Japan's Efforts on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Regional Framework

1. Japan's Efforts on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Regional Framework SEMINARIO ABACC 20 ANOS 10-11 November 2011 Rio de Janeiro, BRAZIL HIROSHI TAMAI Department of Science and Technology for Nuclear Material Management (STNM) Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)

2. CONTENTS • Japan’s Position • State’s System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC) • Regional Framework • Impact of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP Accident This presentation shows neither official statement of Government of Japan nor that of JAEA. 2

3. Japan’s Position

4. Japan’s Policy on Peaceful Nuclear Activity • Japan： • only nation suffered by Atomic Bomb • actively promotes the policy on peaceful nuclear activity disarmament non-proliferation Japan was the first bombed nation and shall be the last one. ◆ Atomic Energy Basic Law(Dec. 1955) The research, development and utilization of atomic energy shall be limited to peaceful purposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently under democratic management, the results there from shall be made publicto contribute to international cooperation. ◆Three Non-nuclear Principles Nuclear weapons: not making, not possessing, not bringing in Memorial Dome (Hypocentre in Hiroshima) registered as the World Heritage in Dec. 1996

5. Japan’s Chronology of Peaceful Nuclear Activity 1945.8 Atomic bombs on Hiroshima & Nagasaki 1947 The Constitution 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Act • accepted to IAEA • first application of IAEA safeguards to JRR-3 fuel 1967 Three Non-nuclear Principles NSG 1975 1976 ratified NPT 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s CSA in force 1977 PP Convention in force 1988 signed CTBT 1996 AP in force 1999 IS Broader Conclusion 2004 Nuclear Terrorism Convention concluded 2007 State level approach2011

6. State’s System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC)

7. Legislative Measures for SSAC in Japan ◆ Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors (Jun. 1957) Chap.1 General Rules Chap.2~6-1 Regulations concerning individual business Chap.6-2 Control concerning the uses of international controlled material (U, Pu, Th) Permission, Report, Record, Accounting and Control, Safeguards Inspection, Designated organisation Chap.6-3 Concerning welding inspection Chap.7 Designation and Permission, Collecting reports, Entering inspections Chap.8 Penal rules ◆ Ordinance for the Use of International Controlled Material - Accountancy & Control - Safeguards Inspection 7

8. SSAC Inspections in Japan for 2010 Note: PDI does not include the person days of DIV and CA 9

9. Development of Integrated Safeguards in Japan • First Broader Conclusion on Japan by IAEA (Jun. 2004) • Introductory Statement of the Director General of IAEA at Board of Governors: • “I am pleased to note that the secretariat was recently able to reach all conclusions needed for the implementation of integrated safeguards in Japan-the State with the largest nuclear program subject to Agency safeguards.” • Facility Level Integrated Safeguards (2004-) • 2004 LWR without MOX, RRCAs, Spent Fuel Storage • LWR with/without MOX, LEU • RRP • Small Facilities and LOFs, Nigyo-Toge R&D • Site Level Integrated Safeguards (2008-) • JNC-1 site (TRP, PFPF and etc.) • JNC-4 site (Monju Fast Breeder Reactor) • JNC-2 site (Joyo Fast Reactor, Critical Assembly and etc.) • JNFL-2 site (Rokkasho Enrichment Plant and etc.) Development of Integrated Safeguards approaches for all facilities and LOFs in Japan was completed as the end of 2010. 10 • Concept of IS • The Optimum Combination of all Safeguards Measures available to the IAEA under CSA and AP to achieve the Maximum Effectiveness and Efficiency • Reduction in Verification Effort for Declared Material, based on Assurance of the Absence of Undeclared Nuclear Material and Activities through Additional Protocol Measure • Utilization of Random Interim Inspections

10. Contribution to IAEA Safeguards Issues • Safeguards Framework - Adoption of INFCIRC/153 - Adoption of INFCIRC/540 - IAEA Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards Implementation (SAGSI) Enforcement of safeguards measures • Technical Projects - Hexapartite Safeguards Project (HSP): 1980-82 Establishment of safeguards measures in centrifugal enrichment plant - Tokai Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise (TASTEX):1978-81 Improvement of safeguards technologies in Tokai reprocessing plant - Large Scale Reprocessing Plant Safeguards (LASCAR):1988-92 Development of effective safeguards technologies in large reprocessing plant - Information Treatment Assistance Programme (ITAP): 1992-98 Effective evaluation of safeguards information - Japan Support Programme for Agency Safeguards (JASPAS): 1981- Development of technologies for advanced inspections

11. Regional Framework

12. Cooperation in Regional Framework Research & Development in Asia & Pacific RCA (1972- )‘Regional Co-operative Agreement for Research, Development and Training Related to Nuclear Science and Technology for Asia and the Pacific’ - Research, Development, Training in Nuclear Science and Technology - 17 member states FNCA (1990- ) ‘Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia’ - Socioeconomic development in peaceful and safe utilization of nuclear technology - 12 member states APSN (2009- ) ‘Asia-Pacific Safeguards Network’ - Improvement of quality, effectiveness, efficiency of safeguards implementation - 14 member states Background of Nuclear Renaissance in 21 Century Energy Security & Environmental Security => Revival of Nuclear Energy New comer countries to have Nuclear Power Plant => Support for infrastructure Japan’s Standpoint Support cooperation - material/equipment for nuclear plant - domestic framework to ensure 3S aiming at peaceful use BilateralCooperation Agreement

13. BilateralCooperation Agreements between Japan ・Peaceful use of Nuclear Materials => Ensuring Safeguards, Security/PP ・Export/Import of nuclear materials, Technical cooperation, Transfer ・Regulation on enrichment and reprocessing Nations concluded/signed the Agreement/Memorandum between Japan signed 1980 1998 signed 2006 2011 1990 1988 1986 signed signed MoC MoC Negotiationin progress 1982 Other MoC (Memorandum of Cooperation ): Italy, Kuwait, Mongolia, Poland, UAE Other Negotiation in progress: India, South Africa, Turkey, UAE 14

14. SSAC Training Course ・IAEA Safeguards ・SSAC ・Accountancy & Control ・Design Information ・Exercise for NDA and C/S ・Facility Visit Structure Program Entrust Training Request to cooperation MEXT Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippine, China, Bangladesh, South Korea, Mongolia, Myanmar, Singapore, Japan, Kazakhstan, Russia, Australia, Others Countries IAEA SG Support Program (JASPAS) Lectures IAEA, MEXT, NMCC, JAEA Purpose of Training • To provide participants with institutional and operational concepts and technology in the areas of nuclear material accountancy and control systems. • To enable participants to initiate, operate and maintain such systems in their countries to meet national safeguards objectives. • To meetinternational standard required by the IAEA. SSACTraining Course for Asian and Pacific region is held every year. • To provide participants with institutional and operational concepts and technology in the areas of nuclear material accountancy and control systems. • To enable participants to initiate, operate and maintain such systems in their countries to meet national safeguards objectives. • To meet international standard required by the IAEA.

15. Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security Cooperation MEXT METI NISA US(DOE) Building a framework IAEA Cooperation Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security Cooperation Cooperation Nuclear non-proliferation and Safeguards Nuclear security Domestic Organizations ・Human resources development for Asian countries ・Training course for IAEA inspectors ・Security of nuclear material, facilities and transport ・Exercise at a mock facility Cooperation Cooperation ROK, China, etc Hub for International Joint Research ASNO EU Australian Safeguards and Non-proliferation Office FNCA, APSN Asian countries Background Kazakhstan, Mongolia(Expert Seminar in2011) Japan’s National Statement at the Nuclear Security Summit (2010, Washington) Japan will this year establish a regional center for the strengthening of nuclear security, tentatively named “the Integrated Comprehensive Support Center for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security for Asia” under JAEA. 16

16. Present Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Definition by UN Semey (2009) • Total absence of nuclear weapons • An international system of verification and control • General Assembly resolution 34/72B (1975) Bangkok (1997) Rarotonga (1986) Pelindaba (2009) Tlatelolco (1969) Description in Treaty • Obligations • nuclear weapons: to prohibit and prevent test, use, manufacture, production, acquisition, receipt, storage, installation, development, possession • Control system • IAEA safeguards • (Regional system not explicitly indicated) • Weapon States Protocol 17

17. Prospect of North-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Statement (1991) DPRK: withdrawal from NPT (2003) nuclear tests (2006, 2009) de facto dead letter Mongolian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (1992) adopted by the UN General Assembly (1998) (Resolution 53/77D, 55/33S) Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (1997) entry into force • Issues on the North-East Asia NWFZ • purpose: mutual observation ? cooperation enforcement ? • total/partial denuclearization ? ASIATOM ? • regional backend ? • member states: Japan, ROK, DPRK, (Mongolia ?), (China ?) • step to function: denuclearization, verification • concern: politically unstable relationship (DPRK, China, any other alliance)

18. Way to North-East Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone • Good practice in Countries of former USSR • Denuclearization (1995) • Central Asia NWFZ Treaty (2009) Denuclearization • Mutual confidence building • - political issue like 6-Parties negotiation • Denuclearization, Verification • - support by nuclear weapon states, etc. Japan’s support fortheir denuclearization, verification - Equipment for SSAC & PP - Cleaning-up & Medical care at test site Construction of control system (conjecture) SSAC (already fullyimplemented in each country) technical support, transport RSAC (a good model: ABACC/EURATOM) • Collaboration with APSN (China, ROK, Japan, Russia, USA…) • Position in NWFZ (not explicit in present NWFZ) 19

19. Impact of Fukushima-Daiichi NPP Accident

20. Sequence of the Accident • Loss of off-site power due to the earthquake • Diesel generator inoperable due to the tsunami • All motor operated pumps including ECCS became inoperable • Decrease in reactor water level • Uncovering the Core • Hydrogen generation due to the Zirconium- Water reaction • Possible fuel rod damage http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/japanchallenges/pdf/japan-challenges_full.pdf 21

21. Roadmap towards resolving the accident 3 months 6~9 months 11 Mar. 17 Apr. Step 1 Step 2 Radiation dose in steady decline Controlling release of radioactive materials(significant reduction of dose level) Target Stable cooling - Resume heat exchange function - [Unit 1,3] Flood up to top of active fuel - [Unit 2] Seal the damaged location Achieve cold shutdown -temperature below 100 degree -below 1 mSv/yr at site boundary [Reactors] Stable cooling - Enhance reliability of water injection - Restore coolant circulation system - [Unit 4] Install supporting structure More stable cooling - Maintain sufficient level of water by remote-control - Resume heat exchange function [Spent Fuel Pools] [Contaminated Water] Decrease contaminated water(decontaminate and desalt) Secure storage place - Prevent leakage to the outside of the site [Contaminated Atmosphere/Soil] Prevent spreading Install reactor building cover

22. Draft Items to be studiedfor Nuclear Material Control • Review on nuclear material control technology & • methodology applied in TMI-2 and Chernobyl-4 • Study on concept of nuclear material control & • Safeguards Approach • (1)Nuclear Material in spent fuel pond • - Analysis of possible access paths/access points • - C/Smeasures • - Verification at shipment • (2) Nuclear Material in core (Debris) • - Estimation and evaluation for initial inventory • - Mapping (incl. degraded fuels, waste materials, dispersed fuel to environment) • - Procedure of Nuclear Material accountancy and declaration(sample measurement, Shipping container measurement) • - Verification procedure at shipment of debris (Mobile monitoring etc.) • - C/S measures for core debris (if necessary) • - Safeguards approach appropriate to a treatment method of debris • Study on measurement method for debris

23. JAEA’s Contribution to the Accident Headquarters of Fukushima Partnership Operations established on 6 May To contribute to the resolution of the various challenges for the ultimate recoveryfrom the accident Autonomous Unmanned Helicopter • A. Environment Radiation Monitoring • B. Environmental Radioactivity Analyses • C. Resident Public Consulting • D. Scientific Advice and Technical Supports • E. Equipment Support • (A-DTotal 34,884Man-Days since 11 March.) • http://www.jaea.go.jp/english/jishin/gaiyou/e1103.pdf Monitoring car Decontamination of Schoolyards and Swimming Pools Bodywasher Trial of remedial actions for forest Scientific advice Technical support 24 Public consulting Radio controlled vehicle with g-eye Contamination Survey

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25. SUMMARY • Japan has intensively promoted the peaceful use of nuclear energy based on well equipped SSAC, leading to the compliance record along the international norms. • Japan has developed the regional support programme in aspects of non-proliferation and peaceful use, which contributes to transparency and confidence building. • Aiming at NWFZ in North-East Asia, many political and technical issues are to be cleared for confidence building and RSAC. • Lessons from the Fukushima-Daiichi NPP accident should be shared world-wide to promote the peaceful use in safe and secure manner. 26

26. Obrigado porsuaaudição Thank you for listening