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Dive into Plato's Philebus to explore false pleasures and pains, and the complex interplay with judgments, emotions, and perceptions. Kant's view on pleasure's role in vitality and the connection to mixed pleasures are also discussed. Uncover the nuances of hedonism and anti-hedonism.
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Plato’s Academy, a mosaic in the Museo Nazionale, Naples, (Photo: Giraudon) The Philebus from 36C to the end. Philosophy 190: Plato Fall, 2014 Prof. Peter Hadreas Course website: http://www.sjsu.edu/people/peter.hadreas/courses/Plato
True and False Pleasures (36C-44D; p. 425-434) Thesis: Pleasure and pain, in most all cases, have ‘intentionality,’ that’s to say they are associated with some object or state of affairs. Since the objects and states of affairs are subject to false beliefs, pleasure and pains in effect became truly felt or false felt. “Socrates: But there is also what judgment is about? Protarchus: Certainly. Socrates: And also what pleasure is about? Protarchus: Very much so.” (p. 426, 37A)
Example of a False Pleasure connected with a Judgment (40B- p. 429) False Pleasures #1 “Socrates: But there are also those painted images. And someone often envisages himself in the possession of an enormous amount of gold and a lot of pleasure as a consequence. And, in addition, he also sees, in this inner picture of himself, that he is beside himself with delight.”
False Pleasures #2 Case of dreams, madness and delusions “Socrates: Do you really want to claim there is no one who, either in a dream or awake, either in madness or any other delusion, sometimes believes he is enjoying himself, while in reality he is not doing so, or believes he is in pain while he is not?” 36E, p. 425. “Protarchus: Of course. But what we call false in this case at that point is the judgment, Socrates, nobody would dream of calling the pleasure itself false.” (p. 427, 38A). But some pleasures and pains cannot be easily isolated from their objects or activities. Yes? No?
False Pleasures #3 Out of Confusion with Misguided Emotions “Socrates: And the same account holds in the case of fear and anger, and everything of that sort, namely that all of them can at times be false?” (40E, p. 430)
False Pleasures #4 Please and Pains suffer from Misapprehension because of Being too Near or Too Far as Does Perception. “Socrates: Well, then, does it happen only to eyesight that seeing objects from afar or close by distorts the truth and causes false judgments? Or does not the same thing happen in the case of pleasure and pain? (42A, p. 431).
Confusion of Pleasures with the ‘neutral state between pleasure and pain. “Socrates: If you hear someone say that it is the most pleasant thing of all to live one’s whole life without pain, how do you understand the speaker’s intention? Protarchus: To my understanding he seems to identify pleasure with freedom from pain.” (43D, p. 433)
Confusion of pleasures with the ‘neutral state Between Pleasure and Pain. #2 The thesis of the ‘anti-hedonists’ “Socrates: They hold that everything the followers of Philebus call pleasures are nothing but escape from pain.” (44C, p. 434). Would such a state be desirable? Or even possible? Kant maintains in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, §60 that pleasure enhances the feeling of life and displeasure or pain hinders it. Pleasure and pain cannot be removed from a feeling of vitality. In fact he states that an unimpeded and steady advancement of vitality, as experienced with unrelenting pleasure, would result in a ‘quick death.’
Complex Mixed Pleasures As Connected with Emotions “Socrates: Take wrath, fearing, longing, lamentation, love, jealousy, malice and other things like that; don’t you regard them as a kind of pain within the soul itself? (47D, p. 437) It would seem impossible to remove pleasure and pain from these emotional states. Some emotions then would seem to contribute to unhappiness or happiness.
The Pleasures and pains of Comedy: Special case of malice (φθόνοs/phthonos) 48A-51A, pp. 437-440 48A, p. 437: Socrates: Now, look at our state of mind in comedy. Don’t you realize that it also involves a mixture of pleasure and pain? . . . 48B, p. 437: Socrates: Since we just mentioned the word “malice” (φθόνοs/phthonos) (note: this word is often translated as envy): Do you treat malice as a pain of the soul, or what? Protarchus: I do Socrates: On the other hand, will not the malicious person display pleasure at his neighbor’s misfortunes? . . .
The Pleasures and pains of Comedy: Special case of malice (φθόνοs/phthonos) 48A-51A, pp. 437-440 [continued] . . . Socrates: What conclusions do you draw from this about the nature of the ridiculous? Protarchus: It is, in sum, a kind of vice that derives its name from a special disposition; it is, among all the vices, the one with a character that stands in direct opposition to the one recommended by the famous inscription in Delphi Protarchus: You mean the one that say “Know thyself,” Socrates? Socrates: I do. The opposite recommendation would obviously be that we do not know ourselves at all. Protarchus: No doubt.
Three Main Ways In Which We May Entertain in Comedy (48E, p. 438) “Socrates: Go on and make a subdivision of this disposition into three Protarchus.” 1. “If someone thinks himself richer than he in fact is.” 2. “Even more consider themselves taller and handsomer than they in fact are, and believe they have other such physical advantages. 3. “But an overwhelming number are mistaken about the third kind, which belong to the soul, namely virtue, and believe that they are superior in virtue, although they are not.” Protarchus: Very much so. Socrates: And, again, among the virtues, is it not especially to wisdom that the largest number of people law claim, puffing themselves up with quarrels and false pretensions to would-be knowledge? Protarchus: Undeniably so.
Laughing at the Ridiculous is a Mixture of Pleasure and Pain Socrates: “Our argument leads to the conclusion that if we laugh at what is ridiculous about our friends, by mixing pleasure with malice, we thereby mix pleasure with pain. For we had agreed earlier that malice is a pain in the soul, that laughing is a pleasure, and that both occur together on those occasions.” (48E, p. 438.)
Some Philosophy jokes: 1. Descartes takes his date, Jeanne, to a posh restaurant for her birthday. The sommelier hands them the wine list, and Jeanne asks to order the most expensive bottle on the list. "I think not!" exclaims an indignant Descartes, and *POOF* he disappears.
Some Philosophy jokes: 2. “One use of the argument from analogy is found in response to the question of what or who created the universe. Some have argued that because the universe is like a clock, there must be a Clockmaker. As the eighteenth century British empiricist David Hume pointed out, this is a slippery argument, because there is nothing that is really perfectly analogous to the universe as a whole, unless it’s another universe, so we shouldn’t try to pass off anything that is just a part of this universe. Why a clock anyhow? Hume asks. Why not say the universe is analogous to a kangaroo? After all, both are organically interconnected systems. But the kangaroo analogy would lead to a very different conclusion about the origin of the universe: namely, that it was born of another universe after that universe had sex with a third universe.” ― Daniel Klein, Plato and a Platypus Walk Into a Bar : Understanding Philosophy Through Jokes.
Unmixed (Pure) Pleasures Bodily: Socrates: “Those that are related to so-called pure colors and to shapes and to most smells and sounds in general all those that are based in imperceptible and painless lacks, while their fulfillments are perceptible and pleasant.” 51C, p. 441 Socrates: Then there is also the less divine tribe of pleasures connected with smells. But because there is no inevitable pain associated with them, in what way or wherever we may come by them, for this reason I regard them as the counterpart to those others.” 51E, p. 441.
Unmixed (Pure) Pleasures Mental: Socrates: Then let us add to these the pleasures of learning if indeed we are agreed that there is no such thing as hunger for learning connected with them, nor any pains that have their source in a hunger for learning.” 52A, p. 411.
Intense and Violent Pleasures Will Lack Being Measured (52C, p. 441) “Socrates: But now that we have properly separated the pure pleasures and those that can rightly be called impure, let’s add to our account the attribution of immoderation to the violent pleasures, but moderation, in contrast, to the others. That is to say, we will assign those pleasures which display high intensity and violence, no matter whether frequently or rarely, to the class of the unlimited, the more and less, which affects both body and soul. The other kinds of pleasures we will assign to the class of things that possess measurement.” Note: Not altogether clear what pleasures Plato considers violent, but certainly pleasures associated with addictions, say currently to alcohol, heroin, methamphetamine, would fit the destructiveness Socrates associates with ‘unlimited’ pleasures.
Pleasure is a Process of Generation; Pain a process of Destruction. They are contrasted with something that has ‘Is’, that is the product of Thought, and not Subject to Becoming. p. 54E, p. 444 Socrates: I am talking of those who cure hunger and thirst or anything else that is cured by processes of generation. They take delight in generation as a pleasure and proclaim that they would not want to life if they were not subject to hunger and thirst and if they could not experience all other things one might want to mention in connection with such conditions. Protarchus: That is very like them. Socrates: But would we not all say that destruction is the opposite of generation? Protarchus: Necessarily. Socrates: So whoever make this choice would choose generation and destruction in preference to that third life which consists of neither pleasure nor pain, but is a life of thought in the purest degree possible.
The Precise and Pure versus and Imprecise and Impure Intellectual Activities (55C-59D) 1. Precise: counting, measuring weighing, -- building is closer, Imprecise: medicine, agriculture, navigation and strategy (56B, p. 446.) 2. Pure and impure, (theoretical and applied) 56E, p. 446: Socrates: Well, then, what about the art of calculating and measuring as builders and merchants use them and the geometry and calculations practiced by philosophers - - shall we say there is one sort of them or two? . . . p. 57D, p. 447: Socrates: That there are at least two kinds of arithmetic and two kinds of geometry, and a great many other sciences following in their lead, which have the same twofold nature while sharing one name.”
The Formal Structure of the Good Life (59E-66D) What is the best mixture? Criteria of the “nature of the good” “Socrates: Any creature that is in permanent possession of it, entirely and in every way, would never be in need of anything else, but would live in perfect self-sufficiency.” 60C, p. 450
The Formal Structure of the Good Life (59E-66D) What is the best mixture? The Trial and Journey Metaphor “Socrates: But didn’t we try to give them a separate trial in our discussion, assign each of them a life of its own, so that pleasure would remain unmixed with intelligence, and, again, intelligence would not have the tiniest bit of pleasure?” 60C, p. 450 “Socrates: Have we not discovered at least a road that leads towards the good?” 61A, p. 450 “So let us pray to the gods for assistance when we perform our mixture, Protarchus, whether it be Dionysus or Hephaestus or any other deity who is in charge of presiding over such mixture.” 61C, p. 451.
Pleasure Should be Mixed With Theoretical and Practical Knowledge “Socrates: Suppose, then, there is a person who understands what justice itself is and can give the appropriate definitions and possesses the same kind of comprehension about all the rest of what there is. Protarchus: Let that be presupposed. Socrates: Will he be sufficiently versed in science if he knows the definition of the circle and of the divine sphere itself but cannot recognize the human sphere and these our circles, using even housebuilding those other yardsticks and circles. Protarchus: We would find ourselves in a rather ridiculous position if we were confined to those divine kinds of knowledge, Socrates! Socrates: What are you saying? Ought we at the same time to include the inexact and impure science of the false yardstick and circle, and add it to the mixture? Protarchus: Yes, necessarily so, if any one of us ever wants to find his own way home.” 62A-B, p. 451.
Pleasures from the Point of View of Knowledge and Vice Versa “Socrates: We should not turn to ourselves with this question, Protarchus, but to the pleasures themselves, as well, as to the different kinds of knowledge, and find out how they feel about each other putting the question in this way.” p. 63A-64A, p. 452-3) Knowledge’s response: 1. The strongest and most intense pleasures cause madness and delusion. Consider again as an illustration addictions, currently such as addictions to methamphetamine, heroin, or possibly alcohol. Very pleasurable at least at first. 2. They destroy family relations since obsession with the drug leads to forgetfulness of family. 3. Pure pleasures are clearly acceptable. 4. Also pleasures of health and temperance and those that commit themselves to virtue are acceptable.
Socrates Claim to Being in “the house of every member of its [the good’s] family” returns us to the theme of the dialogue that the solution to what’s good must a be a mixture of knowledge and pleasure. Many mixtures might qualify – ‘good’s family’ “Socrates: Would there be some justification to our claim that we are by now standing on “the very threshold of the good and of the house of every member of its family.” 64C, p. 453.
Most valued ingredients in the mixture: truth, measure, beauty Socrates: “Well, then, if we cannot capture the good in one form, we will have to take hold of it in a conjunction of three: beauty, proportion, and truth.” (454, 65A) NOTE: Plato’s argument would seem to assume that these three attributes are those that do not contain within themselves some matter of systemic conflict and as such retain their value. “Socrates: That any kind of mixture that does not in some way or other possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending (krasis) in such cases at all but really an unconnected medley, the ruin of whatever happens to be contained in it.” (p. 454, 64E)
Most valued ingredients in the mixture: truth, measure, beauty Pleasure fails on all three criteria. 1. Truth: pleasure is “the greatest imposter of all,” i. e., love is blind. 2. Measure: intense pleasures are anything but measured and moderate, as indicated in 52C-D. ‘Hedono-maniacs’ destroy or harm themselves. 3. Beauty: in sexual pleasure, we hide as much as possible from sight.
The Ranks of the Good: Four Mixtures and Pure Pleasure First Rank: “So you will announce everywhere, both by sending messengers and saying, that pleasure is not a property of the first rank, nor again of the second but that first comes what is somehow connected with measure (περὶ μέτρον, peri metron), the measured (τὸ μέτριον, peri metrion) and the timely (καίριον, kairion) and whatever else is to be considered similar.” p. 455, 66A. The good of first rank alludes to the Eleatic Stranger’s claim in the Statesman regarding what constitutes the ‘good.’
The Statesman on the Good of Due Measure 283B-287A, pp. 327-330 The Visitor (283E, p. 326): “What about this: shan’t we also say that there really is such a thing as what exceeds in due measure [πρὸς τὸ μέτριον, pros to metrion]1, and everything of that sort in what we say or what we do (καὶ τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸν καιρὸν καὶ τὸ δέον, kai to prepon kai to kaipon kai to deon)? Isn’t it just in respect that those of us who are bad and those of us who are good most differ? YOUNG SOCRATES: It seems so. 1. πρὸς τὸ μέτριον, pros to metrion which Rowe translates as ‘due measure’ is literally translated as ‘toward the mean.’
NOTE: the term, ‘μέτριον, metrion,’ is Plato’s word for ‘due measure’ in the Statesman. It also appears elementally in the first rank of the good in the Philebus. The frequency of the term in the Statesman and the Philebus in the context of a measure which is at the ‘right time’ strongly suggests that Plato intends the discussion of due measure in the Statesman to apply to the the first rank level of good in the Philebus. The term, ‘μέτριον, metrion,’ appears a total of ten times in the Platonic corpus: In Phaedo 117B9, Cratylus 414E2, Theaetetus 181B2, Statesman, 283E11, 284A2, 284E6, Philebus, 24C7, 66A7, Phaedrus 229B1, and in the spurious dialogue Lovers, 134E4.
The connection of the good with due measure as discussed in the Statesman and Philebus has led Plato’s scholars such as Kenneth Sayre to find in these passages ‘Plato’s Final Theory of Forms.’ “Forms at least can be known independently of the changeable things that participate in them. As Middle C can be known by a precise mathematical characterization, and the standard Yard can be known in numerical proportion to other linear measures, so the Forms Health, Beauty, and so forth, can be known by exact specification of the due measure by which they are constituted. So, at least, Plato seems to believe in the Statesman and the Philebus.”1 1. Sayre, Kenneth M., Plato’s Late Ontology: A Riddle Solved, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) p. 186.
The connection of the good with due measure as discussed in the Statesman and Philebus has led Plato’s scholars such as Kenneth Sayre to find in these passages ‘Plato’s Final Theory of Forms.’ [continued from previous slide] “For us to say just how the relevant measures in the later cases could be actually specified, however, would require more resources than these dialogues provide. Perhaps it was Plato’s vision that a new ‘godly intelligence’ someday would appear to answer such questions, after the manner of the Pythagoreans in music.”1 1. Sayre, Kenneth M., Plato’s Late Ontology: A Riddle Solved, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983) p. 186.
Illustration of First Rank of the Good: Determination of a ‘Habital Zone’1 1. The right distance from the right sized star. Liquid water which is a condition of life requires a distance from a star in which liquid water can form and remain liquid. The size of the star also must not be much larger than the Sun, inasmuch as larger stars have much shorter lifetime, making it unlikely that there would be enough time for any kind of life, particularly complex life, to develop. 2. The right position is a galaxy. Stars close to the center of a galaxy receive such intense degrees of radiation that any life in the region would be sterilized. Stars close to the center of a galaxy also receive intense amounts of x-ray radiation from black holes at the center of the galaxy. Life would be very unlikely to develop in such an environment. 1. http://lcogt.net/spacebook/what-are-requirements-life-arise-and-survive
Determination of a ‘Habital Zone’ 3. The co-presence of a massive planet and the requirement of an atmosphere. In the solar system Jupiter functions to attract asteroids and comets that would otherwise collide with the habitable planet. A planet’s atmosphere also protects life from impacts. Were it not for Jupiter and the Earth’s atmosphere impacts from collisions would have certainly sterilized earth many times.1 1. http://lcogt.net/spacebook/what-are-requirements-life-arise-and-survive
Review of Socrates Reflection on the Need for a ‘Fourth Cause’ in accounting for the mixture that makes up ‘the good.’ 29C, p. 417: Socrates: “. . . There is something called fire that belongs to us, and then again there is fire in the universe. Protarchus: No doubt. Socrates: And is not the fire that belongs to us small amount, feeble and poor, while the fire in the universe overwhelms us by its size and beauty and by the display of all its power? Protarchus: What you say is true. Socrates: But what about this? Is the fire in the universe generated, nourished and ruled by the fire that belongs to us, or is it not quite the reverse, that your heat ad mine, and that every animal, owe all this to the cosmic fire?
Review of Socrates Reflection on the Need for a ‘Fourth Cause’ in accounting for the mixture that makes up ‘the good.’ [continued]” Protarchus: It is not even worth answering the question. Socrates: Right. And I guess you will give the same answer about the earth here in the animals when it is compared to earth in the universe, and likewise about the other elements I mentioned a little earlier. Is that your answer? Protarchus: Who could answer differently without seeming insane? “Socrates: No one at all. But now see what follows. To the combination of all these elements taken as a unit we give the name ‘body,’ don’t we?
Review of Socrates Reflection on the Need for a ‘Fourth Cause’ in accounting for the mixture that makes up ‘the good.’ [continued] “But what about the following, it this also a question not worth asking? Protarchus: Tell me what the question is. Socrates: Of the body that belongs to us, will we not say that it has a soul? Protarchus: Quite obviously that is what we will say. Socrates: But where does it come from, unless the body of the universe which has the same properties as ours, but more beautiful in all respects, happens to posses a soul. Protarchus: Clearly from nowhere else.
Review of Socrates Reflection on the Need for a ‘Fourth Cause’ in accounting for the mixture that makes up ‘the good.’ Socrates: We surely cannot maintain this assumption, with respect to our four classes (limit, the unlimited, their mixture and their cause – which is present in everything): that this cause is recognized as all-encompassing wisdom, since among us it imports the soul and provides training for the body and medicine for its ailments and in other cases order and restitution, but that it should fail to be responsible for the same things on a large scale in the whole universe (things that are, in addition, beautiful, pure), for the contrivance of what was so fair and wonderful in nature.” Protarchus: That would make no sense at all.
Review of Socrates Reflection on the Need for a ‘Fourth Cause’ in accounting for the mixture that makes up ‘the good.’ 30C, p. 418 “Socrates: But if that is inconceivable, we had better pursue the alternative account and affirm, as we have said often, that there is plenty of the unlimited in the universe as well as sufficient limit, and that there is, above them. a certain cause, of no small significance, that order are coordinates the years, seasons and months, and which has every right to the title of wisdom and reasons. Protarchus: The greatest right. Note: This is not an argument by ‘intelligent design’ argument for God. Rather it is a macro-microcosmic argument by analogy. As the bodily aspect of ourselves and world is a part in kind of the universe, so similarly is the soul, or self-moving part of ourselves to the soul of the universe.
The Five Ranks of the good in the “household of the good.” (66B-C, p. 455) Second Rank: “The second rank goes to the well-portioned (τὸ σύμμετρον, to symmetron) and beautiful and perfect, the self-sufficient, and whatever else belongs in that family.”
Second Rank: “The second rank goes to the well-portioned (τὸ σύμμετρον, to symmetron) and beautiful and perfect, the self-sufficient, and whatever else belongs in that family.” (66B-C, p. 455) The notion of symmetry, thanks to its mathematical appropriation over the past few centuries, has a precise mathematical definition. An object is symmetrical if it is invariant in relations to various a transformations, such as reflection and rotation. Often objects are said to have degrees of symmetry in accordance with the number of transformations an object may incur and maintain its invariance. So a square is more symmetrical than a rectangle because the square may be rotated four times and preserve its invariance. The rectangle does not preserve its invariance in rotation, but as the square preserves its invariance in reflection.
Second Rank: The well-portioned (τὸ σύμμετρον, to symmetron) makes possible the objective, ‘the self-sufficient.’ (See 66B-C, p. 455) “Finally, we would like to mention an aspect of symmetry that might very naturally be used to support either an ontological or an epistemological account. It is widely agreed that there is a close connection between symmetry and objectivity, the starting point once again being provided by spacetime symmetries: the laws by means of which we describe the evolution of physical systems have an objective validity because they are the same for all observers. The old and natural idea that what is objective should not depend upon the particular perspective under which it is taken into consideration is thus reformulated in the following group-theoretical terms: what is objective is what is invariant with respect to the transformation group of reference frames, or, quoting Hermann Weyl (1952, p. 132), ‘objectivity means invariance with respect to the group of automorphisms [of space-time]’.”1 1. Brading, Katherine and Castellani, Elena, "Symmetry and Symmetry Breaking", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/symmetry-breaking/>.
Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity: An Illustration Space-Time Galileo's views of relativity made us get rid of the idea of fixed locations in space. On an airplane, an observer on the plane returns to her seat, she thinks she was going back to the same location in space. However, to an observer on the ground, she does not return to the same place. Instead, she was in an entirely new location because of the motion of the airplane with respect to the ground. This example shows that the two observers do not agree on location–location depends on each person's individual frame of reference.1 1. downloaded 12/1/2014 from http://www.netplaces.com/einstein/special-relativity/einsteins-solution-2.htm
Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity, An Illustration Space-Time Einstein's view of relativity took this one step further. It not only removed the idea of fixed locations in space, but removed the idea of fixed time as well. Events that occur at the same time are simultaneous. Einstein showed that simultaneity is not fixed across reference frames–events that appear to be simultaneous to one observer can occur at different times for a different observer.1 1. http://www.netplaces.com/einstein/special-relativity/einsteins-solution-2.htm
Einstein’s train illustration The observer on the ground receives the light from both lightning strikes at the same time. He measures the distance between the two marks on the ground, and finds that he was standing exactly halfway between the two points. Since he knows that the speed of light is a constant, he can conclude that the two lightning strikes occurred at the same time, that is, simultaneously, since the light traveled the same distance to him from each mark and the two signals reached him at the same time.
Einstein’s train illustration The observer on the train, however, comes to a different conclusion. She is standing in the middle of the train, and so she knows that the distance from the mark left by the lightning at the front of the train is the same as the distance from the mark left by the lightning at the back of the train. However, she receives the light emitted by the lightning strike at the front of the train before the light emitted from the lightning strike at the back of the train. Since she knows the speed of light is a constant, and the distance from each mark is the same, she concludes that the lightning strike at the front of the train happened before the lightning strike at the back of the train.
Professor Richard Tieszen’s Guest Lecturer on Thursday eve, Nov 20, 2014: Kenneth Wharton: His proposal of ‘retro-causality that would rectify the asymmetry of the According to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, quantum evolution is subject to a wave function collapse, which in time is irreversible and thus not ‘symmetric’
The Five Ranks in the “household of the good.” (66B-C, p. 455) Third Rank: “If you give the third rank, as I divine, to reason and intelligence you cannot stray far from the truth.” Socrates shifts here from the ontological to the epistemic but he is still occupied with what is cosmically’ good. Third in rank then is that the universe as rational and intelligible.
The Five Ranks in the “household of the good.” (66B-C, p. 455) Fourth Rank: “Nor again if, besides these three, you give the fourth place to those things that we defined as the soul’s own properties, to the sciences and the arts, and what are called right opinions, since they are more closely related to the good than pleasure at least.” Now, Plato considers what leads to the good for human beings. These are the best mixes of pleasure and cognitive conditions for humans.
