise, differences in mkt productivity between men and women falls so gains are reduced. • Data supporting this possible cause of lower marriage rates: sex wage differences less for AA than whites. • S & D model: • As women’s wages rise, their S of marriage curve shifts back to left, reducing marriage rates. • Also, as women  education, they delay fertility. So like-educated men face worse marriage prospects too.

10. Welfare system •  Key:  “production” while single. • S & D model: if Zf, then likelihood of marrying falls. • History of Welfare • Social Security Act of 1935: created ADC (became AFDC); now TANF. • Beneficiaries: poor mother-only families. • In 1935: mostly widows (deemed “deserving” of support) • Even today: monthly $ support quite low (range from $200 to $600 or so).

11. Welfare and Marriage • Some scholars claim that providing welfare  marriage. • Benefits only given to single-parent families; usually with limited labor market skills. • Could have differential impact by race since AA women somewhat more likely to be low-skilled than white women. • Empirical evidence weak. • Approach: Compare female headship with policy changes: Marriage  in 1970s but welfare falling at same time. • Conclusion: • Moffitt: “..none of the studies find effects sufficiently large to explain…the increase in female headship in the late 1960s and early 1970s.”