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Kobe Earthquake

Kobe Earthquake. Kobe Earthquake. January 17, 1995 5:46 AM Kobe, Japan epicenter on Northern tip of Awaji Island, 20km from Kobe (hypocenter 20km deep) Magnitude 7.2 (Richter) for 20 seconds +5,000 deaths, 30-40,000 injured Destroyed 67,421 houses, partially 55,145 houses. Tectonic Causes.

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Kobe Earthquake

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  1. Kobe Earthquake

  2. Kobe Earthquake • January 17, 1995 5:46 AM • Kobe, Japan • epicenter on Northern tip of Awaji Island, 20km from Kobe (hypocenter 20km deep) • Magnitude 7.2 (Richter) for 20 seconds • +5,000 deaths, 30-40,000 injured • Destroyed 67,421 houses, partially 55,145 houses

  3. Tectonic Causes • Long-term tectonic cause • within triple junction area, involving Pacific, Eurasian, Philippine plates • near Median Tectonic Line, a zone of strike-slip faults (200km N of triple junction) • Short-term/Immediate tectonic cause • Nojima Fault, movement of right-lateral strike-slip fault

  4. Nojima Fault • alongside NW shore of Awaji Island • branches off Median Tectonic Line • Lateral movement, 5 feet 7 inches • Vertical slip, 4 feet 3 inches • movement accommodated the east/west shortening of Eurasian plate in its collision with North American plate along the Izu-Itoigawa line

  5. Damage Factors • Factors • Proximity to fault • Soil & foundation conditions • Age of buildings • Types of structural system

  6. Proximity • Kobe’s proximity to the epicenter made it endure a ‘direct hit,’ which produced destructive seismic shifts • during seismic shaking, ground moved 7 inches horizontally & 4 inches vertically • resulted in earthquake faults, damages to roads and railways, liquefaction at reclaimed lands, fires, crushed houses, landsides • Epicenter’s proximity to a highly populated & urbanized area, increases deaths & damage inflicted

  7. Soil & Foundation Condition • Kobe is built on a complex formation of various hardnesses of ground • ranges from solid Rokko Mountain to the soft reclaimed land of Port Island • amplitude of shockwaves were magnified at the border between soft & hard ground, which increased damage • worst damage in areas bordering the port or stream/rivers • soils poorly consolidated alluvial deposits

  8. Liquefaction of Port • Kobe’s port was constructed on 2 artificial islands made of relatively loose fill & constantly saturated by water • suffered widespread liquefaction & settlement • car companies (Honda, Mistubishi, Toyota & manufacturers (beer, machinery, appliances) were disabled for 2 months

  9. Building Structures • newer buildings were designed to strict seismic codes, revised in 1981, which were mostly undamaged • BUT: • many buildings were built prior to 1981 • only 48% of all buildings were in conformance to revision • many middle floors of buildings collapsed • high vibrations coincide in middle floor • many soft first story floors created for garages • Failure of steel structures at welding connection

  10. Building Structures • many residential buildings were traditional wooden structures with clay tile roofs • highly expensive to retrofit houses, many citizens ignore the idea • heavy clay tile roofs attract large inertia forces during earthquake shakings & result in collapse • Japanese philosophy of strong, thick columns & pillars with intent of standing through ground shaking • results in failed designs & destroyed structures

  11. Damage on Life • most utilities, roadways, railways, the port, and other lifelines to the city center suffered severe damage, which delayed rescue efforts • restoration time • basic services of electricity, +1 weeks • water, 2 weeks • gas,1 month • 200,000 people take refuge in unheated gyms or in parks with limited blanket supplies • limited space & blankets force many to endure night temperatures of -2 C • city eventually builds temporary homes for victims

  12. Fires • caused by ruptured gas lines • burned 6,965 houses, partially 421 houses • many old wooden houses fueled fires • 175 fires consumed an area of 819,000 m2 equivalent to 70 U.S. blocks • Response to fire nearly impossible due to destroyed lifelines & utilities

  13. Subway & Train • one intersection a subway station collapsed, leaving the road above to sink • only 30% of the Osaka-Kobe railway tracks were operational • entire Shinkansen (bullet train) line shut down • quickly rebounded w/80% operability in a month

  14. Hanshin Expressway • large sections of the Hanshin Expressway collapsed • likely where roads crossed areas of softer, wetter ground allowing stronger & longer lasting shaking • result of failure in steel welding connections of columns & brittle fractures in steel columns

  15. Hanshin Expressway • half of elevated expressway's piers were damaged • entire route not reopened until Sept. 30, 1996 • retrofitted w/steel cables & brackets (used to connect & hold up girders) to prevent collapse • other expressways & bridges received damage • But surprisingly Kansai Airport (artificial island) & Akashi Kaikyo suspension bridge (under-construction) were unaffected

  16. Prediction? • Kobe region was thought to be fairly safe in terms of seismic activity • the fracture of active faults due to constant compression stresses are known to occur rarely (1 in 1-3000 year) • Difficult to predict location & timing • ie. prediction of major earthquake in Shizuoka/Tokyo area in near future

  17. Luck • specialists claim Kobe lucky • If earthquake had struck 30-60 minutes later, the death toll would have been 50,000 due to rush hour • If earthquake had struck anytime during 8 am to 9 pm, the death toll would have been around 150,000 due higher % of people in buildings, subway systems, streets & highways

  18. Future Mitigation Efforts • Base/seismic isolation systems • Retrofitting reinforced concrete columns • Retrofitting reinforced steel columns • Examination of buildings • prior 1981 • Alterative for clay tile roofs

  19. Policy Flaws • Overconfidence in Japanese Ability to Respond to Large Scale Disaster • After earthquakes in San Francisco and L.A. in 1989 and 1994, the Japanese government is quoted as saying it was more capable than the U.S. at handling large earthquakes. • Preparedness was Severely Lacking • The Kobe government, not thinking the city was vulnerable to large earthquakes, had not adequately prepared for such a large event. Evacuation plans were unpracticed and emergency supplies were not adequately available. • Absence of a Central Government body to Organize Relief Effort • There was no governmental body that was specifically designed to respond to such an event; thus, response suffered. • Former U.S. Director for Japanese Affairs Glen S. Fukushima describes the phenomenon best: • “What one saw was tatewari gyosei ("vertical administration," where agencies jealously guard their turf and refuse to cooperate with each other) at its worst.” • Orr, Robert M. Jr. “The Relief Effort Seen by a Participant”

  20. Consequences Resulting from Inadequate Policy • A Japanese Government that was both reluctant and unprepared to respond • The government: • Refused international offers of doctors and rescue teams. • Instead of providing food and supplies, asked banks to remain open so that people could get money to pay for supplies themselves. • Suleski, Robert. “Japan After the Bubble Burst: Traditional Values Inhibit Quick Comeback” • Of note: The Yakuza were able to provide aid and support to quake victims more quickly than the government.

  21. Consequences Resulting from Policy Inadequacy • Nikkei Market Collapsed 1000 points • Loss of Economic Infrastructure • Businesses like Sumitomo Rubber, whose locations had been severely damaged, decided to move their fixed capital to other locations. This ultimately removed vital infrastructure elsewhere. • Okuyama, Yasuhide. “Economics of Natural Disasters: A Critical Review.” • Around 400,000 building suffered damage, more than half of which were more than half destroyed. • Infrastructure like electricity, natural gas, water, sewage, and highways were all destroyed. • Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake.”

  22. How Japanese Society Responded • Private Involvement • Corporations stepped in • Convenience Store Chains like Seven-Eleven chartered helicopters and put their employees on motorcycles in order to fill their stores with supplies, which then were sold cheaply to victims. • National Phone Companies like Nippon Telegraph and Telephone set up phone banks. Motorola handed out cell phones to relief workers. • Morse, Andrew and Todd Zaun. “Views from Two Observers.” • Japan Produced more • GDP growth in 1995 was 1.4% in comparison to 1994 where GDP growth was 0.6%; in fact, GDP growth in 1995 was substantially greater than any other year since 1990. • Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake,” 521. • Volunteer Involvement • 1,000,000 volunteers responded without overall coordination. • Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake,” 529.

  23. How Japanese policy Changed • Japan realized that top-down bureaucracy was ineffective at providing relief as fast as was required • Volunteer organizations such as the Kobe Community Support Center were established as a grassroots initiative towards building a strong community fabric that could be responsive to disasters and other local issues • They define their mission as having two major roles: • Support role • Supporting the establishment of NPOs and their activities by providing financial support and a physical location out of which to base operations. • Active role • Actively engaging in society by joining NPO’s to local businesses and providing training, research and lectures to citizens, administrative officers and corporate officers. • Kobe Community Support Center, Objective Paper.

  24. Support of the Private and Civil sectors is CrucialTo Responding to Future Disasters • George Horowich, in his article “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake,” suggested that the government should play the role as overseer, but allow the private sector and the volunteer sector to go to work on the ground. • In a statement by the Global Industrial and Social Progress Research institute, the importance of NPO’s and civilian involvement is emphasized: • “Now, we find theemergence of a civilian sector that voluntarily and self-motivatedly addresses these new types of social issues.Initiated by massive volunteer efforts offered for the aftermath of the big Kobe earthquake in 1995, volunteer activities have won greater recognition in the society for their necessities and importance, leading to the legislation of Specific Non -Profit Activity Promotion Law (NPO Law) in 1998 that truly recognized the role of such activities in the society.Today, about 9000 NPOs and other local NPOs address wider issues ranged from citizens ’ and communities ’ level to international and global scale.” • Global Industrial and Social Progress Committee. “Building a new socio-economic system”

  25. Bibliography • Fukushima, Glen S. “The Great Hanshin Earthquake.”Japan Policy Research Institute. Occasional Paper No. 2 (March 1995). <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op2.html> • Global Industrial and Social Progress Committee. “Building a New Socio-Economic System - Policy Proposal for Cooperation Among NPOs, Businesses, and Governments.” Global Industrial and Social Progress Research Institute. January 28, 2003 • Horwich, George. “Economic Lessons of the Kobe Earthquake.”Economic Development and Cultural Change. Vol. 48, No. 3. (April 2000), pp. 521-542. • Kobe Community Support Center. Objective statement. http://www.cskobe.com/english1.html • Morse, Andrew and Todd Zaun. “Views from Two Observers.” Japan Policy Research Institute. Occasional Paper No. 2 (March 1995). <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op2.html> • Okuyama, Yasuhide. “Economics of Natural Disasters: A Critical Review.” Research Paper 2003-12. West Virginia University. <http://www.rri.wvu.edu/pdffiles/okuyamawp2003-12.pdf> • Orr, Robert M. Jr. “The Relief Effort Seen by a Participant”Japan Policy Research Institute. Occasional Paper No. 2 (March 1995). <http://www.jpri.org/publications/occasionalpapers/op2.html> • Suleski, Robert. “Japan After the Bubble Burst: Traditional Values Inhibit Quick Comeback”The Journal of the International Institute. <http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/journal/vol6no3/suleski.htm>

  26. Bibliography • “Dai-Hanshin Earthquake Information Database”. http://sinsai.fdma.go.jp/search/ • Anderson, Kobe Earthquake of 1995. http://www.warnercnr.colostate.edu/avprojects/98proj/world_volc/web_docs/kobe.html • “The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Statistics and Restoration Progress”. City of Kobe, Jan. 1, 2005 • Somerville, Paul. Kobe Earthquake: An Urban Disaster Eos, Vol. 76, No. 6, February 7, 1995, pp. 49-51. • Louie, John. Earthquake Effects. http://www.seismo.unr.edu/ftp/pub/louie/class/100/effects-kobe.html • Terry, Kathee. Kobe Earthquake. http://vathena.arc.nasa.gov/curric/land/kobe.html • “The Kobe Earthquake: Applying Lessons Learned, 10 years after the Disaster.” Kajima New & Notes. Spring 2005. Vol. 32

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