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Iran-Iraq War and Desert Storm

Iran-Iraq War and Desert Storm. Lsn 38. ID & SIG. chemical weapons, coalition, Desert Storm, human wave attacks, Iran-Iraq War, “left hook”, Khomeini, objective of Desert Storm, Republican Guards, Saddam, Schwarzkopf, shaping operations (deception and air war), Tanker War, War of the Cities.

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Iran-Iraq War and Desert Storm

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  1. Iran-Iraq War and Desert Storm Lsn 38

  2. ID & SIG • chemical weapons, coalition, Desert Storm, human wave attacks, Iran-Iraq War, “left hook”, Khomeini, objective of Desert Storm, Republican Guards, Saddam, Schwarzkopf, shaping operations (deception and air war), Tanker War, War of the Cities

  3. Iran-Iraq War: The Middle East

  4. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): Background • Underlying causes of the war included Sunni vs Shi’ite religious tensions and Persian vs Arab ethnic tensions • The immediate cause was that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein was concerned about Iranian efforts to undermine his regime • Saddam hoped to curtail the spread of Islamic fundamentalism to which Iraq’s Shi’ite population seemed increasingly vulnerable • He also wanted to increase his influence in the Persian Gulf by seizing key geographic areas

  5. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): Background • Saddam had spent vast sums on improving his military and he also knew the Iranian military was weakened by the upheaval of the 1979 Iranian Revolution • Saddam expected a short war Iraqi President Saddam Hussein

  6. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): Iraqi Attack • On Sept 22, 1980 Iraq launched a surprise attack against ten Iranian airfields • Then Iraq launched ground attacks on four separate axes • Most of Iran’s advanced planes were in protective hangars so the surprise aerial attack had little effect • The ground attack also produced little and after about a week Saddam called for a cease-fire

  7. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): Iranian Recovery • Saddam renewed his offensive with several subsequent attacks but by March 1981 they had all exhausted themselves • Instead of the quick victory Saddam had hoped for, all he had done was give the Iranian revolutionary regime a rallying cry to mobilize its people • Now Iraq faced a total war against an enemy with far greater population and resources

  8. Iran-Iraq War: (1980-1988):International Response • In spite of Saddam’s record of human rights abuses, the international community seemed more afraid of the spread of Ayatollah Khomeini’s influence in the Middle East • Consequently there was little support for Iran even though Iraq had initiated the aggression • Logistical shortages would hinder Iran throughout the war Iran seized 66 American hostages in the revolution that brought Khomeini to power

  9. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):Iranian Attacks • From Sept 1981 through May 1982, Iran seized the initiative through poorly coordinated attacks that relied on superior numbers to make up for inferior commanders, staffs, and equipment • In some cases the Iranian used human wave attacks spearheaded by religiously motivated children and old men who would race forward and use their bodies to detonate concealed mines • Then waves of poorly trained militia threw themselves on the barbed wire to try to make a breach • Finally better trained and equipped soldiers would attack over the mangled bodies of the initial waves

  10. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):Iranian Successes • As time passed the Iranians developed better tactics but still suffered huge losses • Nonetheless the Iranians succeeded in pushing the Iraqis back and in June 1982 Saddam ordered the evacuation of most of the territory seized from Iran

  11. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): Chemical Weapons • Iran then shifted its emphasis from defense to offense • In July the Iranians attacked Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, and in October they attacked toward Baghdad • The Iraqis repelled the attacks, using limited amounts of mustard gas and possibly nerve gas in the process Iranian soldier with a protective mask

  12. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):Tanker War • In 1984 the war escalated to a new level when Saddam began using his superior air power to halt the shipment of Iranian oil through the Persian Gulf • The Iraqis shipped most of their oil by pipeline so the Iranians were not able to retaliate against Iraqi shipping • Instead Iran attacked the ships of Iraq’s allies, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia • This became known as the “Tanker War”

  13. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):War of the Cities • From March to June 1985 the “War of the Cities” occurred with both sides launching missile attacks at major population centers • As the Iranians increasingly dominated the ground war, Iraq stepped up its air attacks Both sides fired SCUD missiles at each other’s cities

  14. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):US Involvement • In 1987 the US began playing an increasingly active role having concluded that an Iranian victory would be contrary to US interests in the region • Kuwait transferred ownership of half of its tankers to a US shipping company and US warships provided security for them in the Persian Gulf • There were several direct interactions between the US and Iran including the Iranian cruise missile attack against the USS Stark which killed 37 Americans The USS Stark after the attack

  15. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):Iraqi Advantage • Iran began increasingly wary of even greater US involvement • The strategic situation was beginning to favor Iraq, and Iraq responded with renewed offensives • Iraq scored a huge victory in the Haur-al-Hawizeh marshes but then withdrew in an apparent attempt to signal to Iran a willingness to end the war Donald Rumsfeld, President Reagan’s special envoy to the Middle East, meeting with Saddam in 1983

  16. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): Iranian Difficulties • The USS Vincennes mistakenly identified an Iranian civilian airplane with 290 people on board as a war plane and shot it down • The incident hurt Iranian morale • Iran was also suffering from serious supply shortages and increasingly successful Iraqi attacks • Iran could respond only with human wave attacks, but unlike in 1980, volunteers were less abundant Iranian stamp commemorating the USS Vincennes incident

  17. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):Peace • Finally Iran accepted a truce and the war ended on Aug 20, 1988 • In the end, neither side gained anything of significance and instead plundered their treasuries and wasted thousands of lives • The war left Iraq with over $90 billion in debts • This is going to contribute to Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990

  18. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988):Legacy • The Iraqis used superior air power, attacked commercial shipping, and used chemicals • The Iranians were largely isolated from international support and often resorted to human wave tactics to offset their technological disadvantage • The war left the long standing enmity between the two countries unresolved Iraqi soldiers celebrating in front of a bullet-ridden picture of Ayatollah Khomeini

  19. Desert Storm: The Middle East

  20. Desert Storm: Background • Majority of region administered by Britain until post-World War II. • Long-standing disputes between Iraq and Kuwait. • Iraq argues Kuwait is an Iraqi province. • Iraq mobilized and prepared for invasion in 1961 immediately after Kuwait was granted independence by Britain. • Iraq wants Kuwait to forgive debts Iraq owes from Iran-Iraq War. • Claims Kuwait actually owes Iraq for “defending” it against Iran. • Iraq accuses Kuwait of overproduction of oil/theft of Iraqi oil. • On Aug 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait

  21. The Road to War • March 1990 – US Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted a Command Post Exercise with a Iraqi invasion scenario. • July 25 - US Ambassador April Galaspie told Iraq that their dispute with Kuwait is not a US matter • Aug 2 - Iraq invaded Kuwait. • Aug 7– Two squadrons of USAF F-15s are first US forces to arrive in Saudi Arabia. • Aug 9– First elements of 82nd Airborne arrived in Saudi Arabia. Soldiers of the 82nd Airborne Division departing Fort Bragg, NC for Saudi Arabia

  22. The Road to War • Aug 25, 1990 – UN authorized use of force. • Oct 31 – President Bush gave go ahead for two corps offensive and authorized doubling of force. • Nov 29 - UN Resolution 678 authorized all force needed to expel Iraq if they are not out by Jan 15, 1991. The original plan for a one corps-size force would have been primarily a frontal attack which would have resulted in additional casualties.

  23. The end of the Cold War and Russia’s willingness to join the US in opposing Iraq created an unprecedented level of international cooperation The United Nations adopted resolutions condemning Iraq and authorizing the use of force Thirty-six countries (as well as Kuwait) contributed forces Coalition Operations

  24. Coalition • Coalition unity became the center of gravity (“those characteristics, capabilities or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight”) for the US • Saddam tried to fracture coalition unity by launching Scud missile attacks against population centers in Israel • Saddam hoped to goad Israel into retaliating and therefore cause the Arab members of the coalition to pull out • US pleaded with Israel to stay out of the war and the US deployed Patriot missile batteries to help protect Israel

  25. Combat Operations • Jan 17, 1991 - Air war began • Feb 23 - Ground war began • Feb 28 - Cease fire took effect. • March 2 - 24th ID fought last engagement of the war. • March 3 - Schwarzkopf accepted Iraqi surrender at Safwan.

  26. Shaping Operations • Create and preserve conditions for the success of the operation • Air operation • Cut supplies bound for Iraqi forces in Kuwait from 20k tons per week to 2k tons per week and eliminated Iraqi air threat • Deception operation • Highly visible Marine rehearsals persuaded Saddam to commit an estimated four divisions to protect his flank against an amphibious assault Leaflets such as these deceived the Iraqis into thinking the main attack would be amphibious

  27. The Shift Westward

  28. As Samawah An Nasiriyah Tigris Iran Iraq Euphrates Al Basrah Al Busayyah Republican Guards Persian Gulf XVIII Airborne Corps Iraqi Defenses Kuwait City VIICorps xxxx JFC North Khafji xxx MARCENT xxx Hafir al Batin JFC East xxx Third Army Saudi Arabia The Ground War • Massive air and artillery bombardments prior to D-Day reduced front line forces to less than 50% strength and reserves to 50-75%. • Feb 23 - Iraqis begin torching oil wells. • Feb 24 - Ground campaign kicks off. • Emphasized speed and maneuver. VII Corps will be the decisive operation with the mission to destroy the enemy’s decisive point, the Republican Guards. XVIII Abn Corps will be the shaping operation with the mission to isolate the battlefield

  29. As Samawah An Nasiriyah Iraq Iran Tigris Euphrates Al Basrah 49 N AL Al Busayyah AD H E M 52 51 10 T XX 17 26 Persian Gulf FR 6 6 2 12 XX D 101 47 21 48 Kuwait City 25 15 28 XX 27 11 XX 82 20 30 24 19 16 36 1 III III 3 2 3 7 XX XX XX 1 1 UK XVIII Airborne Corps JFN 14 18 XX XX X 29 1 2 3 xxxx XX JFC North 5 1 XX 2 VIICorps XX xxx XX Marine Hafir al Batin 1 xxx JFE Marine MARCENT JFC East US Third Army xxx Saudi Arabia Situation, 23 February 1991

  30. As Samawah An Nasiriyah Iraq Iran Tigris Euphrates Al Basrah 49 N AL AD Al Busayyah H E M 52 51 10 Persian Gulf T XX 17 26 FR 6 6 2 12 XX D 101 47 21 48 Kuwait City 25 15 28 XX 27 11 XX 82 20 30 24 19 16 36 1 III III 3 2 3 7 XX XX XX 1 1 UK JFN 14 18 XX XVIII Airborne Corps XX X 29 1 2 3 xxxx XX 5 JFC North 1 XX 2 VIICorps XX XX Marine xxx Hafir al Batin 1 xxx JFE Marine MARCENT JFC East US Third Army xxx Saudi Arabia Situation, 24 February 1991

  31. As Samawah An Nasiriyah Iraq Tigris Iran Euphrates Al Basrah 49 N AL AD Al Busayyah H E M 52 51 10 Persian Gulf T XX 17 FR 6 6 XVIII Airborne Corps 2 12 XX D 101 47 21 Kuwait City 15 XX 27 11 XX 82 24 19 1 III III 3 2 3 XX XX JFC North XX 1 1 UK VIICorps JFN XX XX X 1 2 3 XX xxxx 1 xxx XX 2 XX MARCENT XX Marine 1 Hafir al Batin JFE JFC East xxx Marine US Third Army xxx Saudi Arabia Situation, 25 February 1991

  32. As Samawah An Nasiriyah Iraq Iran Tigris Euphrates Al Basrah 49 N AL AD XVIII Airborne Corps Al Busayyah H E M 52 51 10 Persian Gulf T XX 17 FR 6 6 2 12 XX D 101 47 Kuwait City XX XX 82 24 VIICorps III III JFC North 2 3 XX XX XX 1 1 UK JFN XX XX X 1 2 3 xxxx XX xxx 1 XX 2 MARCENT XX JFC East XX Marine Hafir al Batin 1 JFE xxx Marine US Third Army xxx Saudi Arabia Situation, 26 February 1991

  33. As Samawah An Nasiriyah Iraq Iran Tigris Al Basrah XVIII Airborne Corps N AL AD H Al Busayyah M 52 51 10 Persian Gulf XX FR 6 6 2 VIICorps xxx XX 101 Kuwait City XX XX 82 24 III III 2 3 JFC North XX XX XX xxx 1 1 UK JFN XX XX X xxxx 1 2 3 XX US Third Army 1 XX MARCENT 2 xxx XX XX Marine JFC East 1 JFE Hafir al Batin Marine Saudi Arabia Situation, 27 February 1991 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reported the Iraqis were now conducting “the mother of all retreats”

  34. “Highway of Death”

  35. As Samawah An Nasiriyah Iraq Iran Tigris Al Basrah XVIII Airborne Corps AL AD Al Busayyah VIICorps Persian Gulf XX FR 6 XX xxx 101 Kuwait City XX XX 82 24 III III 2 3 JFC North XX XX XX 1 1 UK JFN XX xxx XX X US Third Army 1 2 3 XX xxxx 1 XX MARCENT 2 JFC East XX XX Marine 1 Hafir al Batin JFE xxx Marine Saudi Arabia Situation, 28 February 1991

  36. Partial Escape • However much of the Hammurabi Division escaped intact • Throughout the fighting Schwarzkopf had been pressing VII Corps commander Frederick Franks to pursue faster while Franks felt he still had enemy in contact to deal with • The two never effectively communicated and a gap in the encirclement was the result Franks and Schwarzkopf would provide conflicting versions of events in their post-war writings

  37. Iraq • The objective of Desert Storm was to liberate Kuwait, not to destroy the Iraqi army or remove Saddam • Even though the coalition experienced amazing military success, Saddam remained in power and crushed short-lived uprisings by the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south • Iraqi Freedom would have the objective of changing the regime in Iraq

  38. Review • Ground war emphasized mass, speed, and maneuver • Still largely a linear battlefield • Iraqi Freedom would be much more nonlinear and trade mass for speed • Renewed Air Force arguments about the relative superiority of air power • Technology, low casualties, short war would lead to increased demands for use of military • Importance of media • Felt somewhat used • Would lead to embedded journalists in Iraqi Freedom • Limited objective (liberate Kuwait) left Saddam in power and the Republican Guards largely in tact • Set stage for Iraqi Freedom

  39. Legacy of Desert Storm • Won with an operational concept that sought in a single climatic operation to destroy the enemy’s center of gravity • In 100 hours of combat, American forces destroyed or captured more than 3,000 tanks, 1,400 armored carriers, and 2,200 artillery pieces • The “Great Wheel” swept over and captured almost 20,000 square miles of territory • Only 140 soldiers died in direct combat • Erased the “Vietnam Syndrome” • Scales, Certain Victory, p. 382-383

  40. Next • Student Presentations • Late 20th Century Wars of Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Humanitarian Crisis

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