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Preliminary Hazard Analysis of EUROCONTROL Concept of Operations 2011 using the FAST method

Preliminary Hazard Analysis of EUROCONTROL Concept of Operations 2011 using the FAST method. Safety R & D seminar 25 – 27 October, Barcelona. presented by Alexander Krastev EUROCONTROL. European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation. Acknowledgments. Ian Ramsay, EUROCONTROL

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Preliminary Hazard Analysis of EUROCONTROL Concept of Operations 2011 using the FAST method

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  1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis of EUROCONTROL Concept of Operations 2011using the FAST method Safety R & D seminar 25 – 27 October, Barcelona presented by Alexander Krastev EUROCONTROL European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation

  2. Acknowledgments Ian Ramsay, EUROCONTROL Jacques Beaufays, EUROCONTROL Jose Varela, EUROCONTROL Jos Kuijper, EUROCONTROL Randall De Garis, EUROCONTROL Brian Smith, FAST Michel Masson, FAST Rudi den Hertog, FAST

  3. Content • Safety assessment of future concepts • The FAST and the FAST methodology • Eurocontrol Concept of Operations for 2011 • ConOps 2011 hazard analysis using FAST methodology • Main Findings • Safety R & D needs • Conclusions

  4. Safety Assessment of Future Concepts Key Questions New operational concepts developed in response to the forecasted traffic growth • Are the new concepts inherently safe? • Do the new concepts bring the required safety improvement? • How do concept changes impact on safety of operations? • Will SESAR Operational Concept achieve the safety target for 2020?

  5. Safety Assessment of Future Concepts Difficulties • Concepts’ descriptions limited to the “ideal” world • Level of detail of available description not sufficient • Need for “out of box” thinking • Complex task that requires: • Integrated view of changes across all aviation domains • Due consideration of interactions and interdependencies • Suitable methodology

  6. The Future Aviation Safety Team (FAST) FAST established in 1999 by the JSSI Steering Group • Objective: Develop and implement methods and processes to support the systematic identification and resolution of future hazards in the aviation system • All major aviation stakeholder groups and organisations represented FAST developed a prognostic method for future hazards identification

  7. The FAST Method • The global Air-Ground-Space system considered as a “system of systems” • Focus on the “prognostic” time domain • Augments existing hazard identification techniques • Concept of Areas of Change at the core • AoC list: 192 entries grouped in 11 categories, e.g. • AC_11 Proliferation of heterogeneous aircraft with widely-varying equipment and capabilities FAST handbook available at: http://fast.jrc.it/

  8. The FAST Process 2. Define Scope of Expert Team Hazard- Identification Study Enhance and/or Modify Planned Changes Customer/ Stakeholder Responsibility 3. Assemble an Expert Team Advocate the FAST Philosophy FAST Core Team Responsibility Maintain Futures & Watch Items Maintain Areas of Change Repository Commission Expert Teams Guide FAST Facilitators 10. Inform FAST & Customers Regarding results Enhance the FAST Method 4. Understand Customer Requirements and Future of Interest 6. Identify Areas of Change Pertinent to Future of Interest 7. Enrich Hazards by Evaluating Interactions with Areas of Change 9. Formulate Recommendations & Identify Watch Items Expert Team Responsibility 5. (optional) Identify Intrinsic Hazards Within Future of Interest 8. (optional) Identify Mitigations & Effects of Areas of Change on Mitigations 1. Responsible Party Proposes Change(s) to Global Aviation System; recognizes need for systematic prediction of hazard(s) associated with changes and need to design potential hazards out of system or avoid or mitigate hazard(s)

  9. ConOps 2011 Content Air Traffic Flow & Capacity Management Airspace Organisation & Management Airspace User Operations Information Management& Services Airport Operations Separation Assurance Synchronisation Air Traffic Control Concept of Operations 2011 • Description of the ATM System in 2011 - the Main Changes • The ATM Components, OI’s and System Enablers • The ATM Operational Model • The Key Enablers – SWIM, the Network Operations Plan and • Collaborative Decision Making • The Principles of the Layered Planning Process • High-Level System Capabilities • Business Impact Statements • Annexes • The Actors – Roles and Responsibilities • Operational Scenarios and Use cases

  10. ConOps 2011 The Change Directions • The ConOps 2011 defines the main change directions for the evolution of European ATM: • Gate to Gate Flight Management • Enhanced Flexibility & Efficiency • Responsive Capacity Management to meet Demand • Collaborative Airspace Management • Extended Levels of Automation & Communication • System Wide Information Management • Collaborative Decision-Making

  11. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis Objectives • Establish a comprehensive list of hazards that may be generated by the implementation of ConOps 2011 • Identify hazards which may have a critical impact on ATM safety • Validate the applicability of FAST method to assessments of future ATM concepts

  12. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis Approach • All FAST process steps covered except “Formulate recommendations and identify Watch Items • Tailored briefing packs for more efficient preparation • Two workshops held (6-9 June and 17-20 July 2006) • Excellent mix of expertise in the Expert team • Hazard identification performed by teams in break-out sessions lead by facilitators

  13. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis WS 1 Focus Network Operations Plan • Teams analysed ConOps 2011 from three perspectives: • AOM / ATFCM • ATC and Airport Operations • Airspace Users Operations • The three phases of the layered planning process addressed strategic pre-tactical tactical • Nominal (G2G) Operational scenario used to enrich hazard log • Output: ConOps/Scenario related hazard log

  14. ConOps 2011 Hazard Analysis WS 2 Focus • Three non-nominal scenarios used for hazard identification • Scenario based team composition • Brainstorming session for identification of potential mitigation means • WS output: • Scenario related hazard logs • List of safety issues for further study and analysis Oh God, please help me see the future!

  15. Main Findings • The main ConOps 2011 concept elements could bring a significant safety benefit • Need of a balanced and safe in terms of frequency and complexity process of dynamic airspace changes • Diversity of aircraft equipment and capabilities is an important safety challenge • Safety aspects of human tasks automation deserve particular attention and efforts

  16. Safety R&D Aspects (1)

  17. Safety R&D Aspects (2)

  18. Safety R&D Aspects (3)

  19. Safety R&D Aspects (4)

  20. Conclusions Methodology • Objectives largely met - benefits of safety assessment of operational concepts demonstrated • Involvement of all ATM actors is essential: allowing for synergies and shared knowledge • Use of operational scenarios considered essential • FAST method can be used for safety analysis of future concepts; some fine tuning still needed

  21. ConclusionsBenefits/Limitations of Concept Assessments • Anticipate safety issues right from the concept definition phase • “Validation” of new concepts from safety perspective • Source of recommendations for further analysis and research • Enable risk informed decision making in the planning and development phases • BUT, there are also limitations: • Non-linear increase of uncertainties with time • New or modified hazards may emerge from specific implementation • High level of abstraction

  22. Thank you very much for your attention! ? … possibly a safe option for the future

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