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The Next American Voter

The Next American Voter. The Political Demography of American Partisanship Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, e.kaufmann@bbk.ac.uk Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, Austria goujon@iiasa.ac.at. American Political Demography.

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The Next American Voter

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  1. The Next American Voter The Political Demography of American Partisanship Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, e.kaufmann@bbk.ac.uk Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, Austria goujon@iiasa.ac.at

  2. American Political Demography • Kevin Phillips' The Emerging Republican Majority (1969) • Teixeira and Judis, The Emerging Democratic Majority (2004) • ‘Key’ segments change: Blue-collar whites, soccer moms, Latinos, young, old, ‘metro’ • Field dominated by partisans and pundits. Teixeira 2008 an improvement • Still, need a more rigorous demographic approach that accounts for all trends

  3. American Macropartisanship • Party Identification vs. Voting • How Stable is Party Identification?

  4. Theories of Macropartisanship • Green et al. 1998, 2002 – party identification becomes part of self-identity. Affective, durable, resists vicissitudes • Fiorina 1991; Erikson, Mackuen et al. 1998; Achen 2002 – unstable‚ running tally • Moving equilibrium: Meffert, Norpoth et al. 2001 • Our method compatible with either stable or moving equilibrium theories

  5. Why Demography? • Demography the most predictable of the social sciences. Electorate of 2026 is alive today • Plea from APSA presidents and foreign policy community to incorporate demography • Not futurology: multivariate models posit a universal predictive model y=f(x1, x2...). • But what happens between now and equilibrium?: Demographic models can predict at a point in time by accounting for current composition, age structure, fertility, migration

  6. Fixed, Base Parameters • Largely drawn from GSS 2000-6 • Two-Party Population at start year, by sex, 5-yr bands. Independents held to 15 pc, excluded. • Partisanship transmitted from parents to children. Neither mother, father, Democrat or Republican advantaged in transmission

  7. Parameters Which Could Change • Unlike base population, these could change, so we need to develop an expected scenario and alternatives • Net immigration by party id (by age, sex) • Children per woman by party id • Mortality assumed the same

  8. Immigration • 1.2m per year (many regularized illegals) • Immigrant partisanship = ‘Other Race’ party id • Flow reduced to 863k due to 28 pc of ‘other race’ with no party id

  9. Fertility: A Shift to the Republicans • 1972-84, Democratic Advantage: 2.85 to 2.59 among 40-59 women • 2001-6 Even: 2.39 Democrat v 2.38 Republican for 40-59 women • 2001-6 Republican Edge Among women over 17: 4 % • Why?: Lower-status v. Upper-status whites, second demographic transition. • Possible Scenario: growing Republican advantage: (1.8 v. 1.4 in 2043)

  10. Location of states with respect to the total fertility rate (TFR) in 2002 and the index of fertility postponement in 2002: non-Hispanic white women Source: Lesthaeghe and Neidert 2005

  11. Which Will Win?: Fertility vs. Immigration • ‘Liberals have a big baby problem: They're not having enough of them, they haven't for a long time, and their pool of potential new voters is suffering as a result'. (Brooks 2006) • 'In Seattle,' adds Longman, 'there are nearly 45% more dogs than children. In Salt Lake City, there are nearly 19% more kids than dogs.' (Longman 2006)

  12. How Important is Demography? • Korey and Lascher (2006): doubling of non-white electorate during 1990-2001 in California, but only 3-point shift to Democrats • Here we find just 2.4-point shift to Democrats despite growth of minorities from 30 to 50 percent of the total • Partly because younger minority voters less Democratic than elders (an assimilation/upward mobility effect) • Age structure has locked in growing diversity, but stable partisanship

  13. Conclusion • Partisanship stable, no dramatic shift to Democrats. Much less change in partisan composition than racial composition • Still, we expect 2.4-point shift to Democrats between 2003 and 2043. Most of this is due to immigration • Reduced immigration will affect this projection • Not enough of a shift to lead to a natural party of government • Republicans could gain from growing fertility advantage, but only after 2050

  14. The Next American Voter The Political Demography of American Partisanship Eric Kaufmann – Birkbeck College, University of London, e.kaufmann@bbk.ac.uk Anne Goujon & Vegard Skirbekk- IIASA, Austria goujon@iiasa.ac.at

  15. Partisanship and the Vote • Consistently a leading, if not the leading predictor • Lag effect: previous immigrants naturalize and their children are more partisan, so immigration matters more; new immigrants (whom we assume become partisans) vote at lower rates, so immigration matters less • I.e. Nevada: Hispanics are 20 percent of population but just 10 percent of voters. • Why?: Citizenship, Registration, Participation

  16. Partisan Age Structure 2003 (GSS 2000-2006) • Democrats more female, but only slightly younger

  17. Partisan Age Structures in 2043 (Expected)

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