Tim Haughton University of Birmingham presented at CREES Conference, Windsor 6-8 June 2008

1. For Business, For Pleasure or for Necessity ? National Preference Formation in Slovakia and the Czech Republic Tim HaughtonUniversity of Birmingham presented at CREES Conference, Windsor 6-8 June 2008

2. Emerging Patterns of Membership • Moving target • 4 years = limited period of time; • BUT still can examine different policy areas and examine voting in Council (albeit with some important reservations) • Preference formation and behaviour at European level: • Preferences are augmented, diminished and refracted by strategic and tactical concerns

3. Sources of preference formation in MS • unique historical experiences (George on UK, Paterson on Germany) • ideology (Aspinwall) • size (Archer and Nugent) • dependency (Stone Sweet & Sandholtz) • public opinion • societal interests (Moravcsik)

4. Synthetic Framework of Preference Formation in the Old Member States (Copsey and Haughton, 2008)

5. Core arguments: • NMS largely conform to this synthetic model, but there are some variations: Slovakia: • In contrast to earlier papers (Haughton and Malova 2007), ideology is not such a good indicator as expected • Key = Nature of Slovakia’s transition and accession and the structure of party politics which has facilitated influence of business lobby (although this may be on the wane) Czech Republic: • Initial investigations suggest business lobby far less influential; • Stance shaped more by ideology and role of key politicians such as current president Vaclav Klaus KEY FOR ALL STATES = VULNERABILITY

6. Slovakia under Dzurinda and Fico Dzurinda govt (2002-2006): • enthusiastic, integrationist stance on broad strategic issues (CFSP, euro, Const. Treaty, enlargement etc.), • but refusal to cede national control in other areas especially tax Fico govt (2006-): • Similar positions on Constitutional (Lisbon) Treaty/, enlargement and has opposedproposals to harmonize tax base However: • Economic dimension of foreign policy • Doesn’t have a ‘one-sided relationship with the USA’, but rather a ‘European foreign policy’ • Europe as an external validator e.g. labour code.

7. History and its legacies Meciar-led 1994-8 government’s growing illiberalism • ‘Black hole of Central Europe’ • Slovakia not invited to begin accession negotiations at 1997 EU summit • Ideologically broad-based government formed after 1998 elections – took Slovakia to verge of EU membership Consequences of accession path: • Desire to catch-up – Slovakia as an obedient dog; • Debate – who was responsible for no in ’97 • Valence – who is best placed to achieve the goal

8. 2002 Election Campaign – Smer YES TO THE EU! BUT NOT WITH BARE BOTTOMS…

9. Accession process consequences cont. • Party Politics • Following release from the ‘accession straightjacket’ (Haughton and Malova 2007) parties in NMS are accorded room for manoeuvre – Dzurinda’s party shifted focus to a neoliberal agenda • Institutions • process of accession helped to strengthen the power of the executive and weaken the parliament (Malová et al, 2005) • domestic arena has acted as a ‘facilitator’, the European level provides a potential veto point

10. Dependency

11. Cont.

12. Dependency: EU as a cash cow • As a relatively poor state, distributive politics = key; ensure flow of funds • Even the nationalists like the EU …… for its moneyat least!

13. Powerful societal groups and dependency • Slovakia dependent on EU: net recipient and export market • Business lobby • Dzurinda govt’s neo-liberal project became increasingly fuelled by powerful business lobby • Pressure from business continued post June 2006 • Given Slovakia’s small, open and export orientated economy, business has been pushing for the euro, but simultaneously arguing for the continuation of the national veto on taxation • to help maintain their comparative advantage • low corporate taxation helped the country’s visibility and contributed to enticing foreign investment into Slovakia

14. Party Politics • Many parties in Slovakia relatively new creations • ‘Genetic moment’ (Panebianco) left its mark: • elite-created parties tend to be closely associated with their founders and leaders, • but also often lack strongly developed mechanisms of accountability, • can be dependent on and beholden to the generosity of initial financial backers

15. Czech Republic • Transition and Accession: • Easier c.f. Slovakia • Although mid-1990s – economic problems and coalition governments with weaknesses Key issues animating Czech politics (Hanley) • Main = Socio-economic (State vs. market, tax and spend, welfare reform) • Secondary issues: • Corruption and anti-corruption • Europe • Governance (civil society, decentralization)

16. Preference formation in the Czech Republic • Powerful Business Groupings? • Less evidence than in Slovakia • Although business lobby influence on Social Democrats • Business lobby keener on ‘verejne zakazky’ (public contracts) • Valence? • To some extent ‘yes’ • Historical experiences? • Didn’t have to ‘catch up’ • Ideology? • Klaus (strong Eurosceptic) – support from business in presidential elections • ODS - (party of PM Topolanek and which Klaus used to lead) – divisions over the Reform Treaty • EU Presidency • Forcing country to state some preferences • Europe ‘without barriers’

17. Broader Questions • 1. Is there a continued legacy of being Luxembourg c.f. Helsinki invitee? • Helsinki entrants often had overriding objective of membership and not much debate prior to entry about what type of European Union the countries wanted to belong to (c.f. Czech, Poland etc.) • 2. Party politics, especially in the Baltic States, have been very fluid in the past decade, with appeals often based largely on valence rather than rooted in ideology. Are they more susceptible to the influence of the business lobby in the shaping of socio-economic policy preferences? • 3. Business lobby influential in Slovakia because of the weakness of civil society (as in much of CEE), but are there signs trade union movement is finally showing its teeth?