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Telecommunication Competition Code. Review of Significant Revisions Second Public Forum 6 July 2000. OVERVIEW. Review of Comments on First Draft of the Code Major Revisions Simplified dominance definition Accelerated interconnection process
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Telecommunication Competition Code Review of Significant Revisions Second Public Forum 6 July 2000
OVERVIEW • Review of Comments on First Draft of the Code • Major Revisions • Simplified dominance definition • Accelerated interconnection process • Modified network unbundling and wholesale requirements • Strengthened restrictions on use of customer information • Expanded competition law regime • Schedule for Adoption and Implementation
I. REVIEW OF COMMENTS • 14 parties filed comments: • Singapore-based Licensees • Foreign-based Licensees • Potential entrants • End-users • Industry interest groups • Most commenters support IDA’s basic approach, but proposed various modifications • IDA reviewed all comments; considered additional issues on its own initiative
II.A. DOMINANT CLASSIFICATION • Each Licensee classified as Dominant or Non-Dominant • Dominance: Trigger for special obligations • Tariff filing (just, reasonable and non-discriminatory prices, terms and conditions) • Physical interconnection, network unbundling, and access to essential support facilities • Heightened competition law scrutiny
DOMINANT CLASSIFICATION • First draft • Test: “Market power” in a specific service • Initial designation of Dominant Licensees • SingTel (local exchange, xDSL and leased lines) • SCV (cable modem) • 1-Net (ATM backbone) • Licensee can seek service-specific reclassification using market power test
DOMINANT CLASSIFICATION • Revised draft • Three-part test applied to Licensee • Control of “last mile” facilities; and • Ability to raise end-user prices and/or reduce output; or • Cost or difficulty of replicating facilities creates barrier to rapid competitive entry • Licensee can seek reclassification or service or facility-specific exemptions where growth of competition renders dominance regulation unnecessary
DOMINANT CLASSIFICATION • Initial designation of Dominant Licensees • SingTel (wireline Licensee) • SCV • 1-Net • Goal: Simplify designation process; reflect full range of IDA policy goals
II.B. INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • Co-operation among Licensees is necessary to create a competitive market IDA seeks: • rapid adoption of reasonable interconnection agreements • voluntary agreements, where feasible • prompt and consistent resolution of post-agreement disputes • limited, but effective, regulatory intervention • industry fora set up to develop technical and operational processes and procedures
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • First draft • Limited guidance regarding Dominant Licensees’ Reference Interconnection Offers (“RIOs”) • 90-day unsupervised negotiation process • IDA pre-approval of all agreements • No IDA post-adoption enforcement role
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • Revised draft • Clarifies “three entry paths” to interconnection with a Dominant Licensee • Accept the RIO • “Opt-in” to an existing agreement • Enter an individualised agreement • Voluntary agreement • IDA Dispute Resolution Procedure
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • Revised draft • Significant guidance regarding the RIO • Comprehensive, but unbundled, “offer” that can be accepted without negotiations and implemented in one month • Eighteen categories of issues must be addressed, including: • points of interconnection • origination/termination services • unbundled network elements and services • essential support facilities • wholesale services • co-location rights and procedures
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • interface information disclosure • service quality • service ordering • new service requests • portability procedures • reasonable restrictions on interconnection rights
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • Dominant Licensee also must submit “narrow” Model Confidentiality Agreement • Minimum RIO terms (including default prices) specified in Code appendices • Revised draft addresses SingTel’s obligations • IDA seeks more public input regarding SCV and 1-Net
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • Negotiation process accelerated; incentives for voluntary agreement increased • Initial meeting seven days after request • Confidentiality Agreement by Day 15 • Individualised agreement • Mandatory use of Model Agreement • Requesting Licensee may accept RIO on an interim basis, pending resolution of negotiations
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • Either party can request IDA Dispute Resolution Procedure after 90 days • If RIO addresses a disputed issue, IDA will apply the RIO provision • If RIO does not address an issue, IDA retains full discretion to impose a solution
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • IDA pre-approvals reduced • Agreements between Non-dominant Licensees and voluntary modification of any agreement effective upon IDA notification; 15-day IDA ex post review • Voluntary agreements with Dominant Licensees effective after 30 days, unless IDA rejects • Agreements that satisfy minimum duties and, if a Dominant Licensee is involved, do not discriminate will not be rejected
90 105 165 180 1 7 15 30 150 INTERCONNECTION PROCESS Initial Meeting Licensee Response IDA approval or revision Interim RIO implemented Confidentiality Agreement Request for Interconnection IDA Direction Resolving Dispute Request for IDA Dispute Resolution Submission of Conforming Agreement
INTERCONNECTION PROCESS • IDA will play a role in enforcing certain interconnection agreements • Licensees must agree to refer to IDA, for binding resolution, disputes regarding implementation of Interconnection Agreements based on a RIO or the IDA Dispute Resolution Procedure • IDA resolution should be faster, more consistent than private litigation in the Courts
II.C. DOMINANT LICENSEE INTERCONNECTION OBLIGATIONS • First draft • End-to-end unbundling of all network elements required • UNE platform mandated • Provision of all retail services at wholesale prices required • Minimal guidance regarding co-location obligations
DOMINANT LICENSEE INTERCONNECTION OBLIGATIONS • Revised Approach • Six designated unbundled network elements must be offered by Dominant wireline Licensees • Loops (including sub-loops) • Distribution frame access • Dark fibre • Directory listing database access • White Page listings • Emergency services
DOMINANT LICENSEE INTERCONNECTION OBLIGATIONS • Line sharing not initially required • Periodic review of list, in consultation with industry • Specific cable operator unbundling obligations deferred, lack of sufficient public input • Goal: encourage facilities deployment
DOMINANT LICENSEE INTERCONNECTION OBLIGATIONS • Wholesale Service • General obligation eliminated • But Dominant wireline Licensees must offer wholesale rates for international private leased circuits during interim period • Goal: Encourage facilities deployment, while retaining ability to address short-term problem of high international bandwidth prices
DOMINANT LICENSEE INTERCONNECTION OBLIGATIONS • Co-location • Any piece of equipment customarily used for interconnection may be co-located • Dominant Licensee must avoid unnecessary space limits • Security measures must be reasonable and non-discriminatory
II.D. CUSTOMER SERVICE USE INFORMATION (“CSUI”) • Information about customers’ use of the network • Can provide Licensee with competitive advantage in product development and marketing • Dissemination raises privacy concerns • First draft: Licensee allowed to use CSUI for any purpose, unless customer “opts in” by restricting use to provision of telecom service from which the information was derived
CUSTOMER SERVICE USE INFORMATION • Revised draft • Protection expanded • Licensee can only use CSUI to provide telecom services, and cannot share with affiliates or third parties, unless customer “opts out” by authorising use for other purposes • No affirmative obligation to share with third parties
II.E. COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT • IDA will act as sector-specific competition authority • First draft • Section 7: Barred abuse of dominant position in Singapore Telecom market • Section 8: Barred anti-competitive agreements between Licensees • Dominant Licensees barred from requiring telecom customers to purchase any other good or service
COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT • Revised Approach • Section 7 expanded • Licensee’s abuse of affiliate’s dominant position in foreign or non-telecom markets barred • Unfair methods of competition barred • False or misleading claims • Service degradation • Improper interference with customer relationships
COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT • Section 8 expanded to cover agreements between Licensees and non-Licensees (e.g., network equipment supplier) • Bundling prohibition strengthened: Dominant Licensees may not offer discounts available only to customers that purchase packages of telecom and other Licensee-specified goods or services
III. PROPOSED SCHEDULE • 30 June - Revised Code released • 6 July - Public Forum • 14 July - Comments due • 1 Sept - Code released • 15 Sept - Code effective • 15 Oct - Dominant Licensees file RIOs • 15 Dec - RIOs effective