1 / 42

Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol

Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010. Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol . M. Derrough

wylie
Download Presentation

Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010 Session 3.1Overview of the Additional Protocol M. Derrough Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B

  2. Session Outline • Limitations under CSAs • The Additional Protocol • Information on mines and concentration plants • Information on imports/exports • Information on future plans

  3. Limitations under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

  4. Objective of Safeguards Provide Assurances on the Correctness and Completeness of a State’s nuclear material declarations

  5. What kind of assurances? Under a CSA alone, only credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material can be provided More information and access is required to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State as a whole

  6. Some of the limitations under CSAs • Focuses on declared materials at strategic points in declared facilities (access limited) • Covers only partially the nuclear fuel cycle • No assurances of absence of undeclared nuclear material and facilities (completeness)

  7. Political changes in 1990-1995 • Dissolution of the former Soviet Union • South Africa’s destruction of its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT • Discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme • DPRK • Indefinite extension of NPT

  8. IAEA Board of Governors (March 1995) “…the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of thecorrectness andcompleteness of States’ declarations, so that there is credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities”

  9. Strengthening Programme June 1995Programme 93+2 measures divided into Part I (within existing authority) and Part II (new authority needed) June 1996An open-ended committee of the Board (Committee 24) was established to negotiate the legal instrument for additional authority

  10. The Additional Protocol

  11. The Model Additional Protocol • New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540) • Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement

  12. Objective Provide the IAEA with better tools for verifying the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations

  13. Measures of the additional protocol • State’s provision of extended declaration • Inspector’s broader access rights • Better administrative arrangements, e.g. visas

  14. Waste Storage Waste Storage Coverage under a CSA CSA

  15. Waste Storage Waste Storage Expanded coverage with an AP CSA AP

  16. Extended declaration on nuclear material • Domestically produced source material • Imports/exports of source material for non-nuclear purposes • Locations and uses of exempted material • Waste containing terminated nuclear material

  17. Extended declaration on nuclear-related facilities and activities • Co-located nuclear infrastructure • Other locations where nuclear material is located (mines/exempted/terminated) • Nuclear-related research and development not involving nuclear material • Nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material • State’s future plans

  18. Example RBA, RURITANIA 1 APRIL 2001 (Training Map – Artificial Information)

  19. Broader access rights • All places in nuclear installations or on sites • All other places where nuclear material is located • Decommissioned facilities • Some locations where nuclear-related activities are conducted • Other locations, under certain circumstances

  20. Better administrative arrangements • Simpler inspector designation • No visas or multi-year multiple entry visas • Modern communications capabilities

  21. Information on mines and concentration plants

  22. Mining U and Th naturally occurring Uniformly distributed on Earth in rock forming minerals, sands Various techniques: Open Pit Underground In-situ leach Tails reworking 22

  23. Open Pit Mine Arlit mine, Niger 23

  24. Underground Mine Shaft head frame at Dolní Rožínka, Czech Republic Underground at MacArthur River, Canada 24

  25. In-situ Leach Yellowcake drying and packaging Reagent Supplies * Thickeners Control room Uranium Extraction Evaporation ponds Well house Recovery well Upper Aquifer Impermeable Zone Mineralized Aquifer Impermeable Zone Monitoring wells Injection well Uranium deposit * Acid or alkaline depending on chemistry of Uranium layers 25

  26. Tailings reworking 26

  27. Safeguards activities are currently limited Nuclear material accountancy is not applied to uranium ore concentrates (UOC) but exports are reported Mine and mills sites annual production are declared under an additional protocol. Reporting of mining materials and activities

  28. Location, operational status, and production capacity Approximate annual production for the State as a whole Annual production for individual mines or plants if requested by the Agency Information required under Article 2.a.(v)

  29. Information on imports / exports

  30. Information required under Article 2.a.(ix) - Exports of Annex II Items • Annex II lists “nuclear use” equipment and non-nuclear material in 7 major categories • Information required about the identity, quantity, location of intended use for each export of Annex II equipment or material • Agency may request confirmation by importing State • Reporting on a quarterly basis

  31. 2.a.(ix) – Reactor Components

  32. 2.a.(ix) – Non-Nuclear Material

  33. 2.a.(ix) – Reprocessing

  34. 2.a.(ix) – Fuel Fabrication

  35. 2.a.(ix) – Enrichment

  36. 2.a.(ix) – Heavy Water Production

  37. 2.a.(ix) – Uranium Conversion Plants

  38. Information on State’s future plans

  39. Information required under Article 2.a.(x) - Fuel Cycle Plans Information required: • Government approved plans for nuclear fuel cycle • Fuel cycle R&D specifically included • For next 10-years

  40. Conclusion

  41. The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the strengthened safeguards system • The Additional Protocol increases Agency’s ability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities

  42. The tools of additional protocol allows the Agency to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, a pre-requisite for the implementation of integrated safeguards • Close cooperation with SSACs is necessary

More Related