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CRaTER Pre-Ship Review (I-PSR) MISSION ASSURANCE Brian Klatt. January 3-4, 2008. MISSION ASSURANCE SLIDES. PAIP COMPLIANCE SYSTEM SAFETY RFAs, ACTION ITEMS, AND COMMENTS TRACKING NON-CONFORMANCES, MRBs, AND FAILURE ANALYSIS WAIVERS FORMAL INSPECTIONS QUALIFICATION VEERIFICATION.
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CRaTER Pre-Ship Review(I-PSR)MISSION ASSURANCEBrian Klatt January 3-4, 2008
MISSION ASSURANCE SLIDES • PAIP COMPLIANCE • SYSTEM SAFETY • RFAs, ACTION ITEMS, AND COMMENTS TRACKING • NON-CONFORMANCES, MRBs, AND FAILURE ANALYSIS • WAIVERS • FORMAL INSPECTIONS • QUALIFICATION • VEERIFICATION
PAIP Compliance • Reliability Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Parts Stress Analyses Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Failure Modes and Effects Analysis Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Critical Items List Submitted to GSFC • Parts Stress Analyses Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Reliability Assessments Submitted to GSFC • Analysis of test Data Trend Analysis submitted; MGH & BNL results presented • Software Assurance CRaTER does not employ any flight software • Ground Data System Requirements CRaTER and LRO Ground Data Systems are compatible • Risk Management Requirements Analysis Submitted to GSFC • Integrated Independent Review Requirements Peer reviews on Electrical, Mechanical, and FPGA • GSFC System Review Requirements PDR, CDR, PER, and PSR conducted by NASA IRT • Performance and Environmental Verification Plan Submitted to GSFC • Performance Verification Matrix Submitted to GSFC • Environmental Test Matrix (ETM) Submitted to GSFC • Verification Procedures Submitted to GSFC • Instrument Verification Reports 89 required; 83 completed • Structural & Mechanical Requirements Analysis and Environmental tests demonstrate safety margins • Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) Requirements Tests perform at Chomerics in Woburn, MA • Vacuum, Thermal and Humidity Requirements Thermal balance and Thermal vacuum tests were successful • Workmanship All certified per NASA STD 8739.X • New/Advanced Packaging Technology No advanced packaging employed
PAIP Compliance (continued) • Materials, Processes and Lubrication Requirements MIUL and As-Built M & P lists submitted to GSFC • Material Selection MIUL and As-Built M & P lists submitted to GSFC • Shelf-Life-Controlled Materials and Limited Life Items Material shelf life is monitored; No limited life items • Materials identification and usage list (MIUL) Submitted to GSFC • Fasteners The largest fastener used is #6 • Lubrication CRaTER does not have any mechanisms, thus no lubricants • Procurement Requirements All flight procurement reviewed by Mission Assurance • Purchased Raw Materials Chemical and Physical test results are documented • Raw Materials Used in Purchased Products Not applicable • EEE Parts Requirements In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Part Control Board (PCB) PCB coordinated with GSFC (Rich Williams) • Parts Selection and Screening In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Parts Selection Criteria In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Custom Devices CRaTER does not use any custom devices • Parts Stress Analysis and Derating In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Radiation Hardness In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Destructive Physical Analysis Pre-seal source inspection in lieu of DPA • Failure Analysis Performed to establish root cause of failure • Parts Age Usage In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Parts List PAPL submitted frequently to GSFC (Rich Williams) • Parts Traceability Control In accordance with EEE-INST-002 • Parts Reuse Parts are not reused • Alerts Researched and responded to all Alerts and Notices
PAIP Compliance (continued) • Contamination Control Requirements TQCM change during T/V was in the single digits • Electrostatic Discharge Control (ESD) All certified per NASA STD 8739.7 • Configuration Management Configuration Management Process submitted to GSFC • Preservation and Packing Preservation, Packing, and Handling is documented • Data Retention Design, fabrication, and test data is retained at MIT FOREVER
System Safety • System Safety Program Plan Contained in PAIP (Approved) • Safety Analyses Submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Preliminary Hazard Analysis Submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • System Hazard Analysis Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Operations Hazards Analyses (OHA) Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Operating and Support Hazard Analysis Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Software Safety Not Applicable • Safety Compliance Checklist Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Safety Assessment Report Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Missile System Prelaunch Safety Package Inputs submitted to GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Safety Verification Tracking Log Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Ground Operations Procedures Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Safety Variance Not Applicable • Support for Safety Meetings As Required • Orbital Debris Assessment CRaTER Input submitted to GSFC • Launch Site safety Support Performed by GSFC (Chuck Peterson) • Mishap Reporting and Investigation None were required • Miscellaneous Submittals for Range Use None have been requested
WAIVERS • One waiver was submitted to fly a commercial, unqualified thermistor, which is used only during ground test and integration. • The waiver was withdrawn when a suitable part mounting was not available
FORMAL INSPECTIONS • ALL HYBRID MICROCIRCUITS (100%) USED IN FLIGHT HARDWARE WERE PRE-SEAL VISUALLY EXAMINED AT THE MANUFACTURER'S FACILITY. • ALL ASSEMBLY AND TEST OPERATIONS ON THE DETECTORS (100%) WERE WITTNESSED BY MIT
QUALIFICATION • TWO (2) EEE PART TYPES WERE SUBJECTED TO QUALIFICATION TESTS, IN ACCORDANCE • WITH EEE-INST-002 • INTERFET P/N SNJ90347(IF9030) PASSED EEE-INST-002 QUALIFICATION TESTS ON 4/5/07 • KEMET 1000V, 0.022UF CERAMIC CHIP CAPACITOR FAILED QUALIFICATION LIFE TEST. THE PART WAS DESIGNED OUT OF THE SYSTEM IN FAVOR OF A QUALIFIED CALRAMIC CAPACITOR