Foreign affairs, international relations and the EU and defence?

1. Foreign affairs, international relations and the EU and defence? Richard Rooke: lecture 7

2. A crucial period – are we socially fragmenting? • - end of Cold War 1991-present • - Uncertainty in the effects of the global economy (unemployment, migration, low and high growth in Europe, troubles of Euro?) • - New risks (e.g. China and Taiwan, Chechnya, Iraq and nuclear weapons, Israel and West Bank Palestinians 2000, the new Balkans post Milosevic) • - New American voice and morality (elections 1996 – 2000/200-2004/2008) Buchanan Vs Dole Vs Clinton Vs Bush Vs Gore) – the neo-conservative agenda • - Religious fundamentalism or poor Vs rich? • - Global Terrorism • - Global Warming • - Global transparency – technology and information • - Global Urbanisation

3. NATO • a) April 4, 1949 • B)"Stability, well-being, and freedom"..."collective security" • c) Berlin Blockade • d) 14 articles • e) Organisation: NA Council - perm delegates + secretariat, committees and military committee. The latter meets 2 times per year + geographical commands (allied command Europe/Atlantic/channel/regional planning group • f) Origins: US dominated • Nuclear policy 1960 De Gaulle/French withdrawal • Vietnam • SALT 1 -fail • Dual Track • Inter-mediate-range Nuclear Force Treaty 1987 • Break down of Warsaw Pact 1991 • g) Formulates North Atlantic Co-operation Council November 1991 • h) Partners for peace 1993 (ex-Warsaw pact) • I) St. Malo Anglo-French initiative1998

4. NATO cont’d • From. T Boyd-Carpenter, Conventional Deterrence into the 1990s, Defence Studies Series, Macmillan, 1989 • "The reason for its survival is that it has hitherto best served the national self-interests of the constituent members...it has represented the sole method by which security against the perceived Soviet threat could be attained at an acceptable cost...."Best buy"..." p17 (BUT post 1991 where to…?) • Threats to this from the USA - internal finances, defence budgets, European protectionism. • (NOW added to by the end of the Cold War and the position of a unified Germany, and the future of Europe.)

5. NATO cont’d • From: C.Rose Campaigns against Western defence: Nato's adversaries and critics, Defence Studies series, Macmillan, 1985. • Pp 19 - 36 "Western defence" • a) Nato's strategy based on deterrence • - Massive retaliation - later criticised • b) Flexible response based on: • i) Meet aggression with enough aggression to replace deterrence • ii) Place the onus of attack and escalation on the enemy • iii) Reserve all political power over nuclear use • iv) Ensure balance between conventional and nuclear theatre weapons • v) Do not separate USA forces from Nato's p27

6. http://www.nato.int/

7. WEU • a) 1948 Brussels Treaty Organisation 1955 GB/Fr/Belg/Ned/L • b) 1954 Italy/W Ger. • c) 1988 Sp./Por. • d) 1992 Greece • Military - NATO, etc • Economic and social EEC/EU • Cultural - Council of Europe • e) Council of the Union: 2 meetings foreign and Defence ministers: 2 a month. STOP PRESS Following the Irish referendum and the ratification of the Treaty of NICE - the WEU is in effect DISBANDED operationally!

8. http://www.weu.int

9. Conference on Co-operation and Security in Europe (CSCE). • a)Signed November 1990 in Paris a charter for a New Europe • b) Helsinki follow-up conference July 1992: a regional arrangement under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter • c) Purpose to create a "Collective Security System (CSS) " • Notes taken from: Ingo Peters "CSCE" pp 67- 81 in C.Bluth et al (Eds.) The Future of European Security, Dartmouth, Aldershot, 1995 • d) The collective action of governments on a situation for the purposes of their own national interest p69. • e) To create the collective ones needs to have: • a) Agreement on whom is the aggressor • b) Reach a consensus upon the urgency • c) Reach a consensus about political and other action to suffice. P 70 • f) To achieve this demands instruments and procedures: • - Accepted rules (CSCE council 1 per year/ Review Conference every 2 years/ Heads of States (every 2 years) • - Effective and legitimate decision-making procedures • - Power to enforce political, economic and military sanction pp 73-75 • "The CSCE - at least for the time being - is just another example of the flawed conception of collective security" p 78

10. Russia and NATO and EU-NATO and USA • Dual concerns for Putin: • Work within the notions of ‘Partnership for Peace’ maintaining: • 1) Russian Federation is joining the world community (including with EU, WTO, etc) and its institutions. Also: • 2) Potential Super-Power again with national interests outside USA.

11. THE END of the COLD WAR for Europe. • 1) Civilian diplomacy Vs military force • 2) Developments such as LOME, Yaounde, ACP, and even GATT (WTO) can be exaggerated "Supra-nationalism would not work on foreign policy (Bull, Kahler)": whether this applies to intergovermentalism is another matter. • 3) Experience shows this: ex-Yugo; Gulf, GATT, eastern Europe, dealing with American influence, dealing with China - limited successes if not failure. • 4) The European problem is based upon EXPECTATION Vs CREDIBILITY: a gap of belief - see C. Hill JCMS. • The future demands greater cohesion, and an understanding of what Europe is and what it MIGHT be.

12. Defining the problem • European Foreign Policy over the last 20 years is unique and does not fit easily into a theoretical framework. • Europe Vs USA Vs JAPAN is an over-simplification • Europe can be defined as a series of communities: • a) An economic community • b) A security community • c) A cultural community • Others: geographical, political, institutional, moral, or combinations of these.

13. The capability-expectations Gap • "If the EC/EU were to acquire its own foreign policy it would need to possess the following (from Hill, p217)”: • i) BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OVER: • N = Not yet near • Y = mechanisms available • ? = Difficult to define

14. Future constitutional matters • i)BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OVER: • b) Creating armed forces ...N • c) Treaty making (except economic) ...N • d) Regulation of Commerce ...Y • e) External borders ... Y (but note present difficulties of Schenegen) • f) Acquisition of territory ... Y (economic enlargement) • ii) BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS SUBJECT TO: • g) Democratic accountability...N? • h) Judicial scrutiny ..................................N except some aspects of economic policy. • iii) MECHANISMS AND POLICIES • A) A SINGLE MINISTRY........................N • B) a single intelligence service ..................N • C) a single set of Armed Services..............N • D) a single developmental policy .............. 50% ? • E) a single cultural policy ......................... 5% ?

15. The 1990s: TEU and ToA • Need to establish a stronger Union on the basis of Maastricht, which on Foreign and security policy are enshrined in five general objectives: • - To safeguard common values, fundamental interest and the independence of the Union. • - To strengthen the security of the Union and its members in all ways. • - To preserve the peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter • - To promote international co-operation. • - To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedom. • NEED TO ENHANCE the POLITICAL COMMITTEE

16. Enlargement: harmonisation of policies for accession: November 2000 • CHAPTERCOUNTRY • POHUCZSIEECY • 1.Science and Research (chapter 17)XXXXXX • 2.Telecom and Information ITXXXXXX • 3.Education and Training (chapter 18)XXXXXX • 4.Culture and audio-visual policy (chapter 20)X • 5.Industrial Policy (chapter 15)XXXXXX • 6.Small and medium-sized undertakings )XXXXXX • 7.Economic and Monetary Union (chapter 11) X X X X X X • 8.Free movement of goods (chapter 1) X • 9.Consumers and health protection XXXXXX • 10.Fisheries (chapter 8)XXX • 11.Statistics (chapter 12)XXXXXX • 12.External relations (chapter 26) x • 13.Customs Union (chapter 25)

17. Common CFSP strategies agreed • Common strategy of the EU on Russia 4.6.1999 • Common strategy of the EU on Ukraine 11.12.1999 • Common Strategy of the EU on the Mediterranean region 19.6.2000 (building on the Barcelona process of 1995)

18. Interim Political and Security Committee • TEU (Maastricht) creates the Political Committee • A need expressed post TEU to create a Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) • When PC not sitting at the Council level will have a permanent basis in the IPSC -Created 14 February 2000 • national reps + ambassadorial staff • makes recommendations to Council • day-to-day business • AIM TO CREATE - still in nation-state discussion: • Political and Security Committee • Military committee • Military staff involvement for expertise

19. David Kirkpatrick, Defence Economics, 1999 • Real unit production costs in defence increasing 10% per annum: frigates, submarines, helicopters, artillery, etc • social service costs Vs defence/security costs - national debates • Using old technology in modern warfare is not an option. • Closer alliances - NATO, etc are needed on a cost basis

20. According to some, the USA can launch a medium size strike within 2 days: Europe’s rapid reaction force is attempting to match this

21. The present shape November 2005 • A) The EU will have by 2005 - 60,000 troops ready within 2 months as a RAPID Reaction force • B) Task: Humanitarian and Rescue, Peace-keeping • C) Collective command control • D) Related Civilian Police, Humanitarian assistance and legal and administration rehabilitation

22. Decision-Making GENERAL Affairs COUNCIL of the Council of the European Union Political Security Committee MILITARY COMMITTEE “shall exercise, under the responsibility of the Council, political control and strategic direction of crisis management operations”

23. Group work - up date November 2005 • Determine: • A) After Iraq, does the proposed EU-NATO connection appear feasible? • B) Militarily is the RAPID REACTION FORCE enough? • C) Should the EU spend more and become a MILITARY power in its own right?