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Evaluating the mechanisms of Jalswarjya Water and Sanitation Project

Evaluating the mechanisms of Jalswarjya Water and Sanitation Project. Jie-Sheng Tan Subhrendu K. Pattanayak Nicholas Sch of the Environment, Duke University Camp Resources 9 August, 2011. Objectives. Demonstrate how mechanisms evaluation can complement a standard program evaluation

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Evaluating the mechanisms of Jalswarjya Water and Sanitation Project

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  1. Evaluating the mechanisms of Jalswarjya Water and Sanitation Project Jie-Sheng Tan Subhrendu K. Pattanayak Nicholas Sch of the Environment, Duke University Camp Resources 9 August, 2011

  2. Objectives • Demonstrate how mechanisms evaluation can complement a standard program evaluation • Assess the performance of community driven-development projects Application • Jalswarjya water and sanitation project

  3. Introduction • High global burden of water-related diseases such as diarrhea • Clean water and basic sanitation break the pathways to the diseases • Jalswarjya Water and Sanitation project • Maharashtra, India • Community-Driven Development (CDD) • Community participation: • Each village choose and implement their W&S projects • Village pay 10% of capital costs and all of future maintenance

  4. Jalswarjya– Evaluation of Impacts • 95 treatment, 147 control villages • Treatment: Jalswarjya W&S project • Control: Selected by propensity score matching • Household-level baseline and endline surveys at 2005 and 2007 respectively • Averting costs and cost of illnesses • Improvements in both groups but no statistical difference between both groups • Possible conclusions from these results • Project did not work… but why? • Impacts did not show due to closeness between baseline and endline survey • Another mode of investigation: mechanisms

  5. Hypothesized CDD Mechanisms • 1st: Better preference matching/targeting in CDD • Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (1972) • Centralization • With ‘policy uniformity’ assumption, central planner choose same level of public good (or any goods), g for all communities • Decentralization • Each community can choose their own optimal level of gi

  6. Hypothesized CDD Mechanisms • 2nd: Higher capacity for collective action • Ostrom (1990) case studies on common pool resources • Institutional designs for cooperative actions • Clear and transparent decision-making • Repeated interactions between community members • Delegation of power by government • Woolcock and Narayan (2000) • Suggested policy prescriptions for increasing collective action • Co-production • Empowerment of locals

  7. Preliminary Results • Targeting of preferences

  8. Preliminary Results • Capacity for collective action

  9. Thank you

  10. Hypothesized CDD Mechanisms • 1st: Better preference matching/targeting in CDD • Oates’ Decentralization Theorem (1972) Representative consumer: • giis the level of local public good (or any goods provided by the program) • ϕiis the preference parameter • xiis the private good (or necessities)

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