BRIEFING:NORTH AFRICA FEBRUARY 2011

1. BRIEFING:NORTH AFRICA FEBRUARY 2011

2. MAP OF MIDDLE EAST/NORTH AFRICA (MENA) REGION

3. SIMILARITIES ACROSS THE REGION • Extended leadership terms • Mubarak – 30 years • Ben Ali – 23 years • Gaddafi – 42 years • Bouteflika – 12 years (constitution amended for extension of term) • Abdullah Saleh – 21 years • Rule by emergency laws • Strong military support of presidents/leaders • Support from US/West in fight against terrorism • Hereditary succession (calls for overthrow of government) 3

4. Poor human rights records • Restricted political participation • Opposition to religious political participation (Islamist parties) • Media censorship • Economic situation • High male youth unemployment • No trickle down of oil revenue • High level of unemployed graduates • High food prices 4

5. Key elements leading to protests • Lack of political legitimacy • Circumscribed political space • Demand for socio-economic and political reforms • Underlying history of discontent amongst citizens • Suppression of protests against unemployment, high food prices and corruption • Emergence of ICT as a tool for debate on government policies • Social media as a tool for organisation of protests and mobilisation of educated youth and middle class 5

6. BRIEFING:EGYPT FEBRUARY 2011

7. MAP OF EGYPT

8. POLITICAL SITUATION • Protests in Egypt broke out on 25 January 2011 during the Police Day public holiday. • In an unprecedented show of solidarity thousands of Egyptians defied emergency laws and protested against the brutality of the police and called on the administration of President Mubarak to step down and bring change to Egypt. • The protestors gathered for 18 consecutive days • Reasons for protests; • High unemployment rates (9,5% unemployment and a large number of unemployed male youth at 23% of the male youth population) • Extreme poverty (It is estimated that approximately 40% of the population live below US$2 a day) • Corruption amongst ruling party members and business elite • Lack of political freedoms • Restrictive emergency laws (since 1981) and police brutality • Constitutional requirements prevent widespread political participation 8

9. President Mubarak attempted on several occasions to appease the protestors by; • Sacking his entire cabinet, including the Ministers of Interior, Finance, Trade and Industry, Health, Culture, Transport, Agriculture and Justice • Appointing Omar Suleiman as Vice President, the first vice president in his 30 year presidency • Calling for investigations into the activities of the former Interior Minister and several members of the executive committee of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) • Opposition groups, including the banned Muslim Brotherhood, met with Vice-President Omar Suleiman during the protests and agreed on the formation of a constitutional review. • The Military were deployed on 31 January 2011maintaining that they would not attack protestors. • More than 300 protestors were killed and several thousand injured 9

10. The Muslim Brotherhood, New Wafd Party, April 6th Movement and Mohamed El-Baradei’s National Association for Change were unanimous in calling on President Mubarak to step down immediately. • Youth organisations formed a coalition spanning several political parties and activist groups in an effort to provide leadership to the protests in Tahrir Square. • The Egyptian Supreme Military Council met under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister for the first time in the country’s history without the presence of the Presidenton Thursday 10 February 2011. 10

11. On Friday 11 February 2011 President Mubarak handed over all executive and legislative power to the Supreme Military Council under the leadership of the Defence Minister, Field Marshal Mohamed Tentawi. • The Military Council has dissolved both houses of parliament and suspended the constitution. It has indicated that constitutional reforms would be investigated and proposed for decision by a national referendum followed by elections within the next six months. • The current Egyptian cabinet has remained on as a civilian component to the military leadership in order to ensure that government departments continue to function. 11

12. SECURITY • The security situation has somehow stabilised following the intervention of the military and the return of police to the streets under orders of the Supreme Military Council. • Some protestors are reluctant to back down as they feel it is still to early to gauge whether real change will occur • At this stage there still appears to be no targeted threat to foreigners despite isolated incidents mainly aimed at reporters • The possibility of further protests remains present as protestors will monitor the activities of the military in implementing reforms 12

13. SECURITY • Fears about the emergence of political Islam • Concerns about the Suez Canal • Concerns about the new Government’s stance vis a vis, the 30-year old truce with Israel and Egypt’s moderate stance on the Palestinian question • Implications for the Middle East Peace Process

14. ECONOMY • The economic situation in Egypt can be traced as one of the leading causes for the escalating protests which have broken out • Unemployment remains relatively high at almost 10% with 23% of male youths unemployed. Job creation is stagnant and salaries in most sectors are extremely poor compared to the rising cost of living • Egyptian labour unions, doctors, transport workers and lawyers joining the protests and strike action • Impact of protests estimated at several billion US dollars 14

15. Government intervened through; • temporary closure of the Egyptian Stock Exchange at the height of protests, • implementation of exchange controls to control currency devaluation • declaration of an additional public holiday on Monday 14 February in order to restore calm in the markets • Access to basic services remains a challenge for many Egyptians and around 20% of the population live on under US$2 a day • Government announced an increase of 15% in public service salaries and pension contributions in an attempt to get government departments working again. 15

16. CHALLENGES • Although Egypt has recorded a steady level of GDP growth, it has remained unevenly distributed, causing disappointment and despair especially among the educated youth. • Egypt will need to reach even higher growth levels to create sufficient employment opportunities for an already large number of unemployed as well as the growing number of university graduates. • Other challenges that have been identified include: combating corruption, improving government efficiency, to reduce the socio-economic disparities between the Egyptian elite and the large lower class through permanent employment opportunities and decent wages 16

17. As with Tunisia, Mubarak’s departure has thrust Egypt on a new course. • The process of drafting amendments to the constitution and the inclusion of all stakeholders 17

18. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA • South Africa views Egypt as a strategic partner on the continent, not only at a bilateral level but also at multilateral level. Egypt’s large potential market in terms of minerals and agriculture as well as tourism remains largely untapped by South African business, while its support for African representation and infrastructure development echoes the sentiments of the South African government. • The South African government has welcomed the resignation of President Mubarak and the acceptance of the will of the Egyptian people. South Africa also has indicated its willingness to provide assistance to the transitional government as it prepares for elections. • Bilateral relations have been impacted with the resignation and charging of the former Minister of Trade and Industry who was due to visit South Africa with a large business delegation in March. • The 9th session of the JBC was due to be held in Cairo – unlikely before elections 18

19. BRIEFING:LIBYA FEBRUARY 2011

20. MAP OF LIBYA

21. POLITICAL SITUATION • Anti-government protests have engulfed the capital of Libya, Tripoli and the security situation has deteriorated rapidly. • The building where the country's parliament meets and other government buildings, including police stations were torched and looted. • Anti-government protests in eastern Libyan cities of Benghazi and Al-Badya have continued. • Protestors are calling for Col Gaddafi to leave and for a constitution to be adopted allowing for democratic elections • Eastern Libya and Benghazi in particular have not supported Gaddafi since the 1996 shooting of 1200 detainees • Unrest has spread to the capital, Tripoli despite heavy presence of security forces, including the military 21

22. Communications interrupted as visuals of uprising broadcast on YouTube have seen widespread condemnation of actions of Libyan authorities. • Plain clothes police officers have been deployed due to anger aimed at police following events in Benghazi • Officials at hospitals report that 200 people were killed over weekend of 19 and 20 February following clashes between security forces and anti-government protestors • Widespread reports that an army battalion sent to bring order to Benghazi has joined protestors and that Benghazi has been “liberated” from Gaddafi’s rule • Gaddafi’s youngest son, Seif al Islam addressed the nation on national television despite holding no official position in government. Warned of possible “civil war” and that Gaddafi will “fight until the last bullet” 22

23. SECURITY • The security situation is unstable and volatile. • A curfew has been imposed in Tripoli • Protests are increasing in number and size and it would appear that some members of the military are willing to side with protestors • Two senior air force members have already defected to Malta on their fighter jets. • Military are clashing with protestors using live ammunition • Reports have emerged of attacks on South Korean and Turkish construction sites and possible attacks against Gaddafi’s compound outside Tripoli • Oil companies have started evacuating workers from Libya 23

24. ECONOMY • The economic situation in Libya has influenced protests with vast oil wealth not filtering down to people • Unemployment amongst Libyans remains relatively high as most infrastructure development jobs are given to foreign labourers • One of the largest Libyan tribes has threatened to disrupt oil exports unless crackdown on protestors is stopped • Oil prices have gone up due to the situation in Libya. 24

25. CHALLENGES • Centralised governance • Lack of constitution and dysfunctional governance • Ban on political parties – no official organised opposition forces • Tribal factions 25

26. Undiversified economy – oil wealth not filtering to people • Lack of political freedoms and basic human rights such as freedom of speech and association 26

27. REACTION TO THE CRACKDOWN • Religious leaders in Libya issued a statement calling upon all Muslims to protest against the bloodshed (not against regime change). Thousands responded to this call, which escalated into an anti-Gaddafi rally • Mass defections from the State apparatus: Secretary of Justice, Libyan Ambassadors to the USA, the Arab League, UN, India, Bangladesh and Malaysia • The Arab League has called an emergency Summit

28. REACTION CONT. • UNSG has expressed concern that violence against protesters has escalated to unacceptable levels and indicated that the Libyan authorities were expected to exert utmost restraint, ensure the protection of civilians and address genuine grievances of the population. • In an emergency meeting called by the UNSC some EU countries have called for “swift and clear” action by the Security Council • Libya has, through the South African Ambassador in Tripoli, sought South Africa’s support in ensuring that the UNSC understands the real situation in Libya

29. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA • South Africa views Libya as a key player within the continent • South Africa is currently attempting to revive the bilateral commission with Libya • Libya’s need for infrastructure development and untapped market presents opportunities for South African companies • There are around 200 South Africans registered with the Mission in Tripoli. Those South Africans linked to oil companies are in the process of being evacuated by their companies. The Mission has been approached for assistance by South Africans. 29

30. BRIEFING:TUNISIA FEBRUARY 2011

31. MAP OF TUNISIA

32. POLITICAL SITUATION • The Tunisian citizens undertook civil protests against the regime of former President Ben Ali due to lack of job opportunities, lack of political freedoms, corruption, rising food prices and poverty in rural areas. • As the situation became out of control, President Ben Ali was forced to vacate office and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. The Speaker of the Parliament, Mr. Fouad Mebazaa was sworn-in as interim President in accordance with Article 57 of the constitution and instructed the Prime Minister Mr. Mohamed Ghannouchi to form government of national unity which was later announced on 17 January 2011 with several opposition assigned ministerial posts. It was followed by a cabinet reshuffle on 27 January 2010 with new Ministers occupying the foreign, Defence and Interior Ministries. 32

33. The interim government continues to struggle to assert itself in the face of continued street protests. The protesters demand that all members from the former ruling party, including the Prime Minister and the interim President, should be excluded from the interim government. • Tunisia's interim president Fouad Mebazaa announced on 9 February 2011 that talks with unions would be held soon, after he was given wide powers to restore order and rule by decree until elections are held. • The interim government also lifted a ban on opposition parties . • Meanwhile, the interim government faced another setback following the resignation of the Tunisian Foreign Minister after just over two weeks in the job after criticism of his praise for his French counterpart Michele Alliot-Marie while she was under fire for cosy relations with the entourage of deposed President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. • Tunisia's image as one of the most reliable bulwarks of stability has been damaged, and the road ahead remains uncertain. 33

34. SECURITY • The security situation remains tense and volatile, but it appears that the fragile situation is slowly returning to normal following the recent cabinet reshuffle announced on 27 January 2011. Street protests have dried up in Tunisia in recent days after a reshuffle purged the interim government of most Ben Ali loyalists. The current mood is that anything connected with and even related to the RCD is infected and should be removed. • The police force who had earlier handled the protest had been removed from the scene and the air force and army deployed. A number of people close to former President were also arrested by the military. • The army is expected to oversee security for the country's transition until elections are held. 34

35. ECONOMY • Tunisia has a diverse economy. The Agricultural, mining, tourism and manufacturing sectors are particularly important. Over the past decade the Government has gradually relaxed its control of the economy. Increasing privatization, simplification of the tax structure, a prudent approach to debt and progressive social policies have contributed to raise standards of living in Tunisia, compared to other countries in the region. • Tunisia’s economic development model failed to provide sufficient and adequate job opportunities for the many yearly new entrants into the job market. At 14%, the official unemployment rate in Tunisia is among the highest in the region. • Although Tunisia realised a level of economic prosperity as compared to its neighbours, it has remained unevenly distributed, causing disappointment and despair especially among the educated youth. 35

36. CHALLENGES • Although Tunisia realised a level of economic prosperity as compared to its neighbours, it has remained unevenly distributed, causing disappointment and despair especially among the educated youth. • Tunisia will need to reach even higher growth levels to create sufficient employment opportunities for an already large number of unemployed as well as the growing number of university graduates. Other challenges that have been identified include: the need to privatize industry, to liberalise the investment code to encourage foreign investment, to improve government efficiency, to reduce trade deficit as well as the socio-economic disparities in the impoverished south and west of the country. • Ben Ali’s departure is viewed as the beginning of a new political landscape in Tunisia. However, his departure leaves many questions than answers. While the Tunisians are demanding democratic presidential and parliamentary elections, the way to get there has not been outlined. 36

37. CHALLENGES (cont.) • It is also unclear to what extent the political changes will lead to the decisive social and economic transformation that protesters have been calling for. • The opposition parties are yet to assert themselves and take over transition process. • The challenge for the new leadership is to stick to its ‘transitional’ nature and organise free and fair elections in a reasonable period. The two-month period provided in the current constitution seems to have been extended by six to seven months period which could be deemed reasonable. If the Mbazaa-Ghannouchi government fails to do so, the country might witness new waves of protests with incommensurable consequences. 37

38. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA • South Africa is fully committed to the African agenda, strengthening of the African Union and the promotion of democracy, peace and stability in Africa. The promotion of human rights and political freedom. The South African government can play a significant role in sharing their experiences with the Tunisian interim government and in providing strategic guidelines towards successful transforming into a democracy that is acceptable to the people and the rest of the world. • While recognising the recently announced interim leadership, South Africa should also continue to monitor developments, since the current change of government is in accordance with Article 57 of the Tunisian Constitution which states that if the Presidency of the Republic becomes vacant, the Speaker of the National Parliament should take over the responsibilities of the Republic, while the Prime Minister will continue to co-ordinate the work of government. 38

39. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA • The ongoing political unrest in Tunisia has somehow affected the implementation of the Joint Bilateral Commission. For instance, bilateral engagements between South Africa and Tunisia have been postponed till further notice. South Africa was scheduled to host the JBC during February/March 2011 where several agreements/MOUs were expected to be signed (agreement in the field of health regarding the recruitment of Tunisian health professionals into South Africa; MOU in the field of social development etc). Hosting the JBC would have paved way for conclusion of other agreements under consideration. 39

40. CONCLUSION • Major political realignment in the Middle and North Africa (MENA) Region • Uncertainty about security in the region • Prospects for democratisation • Expectation for socio-economic and political reforms • The “Tunisian contagion” likely to affect the entire MENA region and inspire pro-democracy movements in other parts of the world, particularly, Sub-Saharan Africa

41. THANK YOU