Prediction and Recognition of Piracy Efforts Using Collaborative Human-Centric Information Systems

1. Prediction and Recognition of Piracy Efforts Using Collaborative Human-Centric Information Systems Éloi Bossé, Ph.D Université Laval, Canada HSD.MD.ASI.984016, 18-30 September 2011

2. Outline Domain understanding: Somalia case Situation awareness Decision support This ASI objectives

4. Expansion of piracy operations (1)

5. Expansion of piracy operations (2)

6. Expansion of piracy operations (3)

7. Why Somalia?

8. Portrait of a pirate (1) • 2008 – Puntland government ran out of money to pay its security forces: • For poorly educated, locally born youth, the security sector, both public and private, had been the steadiest source of formal jobs. • Many members of the police and army foresee piracy as an alternative employment. • Young man who possesses nothing but a gun and a desperate disregard for his own life. • For the masses of unemployed and resentful local youth, piracy was a quick way to achieve the respect and standard of living that the circumstances of their birth had denied them.

9. Portrait of a pirate (2) • They refer themselves as ‘badaadinta badah’ = ‘saviors of the sea’ a term when translated in English as ‘coast guard’ • To them, their actions had been in protection of their sea • Legitimate form of taxation levied in absentia on a defunct government that they represented in spirit if not in law! • Lobster population has been devastated by foreigh fishing fleets – mostly Chinese, Taiwanese and Korean ships • from capturing lobsters – they escalated to fishing vessels to commercial shipping vessels • Supported by local population where the Robin Hood figure of pirates is quite strong • Interwoven dynamic between pirates, coast guards and fishermen.

10. Portrait of a pirate (3) • Somalia --country out of a twistedfairy tale • news reports spilling out: warlords, famine, Black Hawks, jihadis, and now pirates • Not a country in anarchy: number of autonomous enclaves • Natural candidate (epicentre) –straddling the shipping bottleneck of the Gulf of Aden and the IndianOcean • Social dimension: ..everythingisdonethrough connections –clan – family – friends -- social networks

11. Portrait of a pirate (4) • ‘the root of our troubles’ isillegalfishingso ‘thatis up to the international community’. • Theycultivated the impression -- Media Image of the fisherman-pirate locked in a one-sided struggle against the forces of foreigh exploitation: • defenders of Somali waters againstimperialist incursions of foreighvessels • Develop as a business (Wall Street IPO - Initial Public Offering)

12. Factors favouring rise of piracy • Geopolitics: location and its relative and tenuous stability • Situated right at the intersection of the Indian ocean and the Gulf of Aden • straddles one the busiest shipping lanes in the world – 20000 commercial vessels (10% of global shipping) transit through the Gulf of Aden per year • Environmental factors: • …it’s just stable enough but also ungoverned enough. You don’t have the chronic instability you have further south … There’s too great a chance of getting caught in the crossfire and too many interests to pay off. • Economic adversity: • Ideal training ground and business status – free of the organized criminal gangs – Islamist groups – covetous warlords • Breakdown of governance: • from 2005 to early 2009, as the central government disintegrated under increasing economic and political pressures, pirate groups gained the freedom to operate with complete openness and virtual impunity

13. Mythes?

14. Attack pattern • Timing: most often occur at dawn and dusk – to take advantage of reduced visibility • Strategy: two skiffs (each typically 5-6 pirates), with one covering the other as its occupants attempt to scale the target vessel.

15. Pirate target vessel profile

16. Vessel type attacks

18. Response (1) • Military: deployment of three multi-national naval task forces beginning in late 2008 has done little to halt pirate attacks: • From 2008-2010 the number of hijackings continued to rise and the trend had not abated so far. • Many find incomprehensible that, despite bristling with state-of-the-art weaponry and detection systems, Western warships have allowed the pirates to continue to hijack ships with seeming impunity. • Fails to appreciate the sheer size of the area that international forces must cover -- window of opportunity –distress call (15-40 minutes) – impossible to response consistently in a timely manner

19. Response (1a) • The IRTC might have made pirates job easier –like patient fishermenwaiting for a nibble. • Theyfaced a higherrisk of death or capture but the transit corridor savedthem the trouble of decidingwhere to hunt.

20. Examples of EU and NATO Naval CTF 25-40 vessels for an estimated annual cost of $1-$1.5 billion

21. Response (2) • With $1-$1.5 billion per year being spent to clamp down on a piracy ‘industry’ worth not more than $90 million – return on investment ?? • When hijacking fail (60-70%) it is due to early detection, increased speed and evasive measures not heavy weaponry. • But the statistics do not reflect the coalition’s multifaceted deterrent effect. • The naval presence is a classic exercise in defence theatre: • Political and humanitarean reason • Protect your own nationals as well as to safeguard international commerce – optics are more important than the results. • Every commentator on Somalia piracy would agree that ‘ the problem must be solved on land not merely at sea.

22. Response (3) • To date, capturing pirates has proved far easierthandecidingwhat to do withthemafterwards. • The laws of foreign nations have treated Somali pirates as another group of ‘boat people’ • The largely Western countries thatpatrol the Gulf of Aden and the IndianOceandesire to avoid the costsassociatedwithtransportingcapturedoffenders and processingthem in domestic courts. • Sinceancient Rome, pirates have been labelled as hostishumani generis - ennemies of all mankind • 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) • 1988 Convention for the Suppression of UnlawfulActsagainst the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention)

23. Response (4) • The international legal framework governing piracy is worn and inadequate (Resolution 1816, Merchant Shipping Act) • Given an array of imperfect solutions, the ‘dumping ground ‘ option may be the best choice for the present.

24. Response (5) • The problemwith ‘gettingtough’ with the pirates isthatjust one misstepcould occasion a monumental financial or evenecologicaldisaster, to saynothing of the potentialloss of life. • E.g. crudeoil or volatile chemicals – makes the potentialcost of violence extremelyhigh. • Presence of armedguardscould cause the shipowner’sinsurance premiums to go up (Lloyd’s of London) • Avoid ‘escalade’

25. Response (6) • Low-costmeasuressuch as barbedwire and high-pressure water hoses • Maritime shipping is an extraordinarilycompetitive global business so: • Engagingarmedguards 10K-day and 5 days to passthrough ‘pirate waters’ would destroy the profit margins • Reroutingtheirvesselsaround the Cape of Good Hope – not an economicaly viable solution – marine hazards are amplified • Averagevessel has 1 in 550 chance to behijacked – a ransomgenerally not exceeding 2-5 % of the worth of the vessel and her cargo

26. Response(7) • Earlydetectionis the single best method of deterring pirate attacks: Ref: any naval officer • Often if the pirates recognizethatthey’ve been detectedearly on, and theysee the shiptakingevasive action, theywill not evenbother to attack. • Key to earlydetectionishavingenough people on board the ships • Can low-costtechnology help here? ‘soft’ detection and sensing? • A second one thathadsomesuccessis ‘turtledefence’ where the crewisbarricading in somesecure place in the vessel.

27. Future Trends of Maritime Piracy • The business willprobablybe a lot more lucrative: • - hundreds of million of dollars cargos; -over and above the value of the crewlives • Pirate negociators have onlyjustbegun to realize how muchshipowners are willing to pay • Each time a companyagrees to a record-setting ransom • Pirate gangs are likely to bemuch more organized: mightdevelopinto mafia-style business • Rival organizations, clan militias, and even Somali Islamist groups willbeincreasinglytempted to rip off successful pirate groups • Encountersatsea are likely to get a whole lot bloodier: • it has recentlybecome standard practice to firedirectlyat the attackedvessel and hercrew. • With the cost of future attacksincreasinglylikely to bemeasured in blood in lieu of dollars, bringing a swift end to the scourge of piracy has never been more imperative

28. What the international community can do against piracy? • Finance an effective and well-paidPuntland police task force • Fund an expansion of the Puntland prison system • Foster intelligence coordination betweenPuntland and International Naval Forces • Clamp down on illegalfishing • Encourage or require passive securitymeasuresaboard commercial vessels

29. The Future Security Environment The challenges of the 21st century include a variety of humanitarian disasters (earthquakes, floods, tsunamis), failed states, instability, global terrorism, intractable conflicts, pandemics, economic crises, and poverty among others. These problems are not one dimensional, but rather involve the consideration of effects in multiple, inter-related dimensions. These dimensions include social, political, and economic effects. These challenges are beyond the ability of any single actor or even a small set of very capable actors (e.g. CFs). Responses to these challenges, if they are to have a chance of success, must involve a large, heterogeneous collection of entities working together. The 21st century mission challenges described above are referred to as Complex Endeavours

30. Characteristics of Complex Situations Source: A. Guitouni ‘A Time Sensitive Decision Support System for Crisis and Emergency Management ‘, NATO IST 086, May 2009 ’

31. Crisis and Emergency Management: Bottom-up Nature of Incident Phenomena In maritime piracy ? • Distributed command and control with various levels of command and decision making occurring at many different operation centres. • Intense communication, cooperation and collaboration are a necessity to fully synergize a multi-agency response • Multiple Interacting Jurisdictions

32. Situation awareness

33. Situation awareness

34. The Cognitive Hierarchy Understanding Judgment Knowledge Cognition Information Processing Data “Key to DECISIONS is INFORMATION”

35. Multi-agent Situation Awareness Multi-agent context Comprehensionof current situation SITUATION AWARENESS Perceptionof elements in current situation Projectionof future status Uncertainty-based information Knowledge and belief Time and non-monotonicity These aspects should be considered all together

36. Context : key to understanding Understanding Judgment Knowledge Cognition Information Processing Data No understanding is possible without knowing the context in which the process of perception of a situation occurs.

37. Domain Knowledge Representation Understanding Judgment Knowledge Cognition Information Processing Data

38. Inf(Object «n») Physical model ‘Key to decisionsis information’ Uncertainty Reliability Relevance Utility Proximity Supportability Expectability Credibility … Information Element ‘Information enablesSituation Awareness’

39. Collaboration in the NATO SAS-050 C2 Conceptual Reference Model (1 of 2) 39 Information Networks Information Accuracy Information Completeness Information Correctness Information Currency Information Consistency Information Precision Information Relevance Information Timeliness Information Uncertainty Shared Understanding Accuracy Shared Understanding Completeness Shared Understanding Consistency Shared Understanding Correctness Shared Understanding Currency Shared Understanding Precision Shared Understanding Relevance Shared Understanding Timeliness Shared Understanding Uncertainty Quality of Interactions Uncertainty of Situation INPUT (21) C O L L A B O R A T I O N

40. Collaboration in the NATO SAS-050 C2 Conceptual Reference Model (2 of 2) 40 OUTPUT Communications Interoperability Shared Awareness Accuracy Shared Awareness Completeness Shared Awareness Consistency Shared Awareness Correctness Shared Awareness Currency Shared Awareness Precision Shared Awareness Relevance Shared Awareness Timeliness Shared Awareness Uncertainty Decision Accuracy Decision Completeness Decision Consistency Decision Correctness Decision Currency Decision Precision Decision Relevance Decision Timeliness Decision Uncertainty (19) C O L L A B O R A T I O N

41. Basic tasks for Situation Analysis Detection: Object Enumeration: (Objects) N Classification: Object  Class Tracking: Object(t)  Object(t +1) Association: Object_i  Object_j

42. Situation analysis needs: A framework in which knowledge, information and uncertainty can be represented, combined, managed, reduced, increased, interpreted (e.g. GIT); Decision theories to explicitly account for the actions and their impact on the environment (to go beyond the open-loop treatment); Multi-agent systems theories to formalize the distributed aspect;

43. Theoretical tools for Situation Analysis • GIT = Generalized Information Theory • Information and knowledge modeling • Theoretical aspects of uncertainty representation • MAS + GIT • Multiple Classifiers • Aggregation/Combination GIT • GIT + Dec. • POMDP SA • MAS = MultiAgent Systems • Multisensor Systems, Network • Multisensor Data Fusion • Social Networks • Dec. = Decision Theory • Planning • Optimization Dec. MAS • MAS + Dec. • Game theory

46. Information Fusion Tasks: Detection -Enumeration -Classification -Tracking - Association MAS: Multi Agent Systems ----DEC: Decision Theory-----GIT: General Information Theory Sensing Situation Understanding Sensing and making sense Decision Support Situation GIT • Ressources: • actors, effectors / e.g. humans, sensors, networks, assets, socio-technical systems, … Task/Resource Management Deciding and acting Dec. MAS Actions/tasks: e.g. anomalydetection - event recognition - situation monitoring – surveillance, energy management, response management, …etc.

47. Decision support: Reach the humain brain

48. User Driven vs. Data Driven • The ‘chasm’...where you start often determines where you finish • Building the bridge is hard INFORMATION NEEDS It Requires… … A new perspective … A unique methodology It Generates… … A radically different solution! Typical System Design Layers of technology patches…but its just a deeper pile of DATA! CSE pulls from the decision making DATA SOURCES

49. Task Cognitive Overload Technology Human(s) Better Operator Interface Automation Data fusion Smarter software “The Desired Outcome” Decision Aids Need for a Holistic Perspective on Design ? ? ? More platforms More displays Operator Demands More data Faster computers Digital Model of Information More sensors Time

50. LIMITATIONS LIMITATIONS REQUIREMENTS REQUIREMENTS Tradeoff Technology Human “TASK/HUMAN/TECHNOLOGY” TRIAD MODEL* Task Task