August 5 th , 2008

1. August 5th, 2008 -unclassified-

2. Need for visible and effective Palestinian advances, based on: Civilians and economic measures Security measures “Pilot Jenin” - Principles On May 4th, the “Pilot Jenin” program went into effect. An Israeli initiative, the program is currently implemented through direct coordination between the Palestinians and Israel, with limited American involvement.The program is part of the attempt to strengthen the moderate Palestinian camp, led by Abu-Mazen, implementing results from the Annapolis Conference. The pilot focuses on economic, civil and security assistance which allows more responsibility to be transferred to the Palestinian Authority in Jenin. This includes improved Palestinian activity in the preservation of law and order and a more stable security environment. Israel will continue counter-terrorist operations as long as the PA does not do so itself. The program provides the PA with the necessary infrastructure but responsibility for it’s implementation is fully Palestinian -unclassified-

3. Pilot Guidelines • The program relies on a combination of security and civilian-economic elements in a specific geographical area in the West Bank, in order to implement visible and effective positive changes. Due to unique characteristics, the Jenin district was chosen as the area for the program to be implemented. • The pilot is a cohesive plan which aims to create instant and effective changes in the field, leading to an increase in the quality of Palestinian way-of-life in the West Bank. Israel is promoting the plan to create positive momentum, particularly among the Palestinian leadership and population. As a result, Israel is prepared to support the project, despite inherent security risks this may create. • Israeli has chosen to cooperate with the international community and the Palestinians, leading the initiative as part of the implementation of the Annapolis conference. This is part of the effort to increase the PA’s willingness to bear more responsibility for internal security issues and to strengthen the PA leadership, institutions and security mechanisms. • The project is based on the understanding that despite intensive Israeli and international assistance, the PA must assume more responsibility, increase efforts to reinforce itself and expand its control through efficient and functioning institutions. -unclassified-

4. Jenin – General Attributes The Jenin district is the northern-most Palestinian district in the West Bank. The majority of the 250,000 residents work in agriculture-related fields. As a result of the withdrawal from four West Bank Israeli villages during the 2005 Disengagement, there are no Israeli villages or cities in its near vicinity (besides the village of Mevo Dotan). It is also relatively far from other Palestinian villages. The Security Fence is located north of the city. A number of terrorist organizations are active in the district, including elements of Fatah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Hamas. Cooperation between these elements of Fatah and the Islamic Jihad exists as well. As a result, Israeli security forces operate within the city. There are approximately 2000 security personnel in the area, as well as hundreds of police officers, armed with hundreds of weapons. Golan Heights Haifa Beit Shean Jenin Tel Aviv Jerusalem Be’er Sheva Eilat -unclassified-

5. Economic and Civil Measures ECONOMIC • Establishment of industrial centers in Mukeible (980 dunam) • Wheat silos in Ja’alyma • Industrial complex for Jenin’s stonemasons. • Agricultural project in Abed-Malek Jaber (300 dunams). Will include a processing and packing factory as well. • Rehabilitation of 7 major roads and axes • Sewage infrastructure improvements, including: • A pipe connecting the village of Barta’a to the Israeli sewage network, as well as 28 other locations • Upgrade of the Jenin treatment plant • Connection of 11 villages to the water network • Electric projects: • Increase of power supply to Tubas by 5 MV • Connection of Um-Reihan village to the electrical grid • Placement of solar units -unclassified-

6. Economic and Civil Measures (cont.) CIVIL RESTRICTION EASINGS • Additional 1,000 work permits within Israeli granted • 1,200 overnight work permits (600 agriculture, 600 construction) • Increase in permitted businessman entry to Jenin (300 added on to the existing 980 permits) • Distribution of 22 additional BMC (businessman and merchant entry cards), raising the sum to 33 • 13 VIP entry cards distributed to local PA leaders and governors • Improvement of Ja`lama and Rihan crossings • Easier movement for businessmen at checkpoints, with extended opening hours of the checkpoints. • Easier movement to the Jordan Valley, including agricultural and public transportation vehicles. 135 additional vehicles have received permits, in addition to 95 existing permits. • Easing of entry for Arab-Israelis into Jenin. • 690 undocumented aliens from Jenin have received Palestinian identification cards. • Creation of a bus line from Allenby, passing through Jericho. -unclassified-

7. Planned Security Measures • Establishment of four new police stations in the Jenin-Tubas area (of which 3 are already active), to complement the existing 27 police stations in the region: • Aqaba (June 13th). • Phara’a (June 13th) • Tamun (June 13th) • BeitKad (June 15th) • Implantation of a rapid coordination mechanism with the IDF to approve Palestinian security activity in under minimal time. • Approval for the deployment of 700 security personnel. 17.5.08 4.5.08 WEAPONS CONFISCATED BY PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES -unclassified-

8. Interim Results • Until now, the majority of security activity in the region has focused on criminal activity. No significant active and effective Palestinian counter-terrorist activity has occurred; only two terrorists have been arrested and two Islamic Jihad members have been injured. • Israel has passed on information about 4 terrorists and 14 Hamas locations which are part of the Dahwa infrastructure. The terrorists were warned but no active efforts have been taken against them or the Hamas locations. • Information sharing between Palestinian preventive units is insufficient, leading to a lack of cooperation and coordination between the Palestinian units. • There has been a decline in active measures taken; out of the original 700 security personnel deployed, only 380 remain. • The “revolving door” phenomenon continues as well – out of 246 criminal arrests, the bulk have been released by PA security forces. 69 out of 80 security arrests have been released as well. • Out of thousands of existing illegal weapons, only 17 weapons have been confiscated by PA forces and transferred to Israeli security forces. -unclassified-

9. Focal Points • Two months after the program began, it appears that it has been relegated to the role of a public order program, lacking a serious and efficient PA approach and leaving the core issue, terrorist activity, unanswered. In addition, economic measures have been delayed as a result of international holdups. • Although the plan has yet to be fully implemented in the Jenin district, the PA seeks to expand it to other areas as well. • The PA refuses to deploy the Jordanian-trained brigade, despite its superior ability to combat regional terror. • International efforts to create Palestinian institutes and strengthen security mechanisms coincide with Israeli interests. Israel is doing its utmost to support them, as manifested in a large number of security, economic and civilian measures, including removal of roadblocks, expanded cooperation with security forces, economic projects and more. • The international community, led by Blair, has yet to assist in short-term project such as road construction, water and electricity, all of which come at a relatively low cost but are capable of having a rapid positive effect. -unclassified-

10. Focal Points • The IDF operates only where required for counter-terrorist activity. • Israel expects the international community to clarify to the PA that significant efforts are required to ensure the success of the program. The strengthening of the PA’s governmental infrastructure, including civil and economic programs, and the deployment of security forces trained in Jordan, is vital to the program’s success. • Fundamental issues within the PA must be addressed. Beyond changed mechanisms, international assistance is required in order to establish effective government institutions and increase law-enforcement capabilities. The international community must demand effective, prolonged efforts to improve the security reality. Security shortcuts will ultimately render any achievements accomplished so far useless. • The proposed Palestinian state must not become another regional state which lacks governmental abilities to oppose domestic anti-Israeli terrorist organizations, such as Lebanon. We must be realistic enough to acknowledge that merely establishing a state may not be sufficient, as evident in daily barrages of rockets which were launched from the Gaza Strip on a daily basis until approximately two months ago. -unclassified-

11. Focal Points • Beyond a reform of the mechanisms, an efficient and capable governmental foundation, including a law system and an enforcement system, must be established. The PA today consists of two members without institutional or organizational support or backing. • Deep-rooted issues in the PA must be solved in order to establish “one PA, one law and one weapon”. Only leadership capable of answering the local population’s needs, while instituting public order and safety, can win the Palestinian public’s support and create a “political horizon”. • Regardless, it appears that a substantial transition stage, in which the Palestinians take required steps to improve the internal situation, is necessary. -unclassified-