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The impact of Ideological polarization on iraq -war attitudes in 2004 Controlling for gender

This study examines the relationship between ideological polarization and attitudes towards the Iraq War in 2004. It analyzes survey data and finds that by 2004, the majority of the U.S. public believed the costs of the war were no longer justified. The study also uncovers a strong ideological polarization on the war, with liberals more likely than conservatives to believe the costs were not worth continuing. The study further explores the impact of gender on war attitudes and finds that while women were more likely to identify as liberal, both genders expressed a majority belief that the Iraq War was not worth the cost. The study concludes that ideological polarization, along with the erosion of public support, hindered compromise and bargaining in addressing the war.

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The impact of Ideological polarization on iraq -war attitudes in 2004 Controlling for gender

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  1. The impact of Ideological polarization oniraq-war attitudes in 2004Controlling for gender Roger C. Lowery PLS 401, Senior Seminar Department of Public & International Affairs UNC Wilmington

  2. Univariate Hypothesis • Theory: • The early “rally-’round-the –flag” support for war in the public erodes over time. (Mueller, 1973) • ABC News/Washington Post polls*: "All in all, considering the costs to the United States versus the benefits to the United States, do you think the war with Iraq was worth fighting, or not?” (http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq2.htm) • H1: the 2004 presidential campaign, did not generate a consensus among the American public concerning whether the Iraq-War costs were worthwhile.

  3. Table 1: * Source: V092, 2004 NES subset, Prysby & Scavo, SETUPS: Voting Behavior 3

  4. Univariate Findings • H1 : (by the 2004 presidential campaign, there was no consensus among the American public whether the Iraq-War costs were worthwhile) is not supported by the sample data because: • Although the predicted lack of consensus is found in the sample results observed; nonetheless, • with a random-sampling error margin of ± 3.0 %, there may or may not be a “cost-not-worth-it” consensus in the national population from which that sample was drawn (58.9 + 3.0 = 61.9%). • However, it is statistically (and substantively) significant that by 2004, the majority of the U.S. public had decided that the costs of the Iraq War were no longer justified (58.9 – 3.0 = 55.9%).

  5. Bivariate Hypothesis • Theory: • We saw in the SETUPS Exercise 8 that the ideological polarization of the mass base of the two political parties was very strong by 2004.* • Since Bush was running as a staunch supporter of the Iraq War and Kerry was running as a vocal critic, it is reasonable to presume that the publics’ views on the war were also ideologically polarized. • H2: by 2004, liberals in the electorate were more likely than conservatives to say that the Iraq-War costs were no longer worth continuing. *http://people.uncw.edu/lowery/pls401/Term_project/index.htm

  6. Table 2: * Source: V068, 2004 NES subset, Prysby & Scavo, SETUPS: Voting Behavior

  7. Bivariate Findings • H2 (by 2004, liberals were more likely than conservatives to say that the Iraq-War costs were no longer worth continuing) is strongly supported by the sample data in Table 2 because: • The predicted pattern is observed (the taub of - 0.40 indicates that ideological polarization on the cost of the war is very strong in the sample). • In addition, this sample finding is statistically significant and thus can be extrapolated to the national electorate (the χ2 probability of random-sampling error is 0.00).

  8. Multivariate Hypothesis • Theory: • If women are more likely than men to be liberal. • And, if women are more likely than men to be opposed to war. • Then, it is plausible to predict that at least some of the ideological polarization on the Iraq War at the bivariate level is spurious (due to the joint influence of gender on attitudes toward both war and political ideology) • H3: compared to the total electorate, the intensity of ideological polarization on the Iraq-War costs in will be weaker within both males and females.

  9. Table 3a * Source: V143, 2004 NES subset, Prysby & Scavo, SETUPS: Voting Behavior

  10. Table 3b * Source: V143, 2004 NES subset, Prysby & Scavo, SETUPS: Voting Behavior

  11. Multivariate Findings • H3 (compared to the total electorate, the intensity of ideological polarization on the Iraq-War costs in will be weaker within both males and females) is contradicted by the sample data in Tables 3a & 3b because: • The strength of ideological polarization did not change as predicted in the partial-table subgroups: the taub did not weaken but remained equally strong within the male and female subgroups as it was in the total electorate. • These sample findings were statistically significant in all three partial tables at the 0.00 level. • Although females were more likely than males to self-identify as liberal, a statistically significant majority of both genders said that “… the Iraq-War was not worth the cost.”

  12. Substantive Implications • By 2004, the majority of the U.S. public had decided that the costs of the Iraq War were no longer justified. • The ideological polarization of partisan elites that strengthened in the 1960s had spread to the mass public and by 2004 was very strong in structuring public assessments of the Iraq War. • By 2004, this ideological polarization had also overwhelmed the previously evident gender gap in war attitudes. • This ideological polarization of both males and females has the disadvantage of impeding the bargaining and compromise so often crucial to achieving the best approximation of the common good in a pluralistic society within a fragmented political system.

  13. Methodological Implications • Given the erosion of public support for the Iraq War through 2004, further tracking to the present would be worthwhile so that long-term trends could be compared to prior, lengthy U.S. wars (WWII, Korea, Vietnam). • Since wording changes often affect survey-question results, a close look at alternate wordings of Iraq-War questions would be a useful. • Because bargaining and compromise are essential to the health of a pluralistic democracy, other important groups in society (e.g., racial, religious, ethnic, regional) should also be examined to measure their level of ideological polarization.

  14. References • Mueller, John E. 1973. War, Presidents, and Public Opinion. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. • Polling Report. “Iraq” < http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq2.htm > accessed, 3/24/09. • Prysby, Charles, Carmine Scavo, American Political Science Association, and Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research. SETUPS: Voting Behavior: The 2004 Election [Web site]. Greensboro, NC: Charles Prysby, University of North Carolina/Greenville, NC: Carmine Scavo, East Carolina University/Washington, DC: American Political Science Association/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [producers], 2005. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 2005. < http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/SETUPS/frame01.html > • Shively, W. Phillips. 2008. Power & Choice: An Introduction to Political Science. 11e. Boston: McGraw-Hill.

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