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LOCAL AND REMOTE PROPULSION RESET OF HHP-8 LOCOMOTIVE USING MEAP

LOCAL AND REMOTE PROPULSION RESET OF HHP-8 LOCOMOTIVE USING MEAP . HHP-8 DISABLING EVENTS. In specific circumstances, the MCB of the HHP-8 locomotive is prevented from closing. These include: MCB latchout HT Config KO K-AUX-2 latchout

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LOCAL AND REMOTE PROPULSION RESET OF HHP-8 LOCOMOTIVE USING MEAP

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  1. LOCAL AND REMOTE PROPULSION RESET OF HHP-8 LOCOMOTIVE USING MEAP

  2. HHP-8 DISABLING EVENTS • In specific circumstances, the MCB of the HHP-8 locomotive is prevented from closing. These include: • MCB latchout • HT Config KO • K-AUX-2 latchout • Currently, only a single reset is allowed by the Alstom MPU program, after which, additional resets are disabled for 45 minutes. • Experience has shown that the 45 minute delay is undesirable and leads to avoidable delays and terminations. • By monitoring LON variables with the MEAP system, a provision can be made that allows for reset of disabling alarms, independent of the 45 minute delay.

  3. COMMUNICATION REQUIREMENTS • Currently, the MEAP system of the HHP-8 locomotive uses only a serial connection to the CMU. • To recognize situations in which the locomotive is disabled and provide the ability to recover, the MEAP system must also have a serial connection to the MPU and a connection to the LON network. • To meet these requirements, two modifications will be made: • The existing serial cable between the MEAP and CMU will be modified to include the two LON conductors. • An additional cable will connect the MEAP to MPU #1, in which both the serial and LON communications will be utilized.

  4. COMMUNICATION VARIABLES • MPU variables are monitored via the serial connection as follows: • The value of the disabling event counter • MCB position • MCB latchout • HT Config KO • K-AUX-2 latchout • Propulsion Reset pushbutton • Reverser position • MFD alarm messages are monitored for the following: • “MCB LATCHOUT” • “SNOW BRAKE” • “NO MOTION BYPASS”

  5. LOCAL RECOVERY FROM DISABLED CONDITION • Upon recognizing a disabled condition, the MEAP system takes the following steps, in the order listed: • Monitors reverser handle position and provides a message to the engineer via the MFD to place the handle in the “Neutral” position. Once the handle is in neutral, the message will clear. • Monitors for “User Authorization” and provides a message to the engineer via the MFD to press the “No Motion Bypass” and “Snow Brake” pushbuttons. When both of these buttons are pressed simultaneously, MEAP will acknowledge that the engineer has given authorization for a reset, and clear the message. • Monitors for the “Propulsion Reset” signal and provides a message to the engineer via the MFD to press the “Propulsion Reset” button. Once the signal is received, the MEAP enables the MPU reset. As the button is already being pressed, the MPU will initiate the propulsion reset.

  6. REMOTE RECOVERY FROM DISABLED CONDITION • If the extent or severity of the isolations are beyond the capability of the local reset, then the MEAP box can be remotely accessed for event information and operation of the propulsion PTE software. • MPU and agate-level events are now available due to the serial connection to the MPU, allowing for interpretation of the source of the isolation. • Propulsion PTE software installed on the MEAP box allows for reset of isolations and latch-outs if deemed safe. • Monitoring of LON variables allows for display of key system variables to the remote user (such as battery voltage, air pressures, etc.). • Remote reset of the locomotive will not be possible unless the same precautions as the local reset are met (i.e. reverser handle in neutral, authorization granted).

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