POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy

POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy Week 2: Major Worldviews Practice and Analytical Implications January 17, 2007

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Three Readings • Mearscheimer and Walt, “An Unncessary War” • RUPE, “Behind the War in Iraq” • Ikenberry and Kupchan, “Liberal Realism”

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications An Unnecessary War • Why was the U.S.war against Iraqunnecessary? Professors John Mearscheimer and Stephen Walt

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why was the War Unnecessary? • The war was unnecessary because the justifications for the war were based on distorted history, and more importantly, faulty logic • The primary flaw in the argument forwar was that Saddam, as the leader of sovereign state, was somehow immune to the laws of realism, that he was a fundamentally irrational and therefore undeterrable “madman”

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why was the War Unnecessary? • The logic of realism tells us that “madman” arguments are, on their face, almost always wrong!

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why was the War Unnecessary? • Key assumptions and logic in Realism • Actors are presumed to be rational • Saddam, as a rational actor, was deterrable • The principle of deterrability means that Saddam did not represent a military threat to the United States

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications "I acted because I was not about to leavethe security of the American people inthe hands of a madman. I was notabout to stand by and wait and trust in the sanity and restraint of Saddam Hussein” - George W. BushOctober 10, 2003

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Was Saddam a Serial Aggressor? • A look at the evidence Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988): The “First” Gulf War Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iran-Iraq War • Iraq was threatened by the emergence of new, very hostile regime • Iran was diplomatically isolated • Iraq’s was supported by a “coalition of the willing” including the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and France

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iran-Iraq War U.S. support of Iraq: a critical point Realist logic: Washington feared the spread of Iran's theocratic, anti-Western ideology, which threatened American interests in the regionWith American support, Iraq’s capacity to achieve its strategic goal was very high

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait The authors: “Saddam's decision to invade Kuwait was primarily an attempt to deal with Iraq's continued vulnerability”

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait “We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait. Secretary Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America” April Glaspie US Ambassador to Iraq

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Wasn’t that irrational? Remember:Acting rationally does not mean you always make the right decision; sometimes you make a bad decision, but this is because actors generally do not have access to “perfect information”

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications Why didn’t Saddam Back Down? Other points • Once the US response was unmistakable, Saddam tried to negotiate a diplomatic settlement • During the conflict, Iraq did not use chemical-biological weapons against the US or its allies; nor were “Scuds” used against Saudi Arabia

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications What about a nuclear Iraq? Now that’s a clear threat, isn’t it? • Direct threat to the United States • Indirect threat, through “nuclear blackmail”

U.S. Foreign PolicyMajor Worldviews: Practice and Implications “The first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they [Iraqis] do acquire WMD, their weapons will be unusable because any attempt to use them will bring national obliteration” - Condoleeza Rice

POLS 425 U.S. Foreign Policy