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THE ALLIED ADVANCE IN THE PACIFIC. ISLAND-HOPPING TOWARDS JAPAN, 1942-44. IMPORTANT DATES. AUG., 1942- FEB., 1943: U.S. ASSAULTS / RETAKES GUADALCANAL NOV.,1942- JAN.,1943: ALLIED CAMPAIGN / CONQUEST OF NEW GUINEA APRIL, 1943 – JUNE, 1944: OPERATION CARTWHEEL
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THE ALLIED ADVANCE IN THE PACIFIC ISLAND-HOPPING TOWARDS JAPAN, 1942-44
IMPORTANT DATES • AUG., 1942- FEB., 1943: • U.S. ASSAULTS / RETAKES GUADALCANAL • NOV.,1942- JAN.,1943: • ALLIED CAMPAIGN / CONQUEST OF NEW GUINEA • APRIL, 1943 – JUNE, 1944: • OPERATION CARTWHEEL • NOV., 1943: BATTLE OF TARAWA • JUNE,1944: • THE BATTLE OF SAIPAN • BATTLE OF THE PHILIPPINE SEA • “THE GREAT MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT”
IMPORTANT TERMS / PEOPLE • ADMIRAL CHESTER H. NIMITZ • GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR • ADMIRAL WILLIAM F. HALSEY • THE SOLOMON ISLANDS • GUADALCANAL • “THE TOKYO EXPRESS” • NEW GUINEA • “ISLAND –HOPPING” • OPERATION CARTWHEEL • TARAWA • “THE GREAT MARIANAS TURKEY SHOOT”
PACIFIC SITUATION, SUMMER, 1942 • JUNE, 1942: BATTLE OF MIDWAY: • IJN IS DEALT 1ST MAJOR LOSS OF WWII • U.S. NAVY ACHIEVES 1ST MAJOR VICTORY IN PACIFIC • JAPANESE ADVANCE IN PACIFIC IS STOPPED • PROBLEM: • JAPANESE EMPIRE IS STILL AT IT’S GREATEST EXTENT • JAPAN STILL CONTROLS MOST MAJOR ISLANDS IN PACIFIC • AUSTRALIA IS STILL THREATENED BY JAPANESE • JAPAN HAS EXTENSIVE NETWORK OF FORTIFIED ISLAND CHAINS THAT MUST BE TAKEN • WHY? • NO INVASION OF JAPAN IS POSSIBLE UNTIL ISLANDS ARE TAKEN • ISLANDS CAN BE USED AS NAVAL AND AIR BASES • RESULT? ALLIES MUST FORM PLAN TO… • ASSAULT / SEIZE JAPANESE-CONTROLLED ISLANDS • ASSAULT & POSSIBLY INVADE JAPAN
PLANNING THE ADVANCE • PROBLEM: • WHAT WAS THE BEST WAY TO DEFEAT JAPAN? • WHAT ROUTE SHOULD THE ALLIES TAKE TO ADVANCE TOWARDS JAPAN? • NORTHERN ROUTE VIA N. PACIFIC ISLANDS? • SOUTHERN ROUTE THROUGH LARGER S.PACIFIC ISLANDS? • DECISION: THE SOUTHERN ROUTE • WHY? • MORE ISLANDS THERE • ISLANDS WERE CLOSER TO EACH OTHER • MANY S. PACIFIC ISLANDS WERE LARGER • SO…ISLANDS COULD BE BETTER USED FOR NAVAL / AIR BASES • SOUTHERN ROUTE WAS CLOSER TO AUSTRALIA • SO WHAT? • AUSTRALIA WAS ALLIED W/ U.S. • AUSSIE MILITARY WAS VITAL TO VICTORY • MANY U.S. TROOPS WERE BEING TRAINED/SUPPLIED THERE
PLANNING THE ADVANCE (cont’d.) • U.S. / ALLIED PLAN TAKES SHAPE: • ALLIED FORCES WILL ADVANCE TOWARD JAPAN ON TWO PARALLEL ROUTES • SOUTH-WEST PACIFIC ROUTE: • SOLOMON ISLANDS – NEW GUINEA – PHILIPPINES • CENTRAL PACIFIC ROUTE: • GILBERT ISLANDS – MARSHALL ISLANDS – MARIANA ISLANDS • WHAT FORCES WILL BE USED?: • S.W. PACIFIC ROUTE: U.S. ARMY, USMC, USN, AUST. • C. PACIFIC ROUTE: USN, USMC • WHO’S IN COMMAND?: • S.W. PACIFIC: DOUGLAS MacARTHUR • C. PACIFIC: CHESTER NIMITZ
GUADALCANAL • ALLIED OFFENSIVE BEGINS THERE: WHY? • GUADALCANAL IS @ SOUTHERN END OF JAPANESE EMPIRE • ISLAND HAS AIRFIELD ALLIES NEED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS • ISLAND CONTROLS SEA LANES TO AUSTRALIA • BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE IT’S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE • SO…ALLIES WANT IT / JAPANESE WANT TO KEEP IT • USMC GIVEN INITIAL TASK OF TAKING ISLAND (U.S.ARMY INVOLVED LATER ON) • AUG. ’42-FEB.,’43: VICIOUS FIGHTING ON ISLAND • JAPANESE DESPERATE TO HOLD ISLAND • THE “TOKYO EXPRESS” REINFORCES JAPANESE • U.S. NAVY DISRUPTS “TOKYO EXPRESS” • OTHER PROBLEMS: • TROPICAL CLIMATE • TROPICAL DISEASE (EX. MALARIA) • JUNGLE TERRAIN MAKES MOVEMENT DIFFICULT • FINAL RESULT: • JAPANESE CAN’T MAINTAIN TROOPS / SUPPLIES • CASUALTIES GROW (EX. 22,000 KIA/MIA) • JAPANESE WITHDRAW FROM ISLAND / U.S. CONTROLS ISLAND
NEW GUINEA • NEW GUINEA: WHY IMPORTANT? • LOCATION • CLOSE TO AUSTRALIA • LOCATED ON IMPORTANT SEA ROUTES TO JAPAN • WAS USED AS A BASE FOR SUPPORTING SMALLER ISLAND GARRISONS • JAPANESE OCCUPIED NORTHERN HALF OF ISLAND • HAD FAILED TO OCCUPY SOUTHERN HALF • WHY? JUNGLE & MOUNTAIN TERRAIN MADE MOVEMENT DIFFICULT • 1942-43: U.S. / AUSSIES DECIDE TO PUSH JAPANESE OFF ISLAND • PROBLEM? • TERRAIN – OWEN STANLEY MTS. ARE DIFFICULT TO PASS • JUNGLE TERRAIN • CLIMATE • DISEASE • SOLUTION? MacARTHUR DECIDES ON SIMPLE PLAN: “OPERATION CARTWHEEL” • BYPASS JAPANESE STRONGHOLDS • USE ARMY & NAVY TO CUT OFF JAPANESE SUPPLIES • STARVE JAPANESE • ONLY ATTACK AREAS THAT ARE VITAL TO ALLIED MOVEMENT • RESULT? • JAPANESE SUFFER MASSIVE LOSSES – 150,000 KIA / MIA • ALLIES SEIZE NEW GUINEA
TARAWA • WHEN? NOVEMBER , 1943 • WHERE? TARAWA ATOLL, GILBERT ISLANDS, CENTRAL PACIFIC • WHAT? JAPANESE-HELD ATOLL W/ AIRFIELD • WHY? • TARAWA WAS THE EASTERNMOST USEABLE AIRSTRIP INSIDE JAPANESE-HELD TERRITORY • CAPTURE WAS VITAL TO ADVANCE TOWARDS JAPAN • ATOLL WAS DEFENDED BY IJN NAVAL INFANTRY W/OUT FLEET SUPPORT • USMC & USN ARE ORDERED TO SEIZE TARAWA & BEGIN USING AIRSTRIP • IJN FORCE: 5000 (approx.) IJN INFANTRY W/ WELL-CONSTRUCTED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS • U.S. FORCE: • USMC 2nd MARINE DIVISION (& ELEMENTS OF USA 27TH INFANTRY DIVISION) • USN – TASK FORCE 30 • TOTAL: APPROX. 35,000 MEN
TARAWA (cont’d.) • PROBLEMS: • JAPANESE DEFENSIVE POSITIONS ARE STRONGER THAN ANTICIPATED • NAVAL GUNFIRE IS LESS EFFECTIVE THAN HOPED FOR • AMPHIBIOUS LANDING CRAFT ARE CAUGHT ON CORAL REEF • MARINES ARE FORCED TO WADE ASHORE • CASUALITES ARE VERY HIGH • FINAL CASUALTIES: • IJN: 4900 KIA, APPROX. 200 SURVIVORS • USMC: 3000, APPROX., 900-1000 KIA • SO WHAT? • USN & USMC HAVE TO RE-EVALUATE THEIR AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT TACTICS • EX.: • HOW CAN NAVAL ARTILLERY BE MADE MORE EFFICIENT DURING THE NEXT ASSAULT? • WHAT ARE THE BEST TACTICS / METHODS TO USE AGAINST JAPANESE POSITIONS? • USN & USMC BEGIN NEW TRAINING METHODS FOR MARINES & NAVAL CREWS