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Migration in the 21st century: a third demographic transition in the making Plenary Address to the British Society for

Outline. Migration marginalised? migration study in broader context of demography.Migration paramount? the importance, or insignificance,of migration in demographic change past and present.Migration as the motor of a third demographic transition'?. Why (most) demographers don't do migration . A f

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Migration in the 21st century: a third demographic transition in the making Plenary Address to the British Society for

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    1. Migration in the 21st century: a third demographic transition in the making? Plenary Address to the British Society for Population Studies Annual Conference, Leicester, 13 September 2004. David Coleman Department of Social Policy and Social Work, University of Oxford

    2. Outline Migration marginalised? migration study in broader context of demography. Migration paramount? the importance, or insignificance,of migration in demographic change past and present. Migration as the motor of a ‘third demographic transition’?

    3. Why (most) demographers don’t do migration A fuzzy category: repeatable, reversible Terrible statistics –defined by 57 varieties of laws. Big errors in both directions. The ‘weak sister’ of demography – or is it? Theory and prediction even more difficult than in fertility and mortality. Politicised and unappealing.

    4. Duff statistics- some examples Most ‘migration’ data isn’t. Invisible ‘foreigners’. You pay your money…..three examples. Bondi beach and ‘unattributable demographic change’: a plague on both houses.

    5. Most ‘migration’ data isn’t

    6. The Amazing Disappearing 'Foreigners' 1991-2001 (thousands) Source OECD (2004) Tables B.1.4, B.1.5

    7. Netherlands: foreigners and persons of foreign origin. Source: Statistics Netherlands

    8. Additions to the British labour force through immigration, 1991 – four definitions. Source: Salt 1992 UK SOPEMI Report

    9. Foreign workforce in Germany - two estimates (thousands). Sources: Social Security, Microcensus.

    10. Lost en route - immigration within the EU, late 1980s. Source : Poulain 1990.

    11. Demography rules OK – 2001 Census versus IPS

    12. ‘Unattributable Demographic Change’: The New ONS Miracle Ingredient! or ‘Honey, I shrunk the migration estimates’. Amaze your audiences! Lose 290,000 people per decade! Shrink your migration estimates overnight! Banish that annoying population growth! Remove those awkward inconsistencies! Keep the 2001 Census (nearly) infallible! http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/methodology_by_theme/revisions_to_population_estimates/implications.asp

    13. Migration paramount – Palaeolithic globalization Globalisation of people, cultures, disease. Migration essential survival strategy for animal populations Universal early human characteristic Constant movement of most hunter-gatherers, transhumance of pastoralists. Colonisation of the Earth – ‘Out of Africa’; wave of advance’ Human racial variation from lack of migration – isolation by distance. Volkerwanderung period up to 15th century (?)

    14. Can ancient migration be reconstructed? Migration perpetual; everyone a migrant? – up to a point. Large scale. Most modern European mtDNA variation from European Upper Palaeolithic, latest Neolithic 6500 BC Anglo-Saxons: Genetics and language favours ‘mass migration’ over ‘elite dominance’, but little Y -genetic evidence for later contributions. Ancestry of most European populations lies in ‘remote past’.

    15. Migration marginalised? Eurocentric view – migration minor between settled wealthy states in peacetime Europe from 15th c; within EU in late 20th. A residual category - migration activity mostly outside Europe; partly European emigration. ‘Macrocentric’ view – migration effects dominant at local level: but a question for geographers? In 19th , 20th centuries, migration effects mostly overwhelmed by birth / death differentials of first demographic transition.

    16. The end of immigration, 1960-84. Source : Eurostat

    17. Migration paramount (2); the present and future. Renewed population growth post-1980s: main source of growth in most developed countries, change of trend in population. Migration expected to increase. Modest changes in age-structure, substantial changes in composition. New populations of mixed origin.

    19. UK Population projections 2002 - 2050. Source GAD 2002- based projections

    20. Projected population growth by component, United Kingdom, 2002-2031, thousands. Source: GAD 2004.

    21. Projected effect of immigration on US population growth 1999 - 2100 . Source: US Bureau of the Census.

    22. Population projections, Sweden, 2004 - 2050, (millions); standard and zero-migration. Source: Statistics Sweden

    23. Population projections, Netherlands 2003-2050, medium variant and zero-migration (millions). Source: Statistics Netherlands

    24. Why migration may continue to increase: the UK example. Hydraulic ‘lavatory cistern’ model should be rejected but - Upward trend in most components. UK government policy to expand migration e.g. increase work permits: aim 200,000, actual 129,000 in 2002. Growth of political influence of ethnic minority populations. Growth of marriage migration with growth of ethnic minority populations, and other chain migration. Some new inflow from EU Accession countries. New diversity-oriented policy (e.g working holidaymakers) Amnesties (see Demography 2003) But asylum claims declining in 2004.

    27. Another (semi) official view (Home Office RDS Occasional Paper no 67).

    28. More work permit migration from outside EU

    29. Family and dependent migration Main reason for growth of immigrant populations in Europe, N. America post 1970s. Marriage migration overtakes ‘family reconstitution’ migration from 1980s.

    30. Components of gross immigration inflows to Western Europe (blue is family; OECD 2003)

    31. Spouse migration to the UK 1973 - 2001 (gross inflow).

    32. Displacement of family re-constitution migration by family formation migration UK 1982 - 1996

    33. Growth of male South Asian ethnic minority populations of marriageable age, and entry-clearance applications for wives/fiancees 1981-2001.

    34. Family re-unification migration and family formation migration, Netherlands 1995, 2002

    35. Other transformations: ethnic groups of mixed origin, England and Wales 2001. Source: 2001 Census.

    36. Births of mixed origin by ethnic group of mother, Great Britain 1992 - 2000 (LFS)

    39. Population of mixed Caribbean origin compared with all Caribbean origin (numbers and percent), England and Wales 2001. (source 2001 Census).

    40. A new demographic transition in the ‘West’? First transition - vital rates Second transition (?) - family, living arrangements Third transition - population composition? - new ethnic groups of mixed origin - possible replacement of ‘majority’ group

    41. Dirk van de Kaa’s model of the ‘Second Demographic Transition’. Source: European Journal of Population 15, p. 313, 1999.

    42. Ethnic change in the USA, projected 1999 - 2100

    43. US 1999 - 2100: projected percentage of all ethnic minorities

    44. US 1999 - 2100: projected proportion of immigrant-origin minorities only

    45. Percent of population foreign, Netherlands 2003 – 2050; medium variant and zero-migration projections. Source: Statistics Netherlands.

    47. Projected growth of population of foreign origin 2000-2050, selected countries, as % of total

    48. Ethnic replacement: Continued migration from one population, into another with sub-replacement fertility, must eventually replace one with the other. If incoming populations have higher fertility, the process will be accelerated. Migration, not differential fertility, dominant effect.

    50. Migration can go down as well as up… (EU, Germany)

    51. Growth of foreign-origin population in Denmark, three projections, showing projected consequences of recent restrictions (green line). Source: Statistics Denmark

    53. Why is it interesting? A new development, and asymmetrical parallels abroad attract attention change of direction in total pop trend cultural, political change incl. foreign policy what happens to original ‘dominant majority’ implies major change of social traditions, identity a future of mixing or segregation or both Sensitive to policy change

    54. Really a transition? Not yet - only in early/middle stages Reversible? Most new populations permanent; and inter-ethnic unions create new populations Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities; New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of ‘New Worlds’; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later. Novelty is peaceful change, with (partial) acquiescence

    55. Migration to Netherlands 2000-2050

    56. Some conclusions Union migration biggest open-ended migration channel, may define national ethnic composition. Trends in partner choice a major factor in future migration flows, and isolation / assimilation of ethnic populations. Inter-ethnic union may diminish or increase group size, but will generate in the long run a variety of new populations of mixed origin. Utility and propriety of ethnic classification may be questioned.

    57. Why does it matter? Ethnic replacement would attract attention elsewhere (Estonia, Latvia, Amazon) Demographic, cultural, political implications in the marginalisation of formerly majority traditions. Does this infringe human rights of natives? Trend is mostly policy-driven, and at least potentially controllable (e.g. Denmark). Implies a future of mixing or segregation or both No remaining ‘nature reserve’ for populations concerned.

    58. Really a transition? Only in early/middle stages, but elements can be projected. Reversible? Most new populations permanent; inter-ethnic unions create new populations. Universal? Only in developed countries. Elsewhere minorities diminishing , especially white and ‘dominant’ minorities; New? Displacement not new; pervasive in first millennium and earlier; extreme in colonisation of New worlds; deportations , ethnic cleansing of WW2 and later. Peaceful change, with (partial) acquiescence

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