Cold War 1945-1991

1. Cold War1945-1991

2. To what extent was the Cold War inevitable, or could it have been avoided – how could it have been avoided? Even though the Grand Alliance unraveled – in spite of past tensions….could it have been avoided? • Answer with your partner

3. Tension / Hostility between USA and Russia/USSR, before 1945 • USA criticized authoritarianism of Czarist Russia (Wilson reluctant to fight with Allies so long as Russia was ruled by the Czars…abdicate…Kerensky) • USA critical of Communist take over in Oct. / Nov. 1917 (supported Provisional Govt. / Kerensky): Democracy and Capitalism were completely opposite to Communism and Totalitarianism….sends troops Whites against Reds • USA upset with Treaty of Brest-Litovsk; USA upset with Comintern (led to Red Scare), with anti-US propaganda from the USSR

4. USSR upset with US for exclusion from Versailles Conference, USA gave support to Whites during the Civil War, and then non-recognition of the new Soviet regime, and negative propaganda • Eventually the USA recognized the USSR in 1933, though the relationship did not improve very much • USA upset/critical with Purges, persecution of Religion, minorities…Nazi-Soviet Pact, Soviet invasion of Poland, Baltic States and Finland • But both became Allies in WW II after 1941: USA extended Lend Lease to the USSR ($11b in aid) • Yet some tension – delay in opening a second front in the West, cancelling Lend Lease and loans right after Germany surrendered, Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and East Germany…an uneasy Grand Alliance

5. When the war ended the past tensions and mistrust re-surfaced, and became much more intense……leading to the Cold War • The two remaining Super Powers differed in their ideologies • USA: Democracy, Regulated Capitalism, Christian Values, Religious freedom, Free Education, Civil Rights • USSR: Communism / Totalitarianism, Public Ownership / Command Ec, Atheism, denial of freedom of speech, assembly, controlled Ed, Media, Socialist Realism • Added to their differing systems were now their different visions for constructing a post-war Europe / World (sovereignty, self-determination), and about the future of Germany (US wants a unified, democratic, but disarmed Germany)….based on their ideologies

6. Different Ideologies / Visions • The US vision was contained in FDR’s Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter agreed with Churchill: his vision resembled Wilson’s vision, contained in his 14 points (later, Truman Doctrine – speech to Congress) • Incorporates self-determination, sovereignty, democracy, no spheres of influence…. international co-operation and peace

7. FDR’s Four Freedom’s • 1. Freedom of speech and expression • 2. Freedom to worship God • 3. Freedom from want • 4. Freedom from fear

8. The Atlantic Charter • 1. No aggrandizement, territorial or other • 2. No territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned… • 3. Respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live • 4. Access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world • 5. Improved labor standards, economic advancement and social security • 6. A peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries • 7. A peace that enables all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance • 8. Abandonment of the use of force… the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security (UN).. disarmament

9. The Soviet Vision Involved: • Securing a sphere of domination / a wall of Soviet dominated nations protecting its Western border / a buffer zone (Soviet Block, Iron Curtain) as protection against possible future aggression…to include East Europe and East Germany • Spreading Communism / Stalinism, within this sphere • Revenge / retribution on Germany (inc. Reparations) and a permanently weakened, divided, disarmed Germany • Added to this….a personality conflict; Stalin, Truman

10. Soviet Domination of Eastern Europe

11. FDR and the US was already taking the lead as the war ended in setting up institutions which embodied its vision. • 1. The International Monetary Fund - 1944 - to regulate world currency exchange rated - to encourage trade. • 2. The World Bank - to aid in the economic growth of war ravaged countries – 1944 • 3. The United Nations, set up in San Francisco in 1945, with its headquarters in NY

12. The USSR refused to get involved in the first two. • The USA, Britain, and the USSR – leaders met at three conferences - display the tension, opposing philosophies, divisions between the two emerging super powers. • Readings….Chafetz and Hampton….on the role of ideology • Met at Teheran (Iran), Yalta (Russia), and Potsdam (Germany)…..differences began to emerge…

13. Teheran • In November 1943, FDR and Churchill traveled to Teheran, Iran…first time FDR and Stalin met • FDR and Stalin established a cordial relationship. • The 3 leaders agreed that an Anglo-American second front would be opened within 6 months in the Western Europe / France

14. Read more from Judge and Langdon on Teheran Conference

15. The meeting also considered the future of Germany – demilitarization and occupation of Germany - problems in Eastern Europe and the Orient, and the shape of the postwar peace system - but no decisions were made. Too early - war was yet to be won…they stopped discussing these contentious issues • Stalin also agreed to enter the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany • They all agreed to be part of an international organization after the War • "We came here with hope and determination", the three leaders wrote in the Declaration of Teheran, "and we leave here, friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose."

16. Yalta • The Big Three met again at Yalta in Russia, in a former palace of the Czars on the Black Sea, in Feb. 1945. • FDR was at this stage beginning to despair, sensing resistance to his internationalist dreams…USSR had occupied and controlled much of Eastern Europe. • Stalin, whose armies were now only miles from Berlin and who was well aware of how much the US wanted him to assist in the Pacific, was confident and determined.

17. They agreed about setting up the United Nations, with veto powers held by the 5 permanent members of the Security Council (of eleven) and to meet in San Francisco to discuss these plans / details at greater length • Stalin promised to join the war against Japan "two or three months after Germany surrendered” • In return for this promise, FDR agreed that the USSR should receive part of the island of Sakhalin, the Kurile islands and part of Manchuria.

18. On other issues, however, there was no / little agreement - especially the future of Poland, the Polish border, Eastern Europe, and Germany. • the future of Poland was a stumbling block. Stalin had already installed a govt. composed of pro-Communists, to the protests of the Britain and the US • Stalin wanted an expanded Polish border, at the expense of Germany: in return FDR / Churchill wanted a new provisional gov. more representative of Democratic parties; they demanded that the pro-Western Polish govt. in exile, in London, be allowed a place in the govt. of Poland, and that democratic elections be held

19. …stalemate…eventually the West accepts an expanded border but unwilling to break with Russia on the eve of Germany’s collapse, accepted Stalin’s vague promises about granting them a place in the govt. (the Polish people would have the opportunity to express their will) and about holding free elections, though he made no firm commitment to a date ….FDR was happy to defer the issue • Later it was claimed that Poland was sold out at Yalta, like Czechoslovakia was at Munich (Judge and Langdon pg.28) • Judge and Langdon; “Poland was treated shabbily at Yalta (FDR had little interest in Poland), but given the Red Army’s occupation of the country and the political and military concerns of the West, it is difficult to envision a radically different outcome.” pg.28

20. Other parts of Eastern Europe were also disputed. Stalin demanded recognition of Soviet power / Communist Regimes in Romania, Bulgaria, Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. • FDR and Churchill protested strongly. Reluctantly they agreed to Soviet influence in eastern Europe for the moment, but insisted that Stalin hold "free and unfettered elections" at an early date, which Stalin vaguely agreed to

21. The future of Germany was heatedly discussed. They all agreed that Germany should not soon again become a major military power, but there were wide differences in their views of how to accomplish that goal. • FDR and Churchill wanted a reconstructed and reunited Germany with a prosperous modern economy, but one that would remain under the careful supervision of the Allies. • Stalin, in contrast, wanted a permanent dismemberment / divided, and unarmed Germany, which Britain and France firmly rejected.

22. Stalin wanted to impose $20b in reparations on the Germans, of which Russia would receive half. FDR agreed on the $20b figure as a "basis for discussion" but left final settlement to a future reparations commission • The agreement they came to on Germany, was, like the Polish and Eastern Europe agreement, vague and unstable • The US, Br, Fr, and the USSR, would each control its own "zone of occupation" in Germany - the zones to be determined by the position of troops at the time the war ended.

23. Berlin, though 110 miles inside the Soviet zone, would, because of its importance, be divided into four sectors, one for each nation to occupy • At an unspecified date, the nation would be reunited; but no specific agreement was reached on how the reunification would occur. • Both sides also agreed to respect the territorial integrity of Iran and to evacuate from Iran as soon as the war was over. • FDR and Churchill had little choice but to give in to Stalin for the moment. The Germans had not yet surrendered and with the Pacific war still raging, they had no means of forcing Stalin to back down from his position of strength – he already occupied most Eastern European countries….yet FDR was later accused of appeasement towards the USSR (Judge and Langdon say his decisions were not impaired by his illnesses, as some suggest – p.25-26)

24. FDR and Stalin returned home from Yalta with different interpretations about what had been agreed on. • In the weeks following the conference FDR watched with horror as the Soviet Union moved systematically to established repressive pro- Communist governments in more and more Eastern European nations. Stalin made no effort to introduce free elections in any Eastern European country. • Still, FDR had faith in his ability to win Stalin's trust of the West. Newly elected to a fourth term, FDR believed he could persuade Stalin that the Soviets had nothing to fear and could relax their iron grip on Eastern Europe – but he died on April 12, 1945.

25. Judge and Langdon • “All three leaders were delighted, believing they had made concessions only over unimportant matters and had secured their principal objectives. Churchill had gained acceptance of France as a great power, so that Britain would not stand alone against Soviet ambitions in Europe. Roosevelt had obtained agreement on the voting procedure in the UN Security Council and had received Stalin’s commitment to aid in the defeat of Japan. Stalin, while failing to gain acceptance of his German agenda, had nonetheless defended his position in Poland – at least until the next meeting of the Big Three. Each of them had gotten what they wanted most. Yalta was, at least emotionally, the final celebration of the solidarity of the Grand Alliance. Within a few months, as Hitler’s empire disintegrated, the defeat of their common enemy and their inability to resolve fully the vexing issues of Soviet security and expansion would shatter the alliance and reveal on the horizon the hazy outlines of the Cold War.” pg.29-30

26. History in Dispute Article • 6 issues were discussed at Yalta • 1. Division of Germany • 2. Creation of UN • 3. German War Reparations: Stalin demands $20b • 4. Declaration of Liberated Europe • 5. Soviet entry into war against Japan • 6. Fate of Poland

27. Agreements • 1. Germany to be divided into 4 Zones • 2. Veto power to be given to the Big 5 nations at the UN: USSR to get 3 seats in UN General Assembly • 3. In exchange for entering war against Japan, 2-3 months after Germany surrenders, Soviets got Southern Sakhalin Island, concessions in Manchurian ports, joint control of Manchurian railroad, control of Central Kuril Island • 4. Eastern Polish borders to be set to the advantage of the Soviets (more West) • 5. USSR pledge to hold free elections in Eastern Europe • 6 War crimes trials to be held after the war

28. USA / FDR got the best possible deal: Frankel • Defends FDR from charge that Yalta was “a colossal blunder”, “a betrayal of the principles of freedom and self-determination” by delivering Eastern and Central Europe to Stalin, that it was “appeasement” • Frankel argues that: • 1. It was the result of FDR’s and Churchill’s strategic choice to concentrate on winning WWII first and thinking about postwar arrangements later • 2. Based on realism and the understanding of what was possible: in countries under Nazi occupation many of the anti-Nazi nationalist-liberation forces were led by communists: these communist leaders quickly established themselves as the de facto rulers of their countries

29. FDR’s and Churchill’s acceptance of provisional governments’ heavily dominated by local communists was thus not a result of … naïve belief in Stalin’s promises to allow free elections: it was the result of recognizing the reality on the ground • 3. FDR’s and Churchill’s acceptance of communist dominated governments in Eastern and Central Europe (Bulgaria, Romania) was the result of a tacit recognition of the Soviet’s demand for a defensive belt and their need to ensure that these countries would be friendly to the USSR: they understood the Soviet’s legitimate security needs

30. 4. The realism was based on what FDR perceived as the vital need for Soviet participation in the war against Japan; the Soviets demands for control of the Sakhalin and Kurile islands, joint occupation of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, and lease rights to Port Arthur were considered reasonable • Frankel concludes that the Yalta agreement was probably the best compromise they could reach • The “myth” of Yalta, that they could have gotten more, is just a “myth”

31. Yalta conceded too much to the Soviets: Perlmutter • It was not the best deal to serve the post war interests of the West • Poland, Eastern Europe, parts of Far East were sacrificed / surrendered needlessly to the Soviets • FDR may have been ill • He abandoned Wilsonianism • More concessions could have been gotten from the USSR : Lend Lease aid to the USSR should have been tied to limiting their expansion in Eastern Europe

32. Truman • Truman did not share FDR's belief in the good intentions / flexibility of the Soviet Union – was less trusting and more suspicious of Stalin (more anti-communist), and had a more aggressive, inflexible, abrasive personality

33. Decided to adopt a get tough approach to the Soviet Union. The lessons of Munich, and the failure of appeasement were clearly in his mind. • He believed that Stalin had made what he considered to be solemn agreements with the US at Yalta. The US, therefore, would insist that he honor them. • Cancelled Lend Lease to the USSR immediately after German surrender – May 8th - and refused a Soviet request for a $6b loan

34. He showed his hard line approach when he met with USSR’s Foreign Sec. Molotov on April 23 at the White House and chastised him for the violations of the Yalta accords with regard to free elections in Poland. • "I have never been talked to like that in my life", a shocked Molotov reportedly replied. "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that again", Truman replied.

35. Potsdam • Truman met with Attlee (replaced Churchill a few days into the conference) and Stalin at Potsdam near Berlin, in July, 1945. They met in a mood of growing hostility…. • Germany had by now surrendered (May 8th 1945)…they didn’t need each other as much as before…though Japan had not yet surrendered • The British and US hoped to use the conference to resolve the question of Germany / end the temporary division – to discuss unification - but Stalin refused to budge… so the 4 way division agreed on at Yalta was rubber stamped to continue for now / indefinitely

36. Stalin pressed for a settlement of the German reparations question – they eventually agreed that each country take reparations from its own zone • Stalin got Allied confirmation of the Western Neisse Line as the Polish border (moved West / favorable to the USSR) in return for reparations agreement • Stalin also refused to budge from Eastern Europe….refused to commit to definite election plans (so called “Yalta Accords”)…..source of great tension (was the atomic bombing of Japan a way of sending a message to the USSR to evacuate Eastern Europe?) • The USSR confirmed its commitment to attack Japan 3 months after the surrender of the Germans (May 8), which would be August 8

37. But Truman was no longer certain the Soviet entry into the Pacific War would be a good thing – would they ever leave if they got a foothold in Japan (would Japan become another Eastern Europe) • During the conference he had been informed that the Atomic Bomb was ready and waiting to be used…. There might no longer be any need for USSR help against Japan • Truman warned the Japanese delegates that if did not surrender they would face utter destruction….they refused • Stalin already knew about the Manhattan Project - was not surprised about the development of the atomic bomb, when Truman told him about it

38. Other business - Nuremburg Tribunal was established • Over the next few months, Truman's and Stalin's mistrust of one another grew. Stalin continued to oppress most of Eastern Europe, forcing loyalty to the Soviet Union through phony trials and executions. • In the Middle East, Stalin kept his troops in Iran long after the US and Br troops had pulled out as agreed, only finally withdrawing them after the US insisted • Truman used Atomic Bomb against Japan….see previous notes….Atomic Diplomacy…Aug. 6th and 9th…in between, Aug. 8th, USSR declared war on Japan…Atomic Diplomacy…… (Readings)

39. Judge and Langdon ….pg. 32-33 • Compared with Yalta, the conference at Potsdam “exhibited a troubling face”. • The Grand Alliance was clearly falling apart. After all, why should any realistic statesman have expected that the wartime alliance would survive Hitler’s demise? The USSR had not been friends with the US prior to 1941, and the unraveling of the alliance was merely a return to the ante bellum situation…. • But…it did not mean that the unrelenting hostility between the Soviets and the West was inevitable or even likely. • Focus on events / situations….not on Truman….Realist (unlike Fleming, Theoharris….blame Truman…… Stalin…Thompson/Tucker

40. Atomic Bomb • Read handout “Why the US dropped the Bomb” • Read Alperovitz………then Barrett and Dowling • Evidence is that the Japanese would have surrendered even if the USSR had not declared war, even if the bombs had not been used, even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated (Walker, Messer) • Japanese could have been persuaded to surrender, were close to surrender…allowing Hirohito to continue would have brought about their surrender…Truman was not opposed to this…but he chose to wait until after the bombing to give them this assurance…the US agreed to this later anyway, after the bomb was used • Soviet declaration of war against Japan would have been enough to force their surrender….just the declaration….not necessarily their presence / assistance… this was the decisive factor, not the bomb, in their surrender……..Truman believed this….but bomb was used two days before….USSR declaration of war was the decisive factor, not the bomb, in their surrender

41. The real goal was to strengthen the hand of the US against the USSR…give the US a “master card” of diplomacy towards the USSR • Stop USSR getting “in on the kill” …Byrnes, Sec of State…stop them pressing their claims on Manchuria, North East China, currently occupied by Japan….no excuse for them to invade these areas • Einstein: the bomb was used to end the war in the Pacific by any means before Russia’s participation: FDR would not have used the bomb • Stimpson, Sec of War, indicates that he and Byrnes discussed with Truman how the bomb could be a “master-card” in big stakes diplomacy towards Russia….with regard to Manchuria, North China, and Eastern Europe….. how the bomb would put the US in a position to dictate its own terms at the end of the war

42. Truman delayed Potsdam, waiting for bomb to be tested: tested on July 16, met with Stalin on July 17, received word of successful testing next day, became more confident….according to Churchill, he became more emphatic and decisive…he was a changed man • “a number of historians now agree that the long term diplomatic interest – beyond a specific desire to end the war before the Red Army crossed the Manchurian border – influenced Truman, Stimpson, and Byrnes, consciously or unconsciously, when they chose the bomb over other readily available ways to stop the fighting.” • Experts differ in the precise weight to accord this motive in the thinking of the US leader…some hold that solely military factors were involved, or that the weapon’s use was inevitable because of the technological, bureaucratic, and military momentum built up during the war

43. Other historians argue that because huge sums were spent developing the new weapon, political leaders found it impossible not to use it • “Still others believe a roughly even mix of political-diplomatic considerations and military concerns were at work, and some writers look to bureaucratic in-fighting to explain the outcome. • But Feis (advisor to gov. and a friend of Stimpson’s) believed that “impressing” the Soviets almost certainly played a role in the decision to use the atomic bomb • Yale professor Gaddis Smith sums up a growing modern view that “the decision to bomb Japan was centrally connected to Truman’s confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.”

44. “in fact some historians now believe that the atomic bomb probably prolonged the war and cost”…Truman delayed until the bomb was ready….Historian Sherwin • Contributed to Cold War…Eisenhower observed… “before the atomic bomb was used, I would have said, yes, I was sure we could keep peace with Russia…Now I don’t know…people are frightened and disturbed all over. Europe feels insecure again.” • John Foster Dulles said that the tensions that became the Cold War started at this time • Read Judge and Langdon, read Barrett and Dowling

45. Barrett and Dowling • Summarize the views of one of these historians • Share notes with partners • Decide on which one you agree with most and why, and why you disagree with the other one and why…..be specific about the arguments you agree with and disagree with from the two

46. Stalin’s Two World’s Speech • On Feb 9, 1946, Stalin added to the growing tension (Potsdam, Atomic Bombing) with a speech in which he declared that capitalism was a danger to world peace. Capitalism and communism, he said, would eventually clash…with Communism winning. Because of that danger, he would protect Soviet security by ending trade with the West and developing modern weaponry (atomic) no matter how high the cost, and Communism would be promoted through a new organization, the Cominform • Taken in the USA to be a declaration of the Cold War, though probably not intended to be (Judge and L, pg. 56) • In the American Supreme Court, Justice Wm Douglas said the speech sounded like "a declaration of WW III".

47. Kennan’s Long Telegram • A few weeks later Truman asked a young US diplomat to Moscow, an expert on Soviet history and politics – George Kennan – to analyze Soviet Foreign Policy for him • In his 16 page reply, on Feb. 26th 1946 – The Long Telegram – he said that • The Soviet had a deep sense of insecurity and fear of the West • They would not accept peaceful co-existence of Capitalism and Communism • They believed that conflict with the West was inevitable; they would promote the extension of Communism as much as possible in preparation for the eventual showdown, which they expected to win…….confirmed the views of Stalin’s Two World’s Speech • They would not be discouraged by the occasional loss to the West

48. But the Soviet economic and political systems had major weaknesses and would eventually crumble internally, without the need for a war • The goal for the US should be to accept Communism where it already existed, but vigorously stop it spreading beyond • He urged long term, patient, but firm and vigilant Containment of Communist expansion….no more appeasement by the West

49. Churchill’s Iron Curtain Speech, 1946 • A few weeks later, in March 5th 1946, Winston Churchill supported this view in a famous speech at Westminster College in Fulton Missouri when he warned that "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent." • He warned that the West should join forces against the Soviet threat…to block Soviet advancement "There is nothing the Communists admire so much as strength and nothing for which they have less respect for than military weakness."

50. Churchill and Truman, "Iron Curtain Speech," March 5, 1946 On March 5, 1946, former British prime minister Winston S. Churchill (1874–1965) delivered a speech, which he intended for a worldwide audience, at Westminster College in Fulton, Missouri. President Harry S. Truman (right) had encouraged Churchill (seated) to speak on two themes: the need to block Soviet expansion and the need to form the Anglo-American partnership. Always eloquent and provocative, Churchill denounced the Soviets for drawing an "iron curtain" across eastern Europe. This speech became one of the landmark statements of the Cold War.