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Chapter 9 Applications. Benevolent Malware. Benevolent malware? “Obviously a contradiction in terms” Malware characteristics, but tries to do “good” Den Zuk --- 1988, removed Brain virus Later versions would reformat disk… Cheese --- 2001, remove li0n worm
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Benevolent Malware • Benevolent malware? • “Obviously a contradiction in terms” • Malware characteristics, buttries to do“good” • Den Zuk --- 1988, removed Brain virus • Later versions would reformat disk… • Cheese --- 2001, remove li0n worm • Created lots of network traffic • Welchia --- 2003, patched problem that Blaster exploited (used official MS patch) • Lots of traffic, cure worse than disease
Predator Worms • Like Cheese and Welchia • Destroy malware and/or immunize • Trying to do good, but it’s still illegal • Previous “predators” caused problems • Might be OK on local network • But how to prevent spread to Internet? • Other technical problems • Control, bandwidth use, monitoring, etc.
Benevolent Malware • No “killer app” for benevolent malware • Everything can be done by more controlled means • Many unresolved issues… • Legal issues • Ethical issues • Technical issues • Mobile agents --- a niche application?
Mobile Agents • Program transfers itself over network • It does things on behalf of a user • For example, propagate to various airline sites in search of best airfare • Questions about mobile agent security • Has a lot in common with malware • A “solution in search of a problem”? • Mobile agents have some advantages, but what they do can be done by other means
Mobile Agents • Previous master’s project • Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) • Privacy policies that websites follow • Student developed an “agent-based privacy enhancing model” • Used agents to analyze P3P preferences • Essentially, a reputation system • Research papers are here and here
Spam • Infection may be “means to an end” • For example, DDoS attacks or • May use zombies/bots for spam • Harvest your email address • Customized spam so that it looks like it came from you , and so on • Aycock has lots of interest in spam • Spam simulator: Spamulator
Access-for-Sale Worms • “Scalable, targeted intrusion” • Compromise machine, install back door • Access to the back door is for sale • Might, for example, use key for access • Can’t allow unauthorized access • So, patch flaws once access obtained • Good for ID theft, blackmail, etc. • Like a botnet, but single machine(s)
Access-for-Sale Worms • Two “business models” • Organized crime • Attacker and cyberthieves work together • Defenses? • Disorganized crime • Attacker sells access to cyberthieves • How to advertise? • Defenses?
Access-for-Sale Worms • Organized crime
Access-for-Sale Worms • Disorganized crime
Access-for-Sale Worms • Good idea to use public key crypto • That is, worm carries public key, and… • Private key used to access back door • What is the advantage of public key crypto over symmetric key crypto?
Cryptovirology • Use malware for extortion • Example: virus encrypts valuable data • Victim must pay to get decryption key • Again, public key crypto is best here • Note that data encrypted with symmetric key, and symmetric key is encrypted with a public key (we call this “hybrid crypto” in CS 265) • Password-protected may be good enough
Cryptovirology • Examples • AIDS Trojan --- 1989 • Floppy disk, sent by mail, with “curious software license” • Encrypted files if user didn’t pay • PGPCoder Trojan (Gpcode, 2006) • Encrypted files having various extensions • Cost $200 to buy decryptor
Information Warfare • Use computers to supplement (or supplant?) conventional warfare • Acquire info from adversary’s computers • Plant false info, corrupt data, denial of service, etc. • Laws and such are not clear • Of limited use if communication infrastructure is damaged…
Information Warfare • Electronic countermeasures (ECM) • Deny enemy use of electronic technology • For example, radar jamming • Information warfare analog of ECM? • Denial of service • Comparison with traditional ECM?
Information Warfare • ECM vsDoS • Persistence --- jamming usually temporary, malware can last longer • Targeting --- ECM uses direct targeting, malware could be direct or indirect • Deception --- possible in both cases • Range of effects --- limited in ECM, much broader with malware (logic bomb, DoS, precision attack, intelligence gathering, forced quarantine, …)
Information Warfare • ECM vsDoS • Reliability --- ECM may be more difficult to test, so reliability is less certain • Continuity --- ECM subject to “ECCM”, while malware only has to succeed once and can attack weakest link • Indirect ways to insert malware? • Software vendors, dormant in systems, deliberately leak infected systems, etc.
Cyberterrorism • Difficult to define? • Create fear, not just irritate users • Inability to use facebook does not strike fear of death into (most) users • So cyberterrorist must somehow create tangible results in real world • Nuclear power plants, utility grid, … ???
Cyberterrorism • Similar uses as info warfare • That is, supplement to real attacks • For example, attack communication infrastructure during physical attack to delay response, cause confusion, etc. • Disinformation before and during attack • Other?