Assessing the National Prosecuting Authority

1. Assessing the National Prosecuting Authority Complexities and possibilities

2. Measuring Performance • Measuring the performance of the NPA in fulfilling the core mandate of prosecution is not straightforward • The most sensible measure of the performance of the criminal justice systemis the number of convictions (i.e. successful prosecutions) in relation to the number of crimes reported to the police, on a year-on-year basis • However this measure incorporates the performance of a variety of state actors in the criminal justice system

3. Conviction rates • NPA has emphasised ‘conviction rates’ as the major measure of the performance of the prosecution service • The NPA records a ‘conviction rate’ of close to 90% • 9 out 10 cases prosecuted result in conviction • ‘… any system which pays attention to conviction rates, as opposed to the number of convictions, is liable to abuse’ • a prosecutor could choose to make only one successful prosecution and boast a ‘100 per cent conviction rate’ • More recently the NPA has begun to emphasise ‘finalisations’ year-on-year

4. Finalisations • Finalisations include: • Verdicts (‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’) • Admission of guilt fines before plea • Stopping of a prosecution after plea • Finalisations number around 325 000 per year • Yet 1 000 000 cases are enrolled each year • Thus less desirable outcomes predominate

5. Outcomes

6. Finalisations per prosecutor • NPA compares itself year-on-year • does not take into account increasing resources • In 2009 NPA had +/- 3000 prosecutors and advocates • Each ‘lawyer’ thus yielded 110 finalisations per year or 2 per working week in a 50-week year • Number ‘concluded’ comes to 4 per week per lawyer if withdrawals are added • But to process 1 000 000 cases requires closer to 7 per week per lawyer with 3000 lawyers

7. Comparative Finalisations per prosecutor • Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for the City of London, England, had 490 prosecutors who finalised 204 000 cases in 2009 – around 9 per week per prosecutor • This productivity is associated with a rate of conviction after trial of around 60–70 % • Each prosecutor in London thus yielded around 270 convictions per year, compared to South Africa’s 110 • The various CPSs for the whole of the UK have roughly the same number of prosecutors as South Africa, serving a population 35% larger than South Africa’s. • Roughly 5 million crimes are reported to the police in the UK, a number similar to the total number of crimes reported to the police in South Africa.

8. The workload argument • It is often assumed that prosecutor performance, in the sense of how many cases a prosecutor is capable of finalising, is negatively affected by work load • The argument is that high work load makes prosecutors less efficient, which means that their rate of throughput – the ratio of verdicts to workload – is reduced • The argument suggests, for example, with a light load of only 10 cases, a prosecutor might manage 7 verdicts (70 %), but with a load of 100, he/she would only manage 50 verdicts (50 %) • The argument says if the workload on each prosecutor could be reduced, then the ratio of verdicts to workload would improve

9. Does the data support the workload argument? • SAPS data from 2000 on cases referred to court and outcomes per province are compared with prosecutor numbers per province in 2000 • The prosecutor workload in a province was calculated as the number of cases referred to the NPA by SAPS for the 20 most serious crimes divided by the number of prosecutors in that province • The prosecutor throughput in a province was calculated as the number of verdicts for the 20 most serious crimes divided by the number of prosecutors • The rate of throughput was calculated as the throughput (number of verdicts per prosecutor) divided by the workload (number of cases per prosecutor) and expressed as a percentage

11. Workload increases throughput • This data suggests that at the range of average workloads present in 2000 among the provinces (211–380 cases per prosecutor per year), an increase in the workload per prosecutor increased the rate of throughput • Prosecutors in provinces with a higher-than-average burden (350 or more cases per prosecutor) achieved the best rate of throughput (53–56 per cent), while those with the least burden (211 cases per prosecutor) achieved the worst rate of throughput (37 per cent)

13. Workload increases conviction throughput • At the range of workloads present in 2000 (211–380 cases per prosecutor per year), an increase in the workload per prosecutor increased the rate of conviction throughput • According to this data, prosecutors with a higher average burden (more than 350 cases per prosecutor) achieved higher rates of conviction throughput (44 %, while those with lower burdens (under 250 cases per prosecutor) achieved lower rates of conviction throughput (28%) • The data strongly suggests that the optimum level of workload is at 350 cases referred per prosecutor or higher. Accurately to predict the optimum workload would require more data

15. Theorising prosecutorial response to resources • Faced with more resources (a higher number of prosecutors per 100 000 cases), prosecutors could either increase the number of cases they undertake or increase the effort they put into each case • Increasing cases would maximise throughput and increasing effort per case would maximise conviction rates

16. The theory in South Africa • Particular emphasis has been placed on conviction rates as a performance measure of individual performance, expressed as a percentage of cases finalised in court rather than as a percentage of cases referred by police • Prosecutors faced with more resources (a relatively lighter case load) may choose to spend more time on ensuring their cases are successful rather than choosing to undertake more cases • Given our immense case backlog, this may not be the most desirable response

17. Workload and prosecutorial discretion • Indeed the problem is compounded by the fact that prosecutors have also interpreted their discretion on the decision to prosecute so broadly that effectively the NPA is also choosing the lighter workload • This is done through the massive rate of withdrawals – which are simply decisions not to prosecute • Cases not prosecuted within a year may in the next year be ‘withdrawals’

18. NPA Performance over time • If it is assumed that trial burden is similarly distributed around the country and has remained similar year on year, comparisons can be made in order to measure relative performance over time • When this is done, the more recent performance of NPA does not fare well • This is because while the number of prosecutors in the NPA has increased year on year, the number of finalisations has not kept pace with the increase in human resources • Since 2003 the number of employees in the NPA increased by 33 per cent from 3 525 to 4 690 • Over the same time period the number of verdicts has shown a general downward trend

19. Decreasing verdict trend despite increasing human resources

20. Impact on Justice • Many are held in custody for months or years only to have their cases withdrawn • Data from a 2008 study showed about half of people in custody at the time their case was concluded, had their case end in withdrawal • Crimes remain unaddressed • Sentenced admissions to prison have halved • More than half of people in prison not sentenced have been held for more than 90 days