Youth, Conflict, and Terrorism

1. Youth, Conflict, and Terrorism Zachary Rothschild Eurasian Regional Affairs Officer Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism U.S. Department of State rothschildzr@state.gov 202-647-2169

2. OVERVIEW • Definitions • Relationship between Youth and Conflict • Lessons learned and programmatic approaches

3. Definitions… • “Terrorists care about how many people are watching, not how many are dead.” • Insurgents: an armed group seeking to wrest political power from a government.

4. …and a relationship… • In 2006,al-Qaida and other terrorists (sought to) exploit insurgency and communal conflict as radicalization and recruitment tools, especially using the Internet to convey their message.” - U.S. Department of State

5. Areyouth a cause of war and terrorism? • No statistical correlation between youth ‘bulge’ and civil conflict, except where other factors present: • High unemployment • States in transition • Politics is organized around violent factions. • Most recruits into violent groups are alienated youth…

6. How Conflict Emerges • USAID’s Conflict Assessment Framework: • Incentives for Violence (Greed and Grievance – personal and group) • Resources (Weapons, Training, Recruits) • Weak State & Social Capacity to Respond

7. Not just self-interest… • Profile of Shehzad Tanweer, 21, one of the British Tube Bombers, July 2005 • Accomplished athlete studying sports science at Leeds Metropolitan U. • Born and raised in U.K, of Pakistani origin • Loving, supportive, and financially successful parents • A friend described him as “not interested in politics,” and “as sound as a pound.” • Sageman’s study of Al-Qaeda Biographies • 2/3 were middle or upper class • 60% had gone to college

8. ….It’s also who you know… • Sageman: 88% of Al-Qaeda members studied (n=400) had family/friends in the ‘Jihad’ • Peer pressure: No suicide bomber has ever acted alone.

9. …and what you accept as right (legitimizing ideology)… “He is an enemy of ours whether he fights us directly or merely pays his taxes.” - Osama bin Laden

10. Doing something about it: Principles and Programs • Peer networks and peer pressure drive radicalization and recruitment… but can also support youth engagement and development. • Programs: • Networking in and out-of-school youth, • Service learning

11. A Mathematical Interlude • 4th grade math puzzle in Afghanistan: • ‘The speed of a Kalashnikov bullet is 800 meters per second. If a Russian is at a distance of 3200 meters from a mujahid, and that mujahid aims at the Russian’s head, calculate how many seconds it will take for the bullet to strike the Russian in the forehead?’

12. Doing something about it: Principles and Programs • Lesson: What youth know can shape what they believe to be right. • Programs: • Maradi Youth Development (Niger) • Madrasa Street Law Program (Kyrgyzstan)

13. Doing something about it: Rural Dynamics • “Traditional authority figures often wield enough power to single-handedly drive an insurgency. This is especially true in rural areas.” • U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual • Pacifying the Moro Islamic Liberation Front: The Datu and his bananas • Lesson: Engage youth with traditional leadership, not apart from youth in isolation – and create opportunity. • Programs: • Intergenerational Dialogue Workshops (Burundi) • Create economic opportunity to reinforce hope and dignity.

14. Doing something about it: Rural Dynamics • Safehavens key to terrorist access to resources; often found in (rural) border areas. • Less state control, less state services = More opportunities for insurgents. • Examples: Hamas & Hizballah • Lesson: Engage youth in service-delivery to reduce likelihood safehavens emerging. • Programs: • Youth Service Corps to improve service delivery

15. Closing Note – Trusted Networks