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1. Background of signatary states 2. International situation

Fisheries agreements and access rights Reference to various situations in West Africa Joseph Catanzano. A pragmaticapproach to the relation between fishery agreements and ambitions to develop countries of the South. 1. Background of signatary states 2. International situation

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1. Background of signatary states 2. International situation

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  1. Fisheries agreements and access rightsReference to various situations in West Africa Joseph Catanzano

  2. A pragmaticapproach to the relation between fishery agreements and ambitions to develop countries of the South • 1. Background of signatary states • 2. International situation • 3. Diagnostic of effects of agreements • 4. How to use fishery agreements for development purposes IDDRA

  3. Background in signatary states Fisheries policy: - Many countries hope to use the fisheries sector to contribute to economic development - Yet the sectoral regulation issue is still not dealt with from the economic standpoint Perception of development: - Idea of underexploited fishery sector - Management limited to cases of overfishing (MSY) IDDRA

  4. Archetype of policies generally adopted advocates increase in level of exploitation and catches, jobs, foreign currency (exports), food safety/security encourages improvement in work tools (modernisation... subsidies) increases importance of HACCP: public health, greater profitability of fishery sector, etc. IDDRA

  5. This vision of dévelopment leads straight to conflict between sectors between objectives (modernisation through subsidy favours capital over labour, etc.) between segments within a sector IDDRA

  6. Thus, there is call for a different vision IDDRA

  7. Vision of development through management Recognition of various factors Limited resource Fishing is mainly an economic activity Fisheries contribution should come from better economic exploitation of resource IDDRA

  8. Vision of development through management Basic problem: what to do with economic gains? Dissipate them? Capitalise them? Withdraw them? IDDRA

  9. In some systems, these gains can be capitalised in the price of access rights limit the capacity but there is no guarantee on capital thus used In certain systems these gains can be withdrawn They revert to Government whichcan use them to invest in coastal regions (create economic alternatives to fishing) IDDRA

  10. Clarification objectives-constraints It is often said that the management goal is to preserve resources Wrong: preservation is a constraint Were this the real objective, fishing would be stopped (e.g. whales, AMP, moratoria, etc.) There is a socio-economic objective, often poorly explained, which makes many fisheries operate at the limit of the resource constraint level (which is not logical) IDDRA

  11. Theoretical positive effects of agreements • means to monitor fishery activities; • means for safety at sea; • research resources for the fishery sector; • national administrative and institutional capacities; • position of sector in the national economy thanks to foreign currency inflows; • transfer of technology and know-how in the fisheries sector; • plans to harmonise fishery regulations. IDDRA

  12. International situation • Overcapacity and overfishing • No incentive to consider the fishery sector as a potential contributor to economic development (in both South and North) • Strategies of European operators are inert • Weakness of European policy IDDRA

  13. Real negative effects of agreements • increase in fishing capacity and efforts; •  increase in risk of overfishing; •  development of competition and conflict in fishing zones; •  increase in commercial competition on export markets; •  heightened incoherence between national territorial development plans and discourse; •  greater complexity in the organisation of fishery sector because of existence of foreign fleets; •  continued application of unclear procedures for allocating fishing rights because of international pressure and competition and because the territorial development systems are not well adapted (definition of types of concessionary access rights to possible resources, absence of standard rules for all actors); •  increased dependence of line ministries and specialised research on foreign donors (because of revenue connected to the CFAs). IDDRA

  14. What CFAs have not done The CFAs have not persuaded or at least inspired the countries of the South to work out principles for the development of their own fishery sector within their own context in a neutral manner that views the potential volumes of rights that can be allocated to foreign fleets as one of the real stakes. YET THE AGREEMENTS ARE THE MOST DEVELOPED FORMS OF CONCESSIONS ON FISHING RIGHTS How can they be used to improve current situations? IDDRA

  15. Use CFAs then revise them • Use the contractual form that defines • Who • When • Where • How • At what price Crucial questions that remain unanswered: • What quantities of the resources are covered by these rights? • Who pays: breakdown of price to be paid between public and private sector. • Settle question of induced effects in relation to constraints. IDDRA

  16. Consequences Too many vessels, too many fishermen Positive effects More jobs More economic activity Economic support for more people Bigger sector IDDRA

  17. Consequences Too many vessels, too many fishermen Negative effects Economic waste Push fishery sector to overfishing Increase management problems Conflicts between fishermen System not sustainable: action inevitable Decision postponement means greater difficulty and cost IDDRA

  18. To be remembered: In the fishery sector, “natural” tendency towards overcapacity Tendency connected to economic factors (incentives) in a certain institutional structure (free access without payment) This tendency could be enhanced through general policy, the sector-specific policy, certain management measures, the international policy. IDDRA

  19. And tomorrow? Prepare for concessionary access systems in order to pave the way for natural economic regulations, along the lines of logic of both private and public actors. Strengthen, give direction to and operationalise links between States (those responsible for resources and the local and/or professional communities that hold concessionary rights), contracts and technical specifications. Strengthen links between research-administration and the profession by changing the nature of the links. Control fishing capacities through economic mechanisms and access rights (prioritise national preferences and, thus, change regulatory mode). Ensure resource sustainability through rent management and treating the allocations question at the national level (aim at development) Shift from unmanaged sectoral development approach to approach aimed at sustainable development of national economies starting with sectoral management.

  20. IDDRA

  21. IDDRA

  22. A few preliminary facts

  23. 1) To be realistic According to regular global analyses, the fisheries sectors are in a more alarming situation now than 30 years ago. Public institutions responsible for fisheries regulations have never, or rarely implemented recommendations that have been made since the 1980s.

  24. 2) Responding pragmatically to the present situation In most of the fishery sectors studied here, as in the fishery sectors of the most developed countries, access rights are being increased either through the institutionalisation of informal access rights at the central level or through the emergence of groups of actors who claim the introduction of such rights as protection against competition. IDDRA

  25. 3) Better understand the conditions surrounding public actions Do not work exclusively on the fisheries problem (which is globally accepted). Consider the problem of public action to regulate, inter alia, the fisheries sector, on a large scale. This means considering: - the objectives of the public policy (coherence in relation to national economy on the whole); - national institutions (relation with advocated regulatory tool but also with national context); - social, cultural, geographic and temporal bases for current situations that contribute to activities to add value to maritime resources (in certain cases they stem from activities or sectors that are germane to the fisheries sector) IDDRA

  26. 4) Better assess the importance of the context Recurrent weakness of fisheries management policies are essential due to lack of attention to what exists. Actually the current attitude is to prioritise targeted objectives rather than the analysis of situations which will generate resistance to or facilitate desired change. IDDRA

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