Darfur Joint Assessment Mission Inception Workshop Nairobi, June 30, 2006

1. Planning and Management of Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Lessons from experienceWhat to do first when everything is a priority? Darfur Joint Assessment Mission Inception Workshop Nairobi, June 30, 2006

2. Key post-conflict characteristics Needs: • Large scale physical destruction • Population displacement • Deaths, vulnerable families, trauma • Dislocated economy • Risk of renewed conflict • Capacity: • “Old” institutions often weakened, collapsed or inappropriate • “New” institutions often designed for resistance, not government • Large aid inflows and many new international actors • Window of opportunity to transform

3. Post conflict needs assessments • Timor Leste, Iraq, Haiti… and subnational, Sri Lanka and post Tsunami in Aceh, Indonesia • Often WB/ UN partnership – increasingly characterised by jointness with government and local consultations • Motivated by prospect of donor support – but broader, long term objectives can be addressed: • Development vision and strategic objectives • Policy and program priorities • Costing linked to domestic budget • Results framework…

4. Developing a coordinated reconstruction strategy:Dimensions and sequencing 1. Address urgent needs – in particular needs of the displaced, physical rehabilitation and restoration of service delivery.  Key is “how” – maximize jobcreation; support stabilization (e.g., strengthen links between, not only within, communities). 2. Rebuild state and key institutions (fiscal capacity, control over means of coercion, macroeconomic management, judiciary, administration, service delivery, etc.). Mix of policy advice and technical assistance needed. 3. Jump-start the local economy through both reforms & investments).  Key is “how” – need to adjust interventions to specific political economy (focus on peace and stability), in particular for prioritizing and phasing; need to “question” conventional wisdom.

5. Timeline and Type of Assistance Type of Aid Security (AU, UN) and Humanitarian Assistance (CAP/ workplan) Development assistance eg Multi-Donor Trust Fund; bilateral programs Development pledges Track 1 Track 2 Two Years after peace Peace Agreement Time

6. Factors in designing interventions • Community-led initiatives: local-level institution survive violent conflict better than national institutions; speed and cost-effective delivery; focus on local choice and accountability. • Coordinated, outsourced service delivery: often dominated by international NGOs; initial outsourcing needs to transition to public sector management or the private sector. • Combined with selected “top-down” service delivery: to avoid marginalization of new administration; toward building a track record of reform and good governance. • Larger infrastructure: unblock major bottlenecks while management/procurement capacity and structural policy issues are resolved.

7. Lessons on institutional capacity building • The budget: focus on fiscal sustainability and prioritization between sectors; providing for discipline and transparency in implementation; opportunity to strengthen aid coordination and emphasize sustainability. • Public expenditure management: focus on core financial and administrative functions: core macroeconomic management, budget and treasury functions, procurement. • Management of technical assistance: planned and coordinated TA; avoiding conflicting donor systems; attracting high quality staff; skills transfer responsibilities in contracts. • Justice and law and order: legal framework and institutions; training of judges; physical rehabilitation; police recruitment….

8. General lessons learned (1) • Post-conflict conditions provide an opportunity to rebuild and transform, but challenging… • In policy and program choices, there are trade-offs between: • Quick visible benefits to the people versus long-term capacity-building • National ownership versus quick delivery • Political sustainability and inclusion versus administrative efficiency • Where expectations are high and capacity limited, setting priorities is essential

9. Key lessons learned (2) • Peace and stability as primary objectives: • Not a given in post-conflict contexts, pre-conditions for any other goal to be reached – high risk of relapse • Need to address both short-term and longer-term causes of instability. • Need for a comprehensive approach: • political, military, administrative, economic, social and humanitarian – given inter-relations • Fast-evolving situation - need for regular review.

10. CPA JAM: Lessons for Darfur JAM Darfur Joint Assessment Mission Inception Workshop Nairobi, June 30, 2006

11. Outline 1. Motivation, Objectives, Scope and Process 2. Emerging Shared Vision 3. Program and Policy Priorities 4. Financing Needs and Institutional Arrangements 5. Monitoring Arrangements 6. Conclusion

12. 2. Motivation: Machakos Protocol, 2002 • Lays out vision to achieve sustained peace • Addresses key causes of the conflict • Presents a historic opportunity to overcome the devastation of war and neglect (5Rs) • Provides relative peace in the war-affected areas • DPA Articles (22, 23): The April 2004 N’djamena, the May 2004 Addis Ababa, the November Abuja Agreements on Ceasefire • DPA Article 17 (99): Recognizes cumulative effects of underdevelopment, prolonged deprivation and conflict and need for measures to address these effects.

13. JAM: Objectives • Assessment and costing of the reconstruction and development requirements for consolidation and sustenance of peace in the post-conflict Sudan • Framework for sustained peace, development and poverty eradication with clear benchmarks for assessing progress • DPA Article 17 (100): Recognizes poverty eradication strategy as basis for development policy framework with the aim of meeting the MDGs. • DPA Article 17 (103): Conduct of a comprehensive assessment of needs in Darfur as a matter of top priority. • DPA Article 19 (155): JAM to be conducted by WB, UN and AfDB to identify and quantify the needs of post-conflict recovery, development and poverty eradication programme for Darfur states.

14. JAM: Scope and Emphasis • Diagnostic: Quantitative, qualitative, field work, conflict, environment and gender analysis and consultations • Poor and most disadvantaged parts of the country, • Policies and programs focus on poverty eradication, acceleration to reach the MDGs and on redressing disparities • Thematic Areas: Reconstruction and development needs within national priorities, efforts and budget commitments with focus on critical first two years (2005-7) in eight (8) thematic areas • DPA Article 17 (102, 108, 109): Recognizes the urgent and serious needs of the war-affected areas/persons, women, basic functioning government and civil administration. • DPA Article 33 Page 94: Darfur JAM Purpose, Scope, preparation, costing and cost-sharing to be agreed upon by the JAM Oversight Committee.

15. JAM: Process and Structure • Conducted by the World Bank and the United Nations • Partnership with technical teams from GOS and SPLM with focus on capacity building • Substantial input from civil society and international development partners • Running for nearly one year, in parallel to the peace process, and to support the peace process through joint technical dialogue and policy training • Ownership Process:Ensure local ownership and buy-in from domestic and international stakeholders through broad-based consultations • Structure: (Core Coordination Group, Core Teams, Higher/National Committees, Council of Ministers/ Leadership Council) • DPA Article 33 Page 94: JAM Oversight Committee consisting of one representative of each state (3), representatives (3) of GNU, one representative each of WB, UN and AfDB.

16. December 2003: CCG established in Nairobi CPA JAM Timeline February 2004: Preparatory phase initiated May 2004: Signing of 3 Naivasha Protocols August 2004: Joint Poverty Eradication Strategy developed by parties September 2004: Official launch of JAM at joint retreat in Nairobi Sectoral Field Assessment Missions September 2004: IPF meeting in Oslo Dec 04/Jan 2005: Joint sectoral sessions/workshops January 2005: Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement Drafting of cluster reports and synthesis report Jan/Feb 2005: Core team to draft synthesis report – GoS, SPLM, UN, WB – in Addis Ababa Darfur JAM Timeline DPA Article 19 (155): Darfur JAM to be conducted within three months after the signing of the DPA March 2005: Final report circulated to donors Consultations and sharing of final report April 2005: Donors conference in Oslo

17. 2. Emerging Shared Vision: Poverty Agenda • Implementing the CPA and promoting a culture of peace; • Building decentralised governance, characterised by transparency and accountability; • Ensuring macro-stability and enabling environment for private sector and rural development; • Comprehensive capacity building programmes at all levels; • Empowering local communities and civil society groups; • Managing resources in an environmentally sound way • Promoting access to basic services • Building a sound and simple system to monitor and evaluate progress towards the MDGs • DPA Article 19: Macroeconomic policy framework for combating povety and sense of marginalization, promoting decent quality of life, living conditions and dignity of all citizens, development of private and agriculture sector, restoration of peace, sustained pro-poor economic growth, macro-economic stability, attainmentof MDGs and equitable development.

18. Patterns of Growth and Poverty • Important economic gains achieved in 1990s following macro stabilization, but pattern of growth is unbalanced Wide poverty variation both between--and within--North, South, urban-rural and three areas (Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Abyei) North South (Darker color indicates higher level of poverty)

19. Human Development IndexState-level and Cross-Country Comparison • Disparities in outcomes large, both across states and compared to neighbors and countries with similar income levels, with Southern Sudan among the worst in the world • Worse-off states are comparable to Ethiopia, which has a much lower per capita income

20. 3. Program And Policy Priorities • Two Broad Phases: • Immediate recovery and consolidation of peace in the first 2 ½ years (mid-2005-2007) in Phase I • Scaling-up for MDGs in Phase II (through 2011) • Embedded in the CPA, and building on the principles laid out for the Poverty Eradication Strategy (PRSP). • D JAM: Track I (Early Recovery = Quick Peace Dividends) and Track II (Long Term Development = Scaling-up) with focus on sector-wide specific programmes rather than small-stand alone projects and use of budget as a coordinating tool.

21. National Government and Northern States: Strategic Objectives Commitments • Enable consolidation of the CPA at all levels through capacity building and increased political commitment for a change and transformation; • Improve governance through promoting humanrights, decentralization, improved management capacity, and anti-corruption measures; • Broad-based growth of income-earning opportunities through stable macroeconomic framework and policyreform; and • Expanding access to basic services.

22. Phase I JAM costs for National Government (including Three Areas) by Cluster (million US$) Notes: * For 2005, July-December only. ** Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for infrastructure, will be revised based on further technical analysis and studies.

23. Government of Southern Sudan:Strategic Objectives Commitments • Developing physical infrastructure for roads, river and air; • Prioritizing agriculture, and promoting private sector development; • Restoring peace and harmony through access to basic services, including health, education and water; • Regenerating social capital (including safe return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees); and • Developing institutional infrastructure for better governance, focusing on public service and service delivery capacity. • D JAM: Makes it simple and realistic to address urgent needs, build key institutions and jump-start the local economy with focus on community-driven programmes, peace and stability

24. Phase I JAM costs for Southern Sudan by Cluster (Million US$) Notes: * For 2005, July-December only. ** Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for infrastructure, will be revised based on further technical analysis and studies.

25. 4a. Financing Needs: Phase I (US $ billions)  High and rising Pro-Poor Ratio, Declining External Share (%)

26. 4b. Aid Management Arrangements and the Multi-Donor Trust Funds • Donors asked to work mostly through two MDTFs to minimize fragmentation and transaction costs: • National MDTF: National Government, war-affected and least developed states in the North including Three Areas • Southern Sudan MDTF: ten states of Southern Sudan. • Management structure (oversight committee/standing committee, technical secretariat with World Bank as administrator, Appraisal Committee (GoSS), MDTF Unit in MOFNE) • Process for projects/programmes approval and implementation (Initial Project Proposal (IPP), Full Project Proposal (FPP), Project Implementation Appraisal, Project Implementation) • Regular “consortium” meetings to assess results, discuss future directions, and renew pledges • DPA Article 33 Page 93: Provides for establishment of Darfur Window within existing National MDTF under the same Oversight Committee as for DRDF with addition of representatives of donors

27. 5. Monitoring Framework • Immediate start to monitoring of JAM implementation tocultivate a results-based focus and culture of public & donor accountability. • Results matrices have been developed • At the cluster level • Overall summary monitoring framework • Monitoring framework is instrument for dialogue at several levels: Line agency, cabinet, NG and GOSS - donor and donor-donor  reported to Sudan Consortium • Designed to be comprehensive –including security and political -- framework – and with integral link to emerging Poverty Eradication Strategy

28. Sample of Summary Monitoring Framework

29. 6. Conclusions • Basis for policy and programs planning and results focus • Improved coordination among donors and government institutions, yet institutional and/or political motives prevail. • JAM programmes linked to budget and country-driven priorities. • Pledges vs. disbursement, humanitarian vs. recovery/development • National ownership vs. quick delivery • Participation and inclusion vs. administrative efficiency • Liberation struggle vs. reconstruction challenges • Decentralization and devolution of powers vs. centralization • Quick visible benefits vs. long term capacity building • Community-led initiatives vs. top-down planning • D JAM: Makes its simple, realistic and doable