U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead

1. U.S. Submarine Force Way Ahead

2. Submarine Force Situational Awareness • Reduced DoD budget • Little or no growth in shipbuilding account • Diverging trends • Increasing requirements and responsibilities • Diminishing resources • Seamless leadership focus required • Embark on a unifying effort

3. Integrated Undersea Warfare • Submarines are asymmetric weapons • Stealth is a force multiplier • ASW is hard and getting harder • Submarines are the optimum ASW platform • Anti-Access/Area Denial must be defeated • Submarine's unique access increasingly valuable to the Joint Force • Adapt/leverage new payloads and sensors

4. Why Submarines in WWII • Requisites: • A National imperative • - World War II • Inadequacy of other platforms • - Battle Force – Much of the Pacific Fleet is “Out of Action” • Value added by distinctive submarine characteristics • - Stealth, speed, endurance, and the right weapon • Ability to step up to critical new roles • - From “Fleet Scouts” to Anti-Surface Ship Warfare “Hunter-Killers” • R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities • - Continuous welds, Sonar, Radar, Mark 14 Torpedo Issues • A strategy built around the submarine • – “Strangulation of Japan” → Capital Ships, Merchants, Tankers Submarines (1.6% of the Navy) Sunk 54.6% of all Japanese Ships Sunk During the War

5. 1940 1950 1960 1970 Why Submarines in the Cold War • Requisites: • A National imperative • - Cold War – Contain Communism • Inadequacy of other platforms • - ISR, Deterrence • Value added by distinctive submarine characteristics • - Stealth, speed, endurance • Ability to step up to critical new roles • - From “Hunter-Killers” to “ISR, Strategic ASW and Strategic Deterrence” • R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities • - Nuclear Power, Acoustic Quieting, Sonar, Ballistic Missiles, MK-48 torpedo • A strategy built around the submarine • – “Control the Seas – Resupply Europe” 1947 1942 1955 1965 First Controlled Nuclear Chain Reaction “Underway on Nuclear Power" First Fleet Ballistic Missile 41 For Freedom Construction Complete

6. Why Submarines Now and in the Future • Requisites: • A National imperative • Rise of Global challenges to U.S. Supremacy • Counter A2/AD Peer, IW, Regional Conflict, Sea Control, Piracy… • Inadequacy of other platforms • - Only submarines have assured access in A2AD environments • Value added by distinctive submarine characteristics • - Stealth, speed, endurance, modular payloads, COTs electronics • Ability to step up to critical new roles • Strike, SOF Support, SEAD, Information Operations • Prompt Strike • R&D contributions with mission-enabling capabilities • Photonics Mast, Unmanned Systems Integration, Ship Automation • Unmanned systems integration (UAVs, UUVs, DNS) • A strategy built around the submarine • Sea Control / Sea Denial / Assured Access • Air/Sea Battle Emerging Concepts Requiring Additional Development

7. Platforms • The U.S. Submarine Force consists of: • 42 Los Angeles class attack submarines (SSN) • 3 Seawolfclass attack submarines • 9 Virginia class attack submarines • 4 Ohio class Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) • 14 Ohio class Ballistic Missile Submarines (SSBN)

8. SSN Force • Current Requirements (2005 Assessment) • 10 SSNs providing Forward Presence (FP) • Able to surge 35 SSNs: includes war plan support • Need 48 SSNs to surge 35 and keep 10 for FP • Fewer ships - greater risk • Current Allocation • SSNs assigned missions only they can perform • Mission categories: critical, high priority, priority, routine • CJCS allocation of 10 just meets critical missions • Future Outlook • A2/AD • Prompt Strike

9. 15Months Transit Turnover/ Maintenance Transit Homeport Maintenance SOF Cert Turnover/ Maintenance Turnover/ Maintenance 10 ½ Months Theater Presence 70% Operational Availability SSGN Force • 4 Ships each capable of carrying: • 154 TLAM (105 typical loadout) • 2 Dry Deck Shelters • 66 SOF for > 60 Days • 2-3 ships always in theater Bangor WA Kings Bay GA Guam Diego Garcia SSGN Mission: High Volume Precision Strike & High Volume SOF Support Able to Perform Many Other SSN Missions

10. SSBN Force • 14 OHIO class SSBNs • 100% of survivable warheads • 54% of operational warheads • 70% under NEW START • 19% of strategic budget • 3900 SSBN patrols since 1960 • TRIDENT(D-5) on OHIO 2042 • Survivable Leg of TRIAD • Significant hedge capability 135 Consecutive Successes 1000 Ohio class SSBN Patrols

11. VirginiaClass SSN Program • Current Plan: 30 Ship Class • Block I: 1998 - 4 ships • All delivered • Block II: 2003 - 6 ships • 4 delivered, 2 under construction • Block III: 2008 - 8 ships • 2 ships per year in 2011 • Acquisition Program • $93B (TY) Procurement Program • APB assumes 30 hulls

12. Virginia Class Improvement Focus 15,000 12,500 10,000 7,500 5,000 2,500 0 "… the cost of them has got to come down ... it's got to be about $2 billion a ship.” ADM Michael G. Mullen Sept 2005 >40% Labor >40% Labor Reduction Reduction • Cost Reduction Strategy • Perform on the Backlog • Design For Affordability • Acquisition Strategy # of Recurring Manhours xK Unit Cost Unit Cost Reduced by Reduced by 4.9M Hours 4.9M Hours To Date To Date SSN803 Unit 1 Unit 7 Unit 30

13. Block III Bow Redesign SSGN MAC Benefits • Parts Reduction – 50K reduced to 29K • Pumps and Valves Further Reduced • Hull Penetrations – 136 reduced to 64 • Life of Ship Components added to the design • Concept to Reality in 18 Months • $800M Total Program Acquisition Savings First Bow Payload Tubes

14. 2010 Nuclear Posture Review • Retained the TRIAD and implies future retention • SSBN most survivable leg of TRIAD • No viable near- or mid-term threat to U.S. SSBNs • Requires continuous at-sea presence in both oceans • Keeps 14 SSBNs in the near-term • Expect to maintain 20 operational tubes per SSBN by 2015

15. OHIO class Replacement Program • Milestone A Achieved on 10 Jan 2011 • Initiated Technology Development Phase • Target Average ship cost (2-12) = 4.9B (FY10$) • Target Average ship annual O&S = 110M (FY10$) • Common Missile Compartment • Electric Drive Propulsion • 16 Missile Tubes • Maximize commonality with VCS

16. Submarine Industrial Base • Situation • Two private construction yards • Electric Boat • Newport News Shipbuilding • Issues • Shrinking supplier base • 75% (by $) sole-source suppliers • 75% of suppliers are small businesses • Need 2500 designers to sustain a submarine design capability

17. Undersea Payload Capacity 250 Payload Capacity Will Decline, As The Value of Undersea Delivery Increases 200 150 Payload Volume (ft^3) SSGN Thousands 100 * Assumes 30 Ship Virginia Class @ 2/year Starting 2011 50 VIRGINIA* 688 0 2009 2014 2019 2024 2029 2034 2039 2044 2049 2054 2059 66% Reduction in Payload Capacity From 2024-2030 New Ship Options Are Unaffordable Flat Fish Study 1999 DARPA Future Sub Study 2003 Towed Payload Module Study 1998 Multi-Mission Module Study 2002 New SSGN 20XX Towed Payload Module Virginia Hull Plugs

18. 48 48 Plan of Record OHIO Replacement SSBN (12) (34) New SSN (27) III Fiscal Constraints 1 1 II IV V (18) (37) (27) (10) Shortfall of SSNs 2 2 46 39 SSNs Uninterrupted Strategic Deterrence 3 3 SSBNs Sufficient Payload Volume 4 4 SSGNs

19. Submarine Force Campaign Design • Force wholeness and integrity • Maintenance/modernization/training Ao • Operations and warfighting today • Safe/secure/effective operations • Operations and warfighting tomorrow • Force structure/payload volume/payloads

20. Integrated Undersea Strategy Issues Actions OHIO Replacement Performance and Schedule Keep OHIO Replacement top priority SSN Force Structure Shortfall Add two lowest cost SSNs with best impact Undersea Payload Volume after SSGN Retirement Add VIRGINIA payload module to 20 SSNs Undersea Payload Capability Gaps Evolutionary payload enhancements with high return

21. SSN Force Procurement Changes Add 2 Cost-Efficient Hulls Delay New SSN Start

22. Virginia Payload Module • 40 Tomahawk / TACMS • 8-12 Prompt strike weapons • Battle management center • Inboard SOF storage • Targeting Block V ships

23. VPM Restores Payload Capacity 1400 1272 Launchers 1200 Block VII 1000 SSGNs Block VI Total # of Launchers Stretch SSN Capacity 800 (4 VPM) Block V 600 400 SSNs (2 Large Bow Tubes) SSNs(12 Vertical Launch Tubes) 200 SSN Torpedo Tubes 0 Fiscal Year VPM added to Blocks V, VI and VII restores most of the payload capacity and distributes it across more hulls

24. Modular, Flexible Payload Plan Advance Dry-Deck Shelter Swimmer Delivery Vehicles Combat Rubber Raiding Rafts Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicles 2 Large Bow Payload Tubes 12 Missile Stows Virginia Payload Module (per tube) 3 Prompt Strike Weapons or; 7 Cruise Missiles or; 7 Torpedoes or; 14 Miniature Air Launched Decoys or: 1 Large UUV Reconfigurable Torpedo Room 24 Torpedoes or; 21” Unmanned Systems or; Distributed Networked Systems or; Decoys Special Operations Force Berthing

25. Summary • Challenges are clear - plan is in place • Submarine Force leadership is focused and unified • VCS program is DoD role model • ORP execution is key