Zionism and Arab Nationalism

1. Zionism and Arab Nationalism • The Arab-Israeli conflict emerged with the advent of nationalism in the Middle East and that the conflict is one of competing nationalisms. • Classical Zionism was rooted in the traditional ties Jews in the Diaspora proclaimed to the Land of Israel, and the belief that Jewish independence would be restored with the coming of the Messiah. • The ideological foundation for modern political Zionism was as follows: the Jewish people constituted a nation and this nationhood needed to be reaffirmed; assimilation was rejected as it was neither desirable nor was it deemed to be possible; anti-Semitism could only be overcome by physical separation from Europe and by self determination; and religious and cultural ties to the Land of Israel made Palestine the logical territorial claim.

2. Zionism and Arab Nationalism • One of the key Zionist thinkers was Theodor Herzl. • His main contribution to Zionism was his book DerJudenstaat (The Jewish State), published in 1896, which advocated independent statehood. • The creation of a Jewish state in Palestine was the only viable and permanent solution to the problem of the Jews. • Through a state of their own, the Jewish people could finally occupy an equal place among nations. • Arab nationalism is the belief that the Arab people constitute a single political community or nation, which should be either independent and united under a common government or a set of independent allied Arab states. • Modern Arab nationalism emerged at the end of the eighteenth century. • At the core of Arab nationalism was the concept of self-determination. • This quest for independence emphasized three elements of Arab nationalism. • 1. A strong anti-Turkish sentiment as a reaction to centuries of Ottoman control. • 2. The entrance of European colonial powers and foreign control of Arab land led to an anti-colonial and anti-imperial element. • 3. The interaction and completion with Zionism also provided it an anti-Zionist ideology.

3. Impact of WWI • The Ottoman Empire had entered the war on the side of Germany. This meant that in the Middle East Britain was effectively fighting the Ottomans. • In order to prevent the Ottomans from taking control of the Suez Canal, Britain started to cultivate local Arab allies. • Embodied in a set of letters known as the Hussein-McMahon Correspondence is the promise that the Arab territory of the Ottoman Empire be returned to Arab sovereignty. • The excluded territory, according to Arab interpretation, referred to present-day Lebanon and parts of Syria only. It did not include Palestine, despite Britain’s later claim that it did.

4. Impact of WWI • By the summer of 1917 the British government had also started to consider the Zionist movement as a potential ally. • The key player on the Zionist side was Chaim Weizmann. • He convinced British decision-makers that the Zionists were important for Britain’s war effort. • The Zionists could help sustain the Russian front which was collapsing from internal Russian revolutionary turmoil, and they could help galvanize the desperately needed American war effort. • The result of Weizmann’s diplomacy was the Balfour declaration which stated that Britain ‘favoured the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. • The Balfour Declaration did not state that Palestine should be turned into a Jewish state. • Neither the Balfour Declaration nor the Hussain-McMahon Correspondence were specific about the actual borders of the territory promised to both Jews and Arabs. • The result was the both Zionists and Arab nationalists believed Palestine had been promised to them; the seeds for conflict had been sown.

5. British Policy and the Palestine Mandate • British troops entered Palestine in 1918 and set up a provisional military government in Jerusalem. • A policy acceptable to both Arabs and Zionists was never achieved and British policy on the ground was further complicated by often contradictory positions in world politics. • Arab and Jewish suspicions of each other and of British intentions flourished. • Many Arabs believed that Britain was planning to hold on to Palestine until a Jewish majority had been achieved. • Many Jews believed that Britain was secretly aiding and arming the Arabs as well as restricting Jewish immigration and land purchases in order to prevent the creation of a Jewish state.

6. The Inter-War Period • In 1929 there was the Wailing Wall incident which occurred in response to benches beling set up in from of The Wall. It resulted in 133 Jewish deaths and 116 Arab deaths. It was followed by the massacre of most of the Jewish residents of Hebron. • The rise of Adolf Hitler in Germany and his anti-Semitic ideology made the Zionist need for a Jewish state more pressing. • Between 1930 and 1936 alone the Jewish population rose from 164,000 to 370,000. This infusion of Jewish population to Palestine led to a new phase in Arab nationalism and the creation of the Arab Higher Committee and a subsequent suggestion for the creation of a partition between the two groups.

7. The Impact of WWII • The Second World War had a number of dramatic effects upon the conflict in Palestine. • 1. Britain’s empire was clearly in decline. Maintaining the Palestine mandate and containing the increasing conflict were becoming too costly, politically, economically and financially at a time when the British government’s priority was post-war reconstruction. From 1945, Britain looked for an honourable way out. • 2. Lobbying by Jewish Americans and a broad American-Zionist network resulted in the Biltmore Program at a conference in May 1942 which called for a Jewish state in Palestine. However, Roosevelt was concerned about the impact this decision may have on Arab oil supplies during the war. Still, in the 1944 presidential elections both parties endorsed the Biltmore program.

8. The Impact of WWII • 3. The Holocaust and the mass murder of 5,600,000 to 6,900,000 Jews led the survivors of the camps and the Zionist Movement to push even harder for a state. • 4. As a result of the war, Europe was faced with a refugee problem of enormous proportions. This created pressure for increasing the number of Jewish immigrants to Palestine and for ending the restrictions on land purchases. • 5. The situation in Palestine had deteriorated rapidly towards the end of the war and had developed into an almost full0-scale Jewish uprising against the British, as well as inter-communal Arab-Jewish tensions bordering on a civil war. • These five key factors created the environment which made British withdrawal almost inevitable and the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine possible. It also convinced both Jews an Arabs that ultimately there would be war.

9. The British Withdrawal From Palestine • The British withdrawal from Palestine and the decision to hand Palestine over to the newly established United Nations was the result of Britain’s inability to settle the conflict between Zionists and Arabs as well as Britain’s need to address more pressing matters at home. • The United Nations set up a Special Committee for Palestine (UNSCOP) and sent it on a mission of inquiry during the summer of 1947. • UNSCOP came to the conclusion that both Jewish and Arab claims were of equal validity, that their aspirations were irreconcilable, and that the only viable solution to the conflict was the separation of the two communities by partitioning the territory and creating both an Arab and a Jewish state. • The Partition Plan drawn up by UNSCOP divided Palestine in accordance with the existing settlement pattern and population centres. • The city of Jerusalem according to the UN partition plan was to come under international control.

10. The British Withdrawal From Palestine • One problem with the plan was the territorial fragmentation of both proposed states, as well as the notion that while partition was necessary, economic unity should be retained. • Another problem was the Arab population ‘trapped’ in the proposed Jewish state. • While Zionist politicians did not like the status of Jerusalem or the lack of territorial contiguity, the accepted the plan as a first step to statehood. The Arab leadership could not find any redeeming qualities to the plan that allotted part of their territory to the Zionists. • Arab league members met to adopt a common strategy and decided to go to war to present the creation of a Jewish state. • On May 14, 1948 the Jewish Agency declared the territory allotted to the Jews as the new state of Israel. • The next day Egyptian, Lebanese, Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi troops attacked the Jewish state to ‘liberate Palestine’. • The contest for Palestine and conflicting communal aspirations had turned into what is know as the Arab-Israeli Conflict.

11. The 1948 War • Israel’s declaration of independence on May 14, 1948 was immediately followed by the declaration of war by five Arab states. • For the first year Israel was barely surviving the onslaught (see paragraph 2 page 15) • The official reason for Arab intervention was the liberation of Palestine, however, it seems there were various alternative motives (see the first full paragraph on page 16) • The ceasefire of 1948 turned the tide in Israel’s favour (see last paragraph on page 16).

12. Results of the War • Israel’s victory and the defeat of the Arab armies were the result of a number of factors: Israeli troops were highly motivated and better trained (WWII experience with the British). • The Arab armies were poorly equiped, had logistical problems, lacked morale and their leadership was divided. • Israel had increased its territory (by 21%) to a point that they had a defendable border – see the map on p. xxxi. • The Arab states too benefitted, Egypt picked up the Gaza Strip while Jordan gained control of the West Bank.

13. The Palestinian Refugee Problem • Palestinians had left their home believing it would be temporary. • The exodus increased as a result of the DeirYassin broadcast. • In groups you will take the position of one of the two sides and state your position regarding the three issues surrounding the Palestinian Refugees: • The dispute over how many left • The circumstances surrounding the Palestinian exodus. • Solution to the refugee problem

14. Impact of the Refugees • Most refugees settled in camps close to the Israeli border or on the outskirts of major Arab cities. • The inability and to some extent unwillingness of the Arab states to absorb these refugees placed the responsibility for these Palestinians to relief organizations. • It also created an environment conducive to the development of a distinct Palestinian national identity based on the right to return and though demand for Palestinian state. • Palestinian refugees, despite Arab and Israeli attempts to ignore them played an increasingly destabilizing role within their Arab host counties, within administered territory and in the Arab-Israeli conflict as a whole.

15. Peace Negotiations • Both Israel and Arab states had only just moved towards independence, and consequently nation and state building were a higher priority than peace. • Arab nations had been de-stabilized by the war (see the first full paragraph on page 20). • Conflicting expectations, aims and perceptions as well as intransigence (stubbornly refusing to compromise) on both sides led to discord in the early Arab-Israeli negotiations. • The aims of Arab states were the acquisition of territory and the repatriation of Palestinian refugees. Israel’s aims were recognition and peace with giving up territory • At the same time the weakness of state and government and the strength of society, discouraged risk-taking by political representatives and shifted the political agenda towards state consolidation.

16. Egypt • Nasser came to power in 1952 and there was hope that he would improve relations between Egypt and the West. • Secret negotiations took place and things were positive until he refused to join the Baghdad Pact (aka: Middle East Treaty Organization or METO) and negotiated an arms agreement with the Czechs. • As Palestinians became more organized they began paramilitary or fedeyeen raids on Israel. As the raids increased throughout the early ’50s Israel initiated a policy of shoot to kill orders, mining of border areas and expulsion operations.

17. Egyptian-Israeli Tensions • Tensions between Israel and Egypt increased in 1953 when Israel accused Egypt of assisting the Palestinians in carrying out border raids though this was likely untrue. • Tensions further increased in July of 1954 when a group of Israeli agents in collaboration with Egyptian Jews attempted to but failed to sabotage British and American property in Egypt in order to create discord between the Egyptian government and the West and to persuade the British that their military presence was still needed. • February 1955 – Egypt kills Israeli cyclist, Israel launches the Gaza raid killing 38 Egyptian soldiers. Egypt turns to the Czechs for an arms deal and the Israelis turned to the French.

18. French and British Support of Israel • The conventional view sees the Israeli Sinai campaign as the result of Soviet arms being brought into Egypt and the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. • Other historians argue that the arms deal temporarily blocked Israel’s efforts to launch a war. • France and Israel teamed up because Ben Gurion saw Nasser as a direct threat to Israel while France considered Egypt to be the main support to Algerian nationalists fighting for their independence from France. • British share of Middle Eastern oil had decreased from 49% to 14% since the end of WWII so nationalizing the Suez Canal was problematic, Nasser’s neutralism prevented the British from establishing a Middle Eastern organization like NATO, Nasser’s modernization or their economy and military was an entry point to Russian involvement in Egypt, Nasser mobilized support against the remaining conservative Arab regimes in the Middle East which were Britain’s traditional allies and Nasser spoke out against British involvement in Africa. • This all led to Britain supporting Israel in their attack on Egypt.

19. British and Egyptian Perspectives on Nationalisation • What were Britain’s perspectives on Egyptian actions prior to the war (2)? Page 28. • From the Egyptian perspective, why did they nationalize the Canal? Pages 27-28. • The key reason for the French and British getting involved was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. The key reason for the Israelis getting involved was the Czech arms deal and the closing off of the Tiran Straits.

20. US Anger Over the War • On October 30, 1956 Israeli troops reached the Suez Canal, Britain and France told Israel and Egypt to withdraw (which Israel did as they had agreed to in advance) – Egypt did not and were bombed. • The US was furious. They applied economic sanctions to Israel and threatened to sever relations if they did not move out of the Egyptian peninsula. • Financial pressure was put on Britain and political pressure on France and both moved out of the area.

21. Causes of US Intervention • The US intervened for four reasons. • 1. A full-scale war meant Russian involvement in the Middle East which could impact access to Middle Eastern oil. This could weaken Western European resistance to communism. • 2. The Americans liked to work with both sides because of the strong Jewish lobby in the US and oil interests in the Arab world. • 3. Eisenhower’s 1956 campaign was based on a peace platform. • 4. The US had just condemned Russian intervention in Hungary and would look hypocritical if they intervened in Egypt. As well, this would divert attention from Russian actions in Hungary. • Based on pages 30-31 assess the winners and the losers of the 1956 Suez-Sinai Campaign. Assess: Egypt, Israel, France, Britain, the United States and the USSR.

22. The PLO • The Arab world and the international community seemed to have forgotten about the plight of the Palestinian refugees. It was this realization that led to a Palestinian political and military revival. • Fatah was formed in 1957 • In 1964 the PLO was created by Nasser in order to control Palestinian fedayeen. • The PLO served as an umbrella for all Palestinian resistance groups, providing political and military coordination when needed, but essentially leaving individual groups free to act. • Its main political institution was the Palestine National Council • The PNC was committed to Palestine as a future state and using armed struggle to achieve a state of its own. • Up until 1967 the PLO remained very much under Arab and particularly Egyptian control • Units of its official army, the Palestine Liberation Army were trained and to some extent integrated in to the various Arab armies.

23. Causes of the 1967 Six Day War • Syria elected a hostile Ba’thist party and later fought a battle by the Sea of Galilee with the Israelis. • In November of 1966 the Syrians signed a defense pact with Egypt. • There were Fedayeen operations against Israeli from Jordan that led to the Israel launching an attack on villages in the West Bank. • During the first half of 1967 Israel and Syria engaged in air battles. • A Soviet report to Nasser’s aid Anwar Sadat falsely accused the Israelis of having already mobilized for attack on Syria. Egypt was compelled to act because of the defense pact they had signed with them.

24. Why The False Report? • The Russians wanted to take pressure off of Syria to engaged militarily – they now had reason to fight. • It was an inaccurate and poorly interpreted report. • Israel deliberately misled the Soviets to draw Syria or Egypt into a war. • The Soviets wanted a war (see quote at the bottom of page 34) • To weaken the American position in Vietnam.

25. Causes and Events of the Six Day War • Nasser sent troops to the Sinai as a deterrent but it was interpreted as a act of war because the UNEF had to be fully withdrawn. • Nasser closed the Strait of Tiran more as a political move to show strength to his Arab allies. However it was regarded as an act of aggression by the Israelis. See quote in the second full paragraph on page 35 regarding Egypt’s intent. • Jordan mobilized soldiers and signed a defence pact with Egypt. • The two sides could not come to an agreement and with both sides under pressure to attack, Israel launched an attack on June 5. • Israel’s air superiority ensured a quick victory. All three Arab nations signed a peace treaty within six days. See the map on page xxxii to see the results of Israel's victory.

26. The Aftermath of the Six Day War • Israel increased its territory by three times and became a dominant power in the region. • Egypt lost influence and Syria gained, leading to an arms race between Syria and Israel. • It increased involvement of the US and Russia. The prestige of the Soviet Union, as Egypt’s and Syria’s ally, had also been damaged, while the United States started to see Israel as a valuable asset in the region through which to counter Soviet influence. • US support for Israel was primarily based on their military strength and opposition to Soviet supported Arab states. • They also shared similar moral and political standards.

27. The Aftermath of the Six Day War • With the Six Day War, regional dynamics had also changed. • Pan-Arabism started to decline and had to compete not only with the emergence of political Islam but also with strengthened local nationalisms. Including Palestinian nationalism. • By discrediting Nasser and ejecting the Jordanians, Syrians and Egyptians from those parts of Palestine which had been saved from Israeli takeover in 1948, the Israeli victory contributed to the re-focusing on a particular brand of Palestinian nationalism as well as placing the Palestinians back on the international agenda.

28. The Aftermath of the Six Day War • The initial view of the Israeli government was that the conquered territory could be returned for peace, with the exception of those areas which Israel saw as strategically vital as well as East Jerusalem. • On the Arab side, the more hard-line states advocated a continuation of the conflict in order to liberate all of Palestine. Others, such as Nasser and King Hussein of Jordan preferred a diplomatic solution. • The Arab summit in Khartoum in September 1967 decided the debate in favour of the hardliners: No peace with, no recognition of, and no negotiation with, Israel. • Peace was primarily difficult to achieve because of the mutual distrust between the two, because Israel refused to negotiate with Palestinian refugees and their representatives and because of Israel’s strong position after the war did not encourage concessions, while the Arab’s weak position make it impossible to become an equal negotiating partner. • Revisit the second paragraph on page 32 and outline the four historiographical perspectives on the causes of the Six Day War.

29. The War of Attrition • A continuation of the Six Day War meant to push the Israelis back from their encampment on the Suez Canal. • Nasser wanted to keep the superpowers interested otherwise he would not be able to reclaim the Suez Canal nor would he be able to get Soviet shipments of weapons. • The Soviets did get involved and both sides suffered deaths and casualties. • Eventually a ceasefire was signed in July of 1970.

30. The Palestinian Revival and Black September • As a result of the 1967 defeat Yasser Arafat became the clear leader and spokesperson for the Palestinians. • When Fatah began working underground the conflict began to show a distinct Israeli-Palestinian element to it. • Organizations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) saw a huge increase in volunteers. • Efforts by the Palestinian National Movement to initiate an uprising in Palestine against the Israeli was quickly crushed so they had operate out of Jordan. • Arafat consolidated the resistance groups into the PLO by 1970 and developed a stronger political element to the movement. • The Palestinian launched attacks from Jordan and Lebanon making those two countries targets for the Israelis. • Eventually, Jordan attacked the Palestinian settlements within their country and pushed the Palestinian out – leaving Lebanon their only base from which to attack. • To make things worse for Arab solidarity, Nasser died shortly after initiating a peace agreement between Palestinians and Jordan.

31. Sadat’s Efforts at Peace. • Sadat came to power upon Nasser’s death and three years in was still struggling to make a name for himself. • Sadat started by attempting to initiate a peace agreement with the Israelis to regain the Sinai Peninsula. • The Israelis argued the peninsula was necessary for national security and also saw the agreement as a sign of military weakness on the side of the Egyptians. • Egypt decided they needed to initiate a limited war to persuade the Israelis to negotiate a peace agreement. • Sadat felt that an attack would: • Break the defeatists attitude of the population • Boost his regional stating • Create a better negotiating position for Egypt

32. Causes of Egypt and Syria’s Fight • Sadat was pursuing peace with Israel because: • He wanted to reclaim the Sinai and the Suez Canal for Egypt. • It would help his image if he got back what Nasser had lost. • Peace would reduce the cost of defence expenses that were seriously impacting the Egyptian economy. • Syria agreed to help because they wanted to regain the Golan Heights they had lost though they were under no impression that the war would lead to peace.

33. The 1973 October War/The Yom Kippur War • The US was caught off guard because of Watergate, leaving Vietnam and Spiro Agnew. • Israel was caught off guard because they underestimated Arab frustration over Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza and Sinai; they perceived Egypt as weak because they had expelled the Soviet military and because of Sadat’s non-action after threats in 1971. (See quote on 43-44). • Israel found out about the attack but didn’t want to be seen as the aggressors and alienate the US. • They needed US help who couldn’t afford to be associated with a pre-emptive attack for fear of an oil embargo and involvement in another foreign war. • The US had also been told by Sadat that it was a limited operation aimed at forcing Israel into a withdrawal from 1967 areas and establishing a peace agreement. • Militarily Egypt was quite successful and the tide only turned for Israel when assisted by the US.

34. Consequences of the War • After some fear mongering on the sides of the superpowers they eventually got together and forced a ceasefire between the two. • OPEC initiated an oil embargo on the US because of their support of Israel. • Egypt perceived they had been victorious even though Israel had ended with greater military success. • Sadat gained great respect throughout the world. • Deaths and casualties on both sides led to each wishing to be more flexible in negotiating a peace settlement.

35. Attempts At Peace • On 11 November 1973 the first agreement between Israel and Egypt was reached at kilometre 101 on the Cairo-Suez road. It provided for relief for the Egyptians Third Army trapped behind Israeli lines, the replacement of Israeli by UN checkpoints and the exchange of prisoners. • The Israelis and Egyptians first started to negotiate in Geneva in 1973 at The Middle East Peace Conference - a conference which was rather unsuccessful. • As a result Kissinger engaged in “shuttle diplomacy” in an attempt to bring the two groups together. • He was eventually successful when on January 18, 1974, Sinai I was signed and Israeli troops moved out of the west bank of the Suez Canal. Sinai II was signed on Sept. 1, 1974 which gave Egypt more control over the Sinai Peninsula, including oilfields.

36. Peace With Syria • Peace with Syria was more difficult because Syria wanted to negotiate as a united Arab front, he felt Egypt’s separate negotiations would undermine his attempts to re-gain the Golan Heights as well as Hafez al-Asad’s goal of being seen as the leader of the Arab world. • An agreement on the Golan Heights was more difficult than Sinai because of the small area involved. • Israeli withdrawal from just beyond Quneitra on the Golan Heights was secured on May 31, 1974.

37. The Election of Lukud • The election of Begin and the Lukud Party in 1977 resulted in a much more militant Israel. • Begin was going to keep the Golan Heights and West Bank, build settlements in the areas that he felt belonged to Israel anyway and exclude the Palestinians from discussions. • The benefit of having Begin in power was that his hawkishness made able to invite Sadat to Israel to present to the Knesset and negotiate – see quote in page 50. • During Sadat’s speech he declared that he wanted the withdrawal of Israel to pre-1967 territory and Palestinians to be given the right to self-determination. Begin wanted to keep the West Bank and refused to negotiate with Arafat – indeed he equated him with Hitler.

38. The Camp David Accords • Sadat and Begin signed two agreements at Camp David in a peace process led by Jimmy Carter. • One agreement was Israel giving up the Sinai in exchange for peace. • The second involved resolving the Palestinian problem. Unfortunately, Carter and Sadat had a different interpretation of this agreement than Begin did (see the last paragraph on page 52). • On March 26, 1979, the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty was signed. • Israel returned the Sinai to Egypt in return for peace, full diplomatic relations and shipping through the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba. • In the months following the treaty, it became clear that Begin had no intention of relinquishing Israeli control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip as Israel continued to build settlements in the area.

39. The Results of Peace • The Palestinians had been ignored – see the quote by Edward Said at the bottom of page 53. • For Egypt it meant boycott by the Arab League and the suspension of negotiations on Palestine made it look like Egypt had abandoned Palestine in order to regain the Sinai. • Egypt did not grow economically as much as had been hoped and Sadat was assassinated in 1981. • Both sides benefitted from normalized relations with one another and Egypt emerged as a Middle East mediator. • Israel achieved border security in the south however their acts of aggression with Lebanon and annexation of the Golan Heights ensured Middle East peace was still a long way off. • Watch: Jimmy Carter, Read: A Short History of Palestine and Listen To: We Didn’t Start The Fire