Egypt National Security

1. Egypt National Security

2. The Economic Landscape Pre-Mubarak Fall • GDP was growing at 5% a year. • A strong banking system and balance of payments.

3. The Economic Landscape Post-Mubarak • GDP crashed, falling by 4% in the year to the first quarter. • Official reserves have fallen by $9 billion this year. • The government is facing an external-financing gap of about $11 billion in the second half of this year

4. Key Strategic Points • Egypt = Oldest continuous nation-state in M.E. • Egypt = Most homogeneous nation-state in M.E. • Egypt = Under extended foreign domination • Egypt = Easy to invade/not easy to defend • Egypt = “Gift of the Nile.” Herodotus • Egypt = Leading Arab power • Egypt = Strategic Rentier State • Egypt = Military is paramount in national security

5. Egyptian National Security in modern times, 1952-1981(I) • National Security under Nasser I, 1952-1956: • Ext. threats: Britain, France, Israel • Int. threats: Communists, Islamists, Weakness of the Military • National Security under Nasser II, 1956-1970: • Ext. threats: Israel, the West, Arab monarchies • Int. threats: Islamists, Socioeconomic Crises, Leftists, • Functional threats: Weapons of Mass Destruction, Water • National Security under Sadat I, 1970-1973: • Ext. threats: Israel, Israel, Israel • Int. threats: Political Factions, Left-wing groups, Students & Intellectuals, Islamists, Armed Forces

6. Egyptian National Securityin modern times, 1952-1981 (II) • National Security under Sadat II, 1973-1978: • Ext. threats: Israel, Libya, Ethiopia, Instability in Africa & Sudan, threats to Arab monarchies • Int. threats: Islamists, Left-wing, Socioeconomic crises, Armed Forces • National Security under Sadat, III, 1979-1981: • Ext. threats: Israel, Libya, Soviet Union, Africa south of the Sahara, Islamic Republic of Iran, • Int. threats: Political and socioeconomic crises, Armed Forces • Functional threats: WMD proliferation, General Regional Instability, Water

7. Egyptian National Security under Husni Mubarak, 1981-Present • External Threats: • Israel • Iran • Iraq • Sudan • Libya • Islamic Radical Infiltration • Internal Threats: • Islamist Insurgency • Socioeconomic Crisis • Political Delegitimization • Functional Threats: • WMD Proliferation and Strategic Imbalance • General Regional Instability

8. Egyptian National Security:Role of U.S./Egypt and Nukes • Egypt and U.S.: From Adversary to Ally/Mentor • Benefits: • Relationship w/ most powerful nation • High-tech military • Socioeconomic Aid • Costs: • Constraints on independence • Favors Israel • Causes more instability than removes it • Egypt and Nukes: • Why do states seek Nukes: Int. System exp.; State exp.; Nuclear Myth-makers and Domestic Politics exp.; Technological exp. • Why do states forego Nukes: Costs, reliance on major ally, lowered security threat

9. Prospects for Post-Mubarak Egypt: The rise of the Islamic Current • Under the Mubarak regime there was a sort of tactical arrangement that allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to operate vast social welfare programs , especially in areas where the government was dysfunctional , and even to compete in limited fashion in legislative elections, so long as the MB candidates campaigned as “independents”. • The demise of the Mubarak regime provided an opening for the MB to return to the political stage as a fully legitimate actor with the imperative to adopt a very delicate balance between, on the one hand, embracing the ideals of change, democracy and revolution and, on the other hand redefining and updating the tacit arrangements with the military. • The Brotherhood does not occupy the Islamist space on the Egyptian political spectrum all by itself. There are at least six different elements within the overall Islamist current. Moving from the most radical to the most liberal, these include: The Islamic Jihad; the extremist Salafiyun; the Brotherhood and its new political party, the Freedom and Justice Party; the liberal wing of the Brotherhood; the youth of the Brotherhood , which sometimes coalesces with liberal and leftist youth; and the al-Wasat/Center party, which is led disaffected Brotherhood members. • One implication of this variety of Islamist political groupings-especially the impact of the emergence of the salafis as political actors- is that is has the effect of making the brotherhood look more mainstream and moderate, by comparison. • One additional facet of Islamist politics is the extent to which a variety of groups reportedly receive funding from foreign sources, especially from Saudi Arabia and Gulf. Informed observers especially focus on Salafi groups as recipients of this funding, which has the potential to distort the local political environment.

10. Are deep concerns about the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence warranted? • The Brotherhood is a profoundly political organization that will tactically exploit whatever opportunities it is offered to reorder Egyptian society in an Islamist fashion. • Should the Brotherhood achieve political power , it will almost certainly use that power to transform Egypt into a very different place. The more likely outcome would be a deeper and systemic Islamization of society, including the potential for a frightening growth of sectarianism between Muslims and Copts and even deepening intra-Muslim conflict between Salafis and Sufis. • However, while extreme wariness and caution is warranted, it would be a mistake to operate under the assumption that the Brotherhood’s ascension to power is inevitable, given the country’s broad range of political alternatives and the fact that the Brotherhood does not command majority support among the Egyptian public. • Moreover, the Supreme Military Council maintenance of the most important elements of the Mubarak-era constitution suggests that the Egyptian military does not intend to change an electoral system that effectively prevents the Brotherhood from achieving political power through the ballot box. • Still, it is important to be vigilant about the mainstreaming of the Brotherhood in Egyptian political life and the impetus this would give to the Islamization of domestic politics and foreign policy.