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Deterrence and Defiance Models of Terrorist Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1992

Deterrence and Defiance Models of Terrorist Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1992. Gary LaFree, Raven Korte and Laura Dugan START Research Symposium June 28, 2006. Terrorist Actions. Terrorist Support Group Actions. Government Actions. Theoretical Perspectives: Deterrence Models.

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Deterrence and Defiance Models of Terrorist Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1992

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  1. Deterrence and Defiance Models of Terrorist Violence in Northern Ireland, 1969 to 1992 Gary LaFree, Raven Korte and Laura Dugan START Research Symposium June 28, 2006

  2. Terrorist Actions Terrorist Support Group Actions Government Actions

  3. Theoretical Perspectives:Deterrence Models • Deterrence models portray humans as rational actors who seek to minimize costs and maximize benefits. • This perspective maintains that an individual’s propensity to engage in violence or crime (including terrorism) can be altered by the actions of the government. • Deterrence models suggest that government intervention will decrease terrorist strikes by increasing the costs of future strikes.

  4. Defiance Models (Sources) • “Ju-jitsu” nature of some terrorist actions • Experimental literature on reactance • Criminology literature --Labeling --Restorative Justice --Defiance • Defiance models suggest that government intervention will increase terrorist strikes by increasing resistance to the sanctioning agent.

  5. Prior Research • Northern Ireland case studies • Other country case studies • Aerial hijacking studies

  6. Prior Research: Conclusions • Little empirical data • Few statistical tests • Mixed support but probably more evidence for defiance than deterrence models • No prior research that treats deterrence and defiance as theoretical alternatives

  7. Major Terrorist Groups • Republicans • Irish Republican Army (IRA) • Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) • Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO) • Loyalists • Ulster Defense Association (UDA) • aka Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) • Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)

  8. Selected Interventions

  9. Cox Proportional Hazard Model • We analyze 2,603 Rebublican terrorist incidents from 1969 to 1992 drawn from the GTD and supplemented by Sutton (1994). • h(Y) =λ0(Y) exp (β1Government Actions+ β2Context+β3Controls)

  10. Variables • Dependent Variable • The hazard of a terrorist attack, measured by the number of days until the next incident perpetrated by each terrorist group. • Independent Variables • 5 Government Actions • 3 Context Variables • 5 Control Variables

  11. Descriptive Statistics of Republican Data (Loyalist Statistics in Parentheses)

  12. Terrorist Activity by Group

  13. Violent Attacks in Northern Ireland, 1969-1992

  14. Moving Coefficients for Hazard Models, 6 to 60 months *p≤0.05 and **p≤0.01, all two tailed tests.

  15. Defining the Deterrence-Defiance Axis • Salience of the issue • Strength of social bonds • Perceived fairness

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