CRaTER Pre-Ship Review (I-PSR) Mission Assurance

1. CRaTER Pre-Ship Review(I-PSR)MISSION ASSURANCEBrian Klatt January 3-4, 2008

2. MISSION ASSURANCE SLIDES • PAIP COMPLIANCE • SYSTEM SAFETY • RFAs, ACTION ITEMS, AND COMMENTS TRACKING • NON-CONFORMANCES, MRBs, AND FAILURE ANALYSIS • WAIVERS • FORMAL INSPECTIONS • QUALIFICATION • VEERIFICATION

3. PAIP Compliance • Reliability Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Parts Stress Analyses Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Critical Items List Submitted to GSFC • Parts Stress Analyses Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Reliability Assessments Submitted to GSFC • Analysis of test Data Trend Analysis submitted; MGH & BNL results presented • Software Assurance CRaTER does not employ any flight software • Ground Data System Requirements CRaTER and LRO Ground Data Systems are compatible • Risk Management Requirements Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Integrated Independent Review Requirements Peer reviews on Electrical, Mechanical, and FPGA • GSFC System Review Requirements PDR, CDR, PER, and PSR conducted by NASA IRT • Performance and Environmental Verification Plan Submitted to GSFC • Performance Verification Matrix Submitted to GSFC • Environmental Test Matrix (ETM) Submitted to GSFC • Verification Procedures Submitted to GSFC • Instrument Verification Reports 89 required; 83 completed • Structural & Mechanical Requirements Analysis and Environmental tests demonstrate safety margins • Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Requirements Tests perform at Chomerics in Woburn, MA • Vacuum, Thermal and Humidity Requirements Thermal balance and Thermal vacuum tests were successful • Workmanship All certified per NASA STD 8739.X • New/Advanced Packaging Technology No advanced packaging employed

4. PAIP Compliance (continued) • Materials, Processes and Lubrication Requirements MIUL and As-Built M & P lists submitted to GSFC • Material Selection MIUL and As-Built M & P lists submitted to GSFC • Shelf-Life-Controlled Materials and Limited Life Items Material shelf life is monitored; No limited life items • Materials identification and usage list (MIUL) Submitted to GSFC • Fasteners The largest fastener used is #6 • Lubrication CRaTER does not have any mechanisms, thus no lubricants • Procurement Requirements All flight procurement reviewed by Mission Assurance • Purchased Raw Materials Chemical and Physical test results are documented • Raw Materials Used in Purchased Products Not applicable • EEE Parts Requirements In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Part Control Board (PCB) PCB coordinated with GSFC (Rich Williams) • Parts Selection and Screening In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Parts Selection Criteria In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Custom Devices CRaTER does not use any custom devices • Parts Stress Analysis and Derating In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Radiation Hardness In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Destructive Physical Analysis Pre-seal source inspection in lieu of DPA • Failure Analysis Performed to establish root cause of failure • Parts Age Usage In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Parts List PAPL submitted frequently to GSFC (Rich Williams) • Parts Traceability Control In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Parts Reuse Parts are not reused • Alerts Researched and responded to all Alerts and Notices

5. PAIP Compliance (continued) • Contamination Control Requirements TQCM change during T/V was in the single digits • Electrostatic Discharge Control (ESD) All certified per NASA STD 8739.7 • Configuration Management Configuration Management Process submitted to GSFC • Preservation and Packing Preservation, Packing, and Handling is documented • Data Retention Design, fabrication, and test data is retained at MIT FOREVER

6. System Safety • System Safety Program Plan Contained in PAIP (Approved) • Safety Analyses Submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Preliminary Hazard Analysis Submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • System Hazard Analysis Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Operations Hazards Analyses (OHA) Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Operating and Support Hazard Analysis Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Software Safety Not Applicable • Safety Compliance Checklist Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Safety Assessment Report Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package Inputs submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Safety Verification Tracking Log Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Ground Operations Procedures Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Safety Variance Not Applicable • Support for Safety Meetings As Required • Orbital Debris Assessment CRaTER Input submitted to GSFC • Launch Site safety Support Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Mishap Reporting and Investigation None were required • Miscellaneous Submittals for Range Use None have been requested

7. ACTION ITEMS AND COMMENTS

8. ACTION ITEMS AND COMMENTS (CONTINUED)

9. ACTION ITEMS AND COMMENTS (CONTINUED)

10. NONCONFORMING MATERIAL REPORTS

11. WAIVERS • One waiver was submitted to fly a commercial, unqualified thermistor, which is used only during ground test and integration. • The waiver was withdrawn when a suitable part mounting was not available

12. FORMAL INSPECTIONS • ALL HYBRID MICROCIRCUITS (100%) USED IN FLIGHT HARDWARE WERE PRE-SEAL VISUALLY EXAMINED AT THE MANUFACTURER'S FACILITY. • ALL ASSEMBLY AND TEST OPERATIONS ON THE DETECTORS (100%) WERE WITTNESSED BY MIT

13. QUALIFICATION • TWO (2) EEE PART TYPES WERE SUBJECTED TO QUALIFICATION TESTS, IN ACCORDANCE • WITH EEE-INST-002 • INTERFET P/N SNJ90347(IF9030) PASSED EEE-INST-002 QUALIFICATION TESTS ON 4/5/07 • KEMET 1000V, 0.022UF CERAMIC CHIP CAPACITOR FAILED QUALIFICATION LIFE TEST. THE PART WAS DESIGNED OUT OF THE SYSTEM IN FAVOR OF A QUALIFIED CALRAMIC CAPACITOR

14. SCIENCE PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION

15. SCIENCE PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION(continued)

16. DATA INTERFACE VERIFICATION

17. ELECTRICAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION

18. MECHANICAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION

19. THERMAL INTERFACE VERIFICATION

20. CONTAMINATION VERIFICATION

21. ENVIRONMENTAL VERIFICATION

22. VERIFICATION KEY