Walter Hays, Global Alliance for Disaster Reduction, University of North Carolina, USA

1. TWO SUCCESSIVE POWER BLACK- OUTS IN INDIA IMPACT 0NE-HALF OF INDIA’S 1.2 BILLION PEOPLEJULY 30-31 and following, 2012 Walter Hays, Global Alliance for Disaster Reduction, University of North Carolina, USA

2. LOCATION MAP

3. BLACKOUTS ON TWO SUCCESSIVE DAYS CREATE CHAOS IN INDIA OVER 600 MILLION PEOPLE AND ALL COMMUNITY POWER-DEPENDENT SYSTEMS AFFECTED

4. DIMENSIONS OF THE BLACKOUTS • Power grids in 19 of India’s 28 States stretching from Assam, near China, to the Himalayas and the northwestern deserts of Rajasthan, shut down

5. What is dramatic about these blackouts is that they have impacted the entire country.

6. BLACKOUT NO SURPRISE FOR INDIA’S BUSINESSES • India's well known, unreliable power system had already forced businesses to create a “workaround electricity system” of noisy, dirty and expensive diesel generators.

7. INDIA’S BUSINESSES LOSE MONEY, BUT ABLE TO COPE • Although very costly for a businesses’ bottom line, most large businesses were prepared and able to cope with what may be the “world’s worst blackout.”

8. On Monday (July 30th), India was forced to buy power from tiny Bhutan

9. HOW BAD WAS IT? • The worst blackout in India’s history that spread to more than half the country Tuesday, reinforced concerns that the nation’s inefficient power sector could undermine its long-term economic ambitions to become a SUPERPOWER.

10. INTERNATIONAL EMBARASSMENT The scale of the blackouts caused India acute embarrassment on the international stage.

11. CAUTION: DON’T THINK THAT INDIA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT IS VULNERABLE TO POWER OUTAGES

12. POWER STABILITY: HARDER TO ACHIEVE • India is NOT uniquely vulnerable to large-scale grid failures. • The growing complexity and reliance on the electric grid is making power stability harder to achieve in both developed and fast-growing countries.

13. CAUSES AND EFFECTS YOU CAN NEVER PREVENT ALL THE POSSIBLE FAILURES AND THEIR EFFECTS

14. THE CAUSES: 1)India’s antiquated power systems, 2) An increase in peak demand caused not by the heat, but by an unexpected need to pump water from wells for agricultural uses due to much less rain during the monsoon season, …

15. THE CAUSES (continued): 3) Low current rainfall has also restricted the amount of hydroelectric power delivered by dams, normally a significant percentage of India’s power

16. Monday’s failure was also blamed on individual states drawing too much power from the grid, in defiance of regulations.

17. Central government was supposed to warn states if they were drawing excessive power from the system, but NO warnings were issued on Monday or Tuesday.

18. GAUHATI: NO POWER IN THE LINES

19. NEW DELHI: HUGE TRAFFIC JAM; JULY 30, 2012

20. NEW DELHI: COMMUTERS OUTSIDE SUBWAY STATION

21. NEW DELHI: COMMUTERS WAITING FOR TRAIN SERVICE

22. DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPACTS • All power-dependent community functions (e.g., government, business enterprise, hospitals, schools, …) in 19 States, were shut down.

23. DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPACTS • Some major city hospitals and office buildings had to fire up diesel generators.

24. DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPACTS • Trains and subways brought to a halt.

25. DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPACTS • Two hundred miners were stranded in three deep coal shafts in the state of West Bengal when their electric elevators stopped working.

26. DIMENSIONS OF THE IMPACTS • Wheat-belts:Punjab and Uttar Pradesh in the Ganges Plains, needing electricity to pump water from wells, were hit hard

27. POWER RESTORED, FOR NOW 3:00 PM TUESDAY, JULY 31 FOR EMERGENCY SERVICES “NORMAL” ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 1, 2012

28. NEW DELHI: POWER RESTORED; CABLES AND WIRES NOTWITHSTANDING

29. A TYPICAL UNANSWERED QUESTION Were the power outages “accidents” that were just waiting to happen?

30. A TYPICAL UNANSWERED QUESTION Are the causes of India’s power outages more political than from lack of technology or inadequate engineering?

31. A TYPICAL UNANSWERED QUESTION Big cities like New Delhi have backup power, but what might happen during surgery in a small town?.

32. A TYPICAL UNANSWERED QUESTION How many will die because of this historic blackout... 10? ---100? --- 1,000?

33. INDIA’S LONG TERM NEED FOR POWER At present, about 300 million people in India have no access to power, and 300 million more have only sporadic access.

34. THE LONG TERM QUESTION Grappling with the slowest economic growth in nine years, can India pump $1 trillion into infrastructure and power over the next five years, as planned?

35. TIME FOR A SHIFT IN TECHNOLOGY • India's disaster illustrates the perils of the current practice of relying on manual control of the power grid.

36. THE GRID OPERATOR • The primary function of grid operator is to anticipate load and to maintain a steady balance between power supply and demand.

37. THE GRID SIGNAL • The grid signal operates at a set frequency—60 hertz in the U.S. and 50 hertz in India —and when supply and demand fall out of sync, the frequency will either dip or rise.

38. KEEPING THE GRID SIGNAL STEADY • TIn the U.S., grid operators have "hot" generators on standby to ramp up power in order to keep a close-to-steady frequency, which works if the generators are not maxed out.

39. COSTLY AND IMPRACTICAL IN INDIA • In a country like India, it's both costly and impractical to keep 10 percent of the generation capacity on contingency when you may only use it once in a lifetime.

40. THE TECHNOLOGY TO KEEP THE SIGNAL STEADY EXISTS NOW • A shift in technology frommanual control of the grid (which is common in India and many places around the world) to more advanced control technology can help grids recover more effectively from outages when they occur.