Reliability Subcommittee Report to PCC

1. Reliability Subcommittee Report to PCC Vancouver, British Columbia 27 June 2002 RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

2. Outline • NERC/WECC Planning Standards - Approval Item • NERC/WECC Planning Standards - Status Report • UVLS Criteria • PBRC • Waiver of NERC Standard • Resource Adequacy Assessment RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

3. A. NERC/WECC Planning Standards - Approval Item • Process Review • Existing Standards and Guides to be Modified • New Guide • Standards and Measures to be Deleted RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

4. A.1 Process Review • February 2000 - Assignment to RS. • June 2001 - PCC approved merged standards and PBRC Phase 1 • November 2001 - RS posted recommendations on 36 standards, guides, and definitions for 60 day comment. • January 2002 - RS received 14 pages of comments from 9 individuals. • February 2002 - RS made recommendations to PCC addressing 34 standards, guides, and definitions. • March 2002 - RS posted 6 additional recommendations. • May 2002 - RS received two comments on recommendations posted in March • June 2002 - RS is making recommendations on 8 additional standards, measures, guides, and definitions. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

5. A.2 Existing Standards and Guides to be Modified • Definition of Cascading RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

6. Cascading • Cascading is the uncontrolled successive loss of system elements triggered by an incident at any location. Cascading results in widespread electric service interruption, which cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by appropriate studies. • Explanation: • RS recommends that the NERC definition of cascading be adopted for WECC. The NERC definition adds the phrase “which cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by appropriate studies.” This additional language helps to define the extent of service interruption acceptable within the definition. • One “no” vote at RS. • Concern that the additional language is confusing. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

7. A.3 New WECC Guide • WECC I.A.GX RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

8. WECC I.A.GX • An initiating event of a three phase fault may be used for screening contingencies of two circuit common right-of-way contingencies. However, the required performance will be as specified in Table I for catagory C5 (Fault (non 3 phase) with Normal Clearing: Double Circuit Tower-line) events. Simulations meeting the criteria with a three phase fault may be assumed to meet the criteria with a single phase fault and normal clearing. • Explanation: • While a three phase fault may not be required to be studied for some, some may wish to use three phase faults for screening purposes. Since a three phase fault stresses the system more than a non-three phase fault, systems that can sustain a three phase fault can be assumed to meet other faults. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

9. A.4 Standards and Measures Recommended to be Deleted • WECC I.A.S8 • WECC I.A.S9 • WECC III.A.M1 • WECC III.B.S1 • WECC III.F.S1 • WECC III.F.S2 RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

10. WECC I.A.S8 • Existing Standard: • Category C or D outages have an expected probability of occurrence of less than once every three years. If a multiple element outage occurs more frequently, the operators/owners of the facility shall expeditiously implement measures to reduce the frequency of occurrence of the outage and/or take steps to reduce the impact of the disturbance. • Explanation for deleting: • This standard is redundant to the new PBRC Standards. • RS approved this standard with only one “no” vote. • Concern regarding implementation of PBRC. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

11. WECC I.A.S9 • Existing Standard: • During a shakedown period, determined by the owner, a bipolar DC line outage will be treated as a single circuit outage (Category B). After the shakedown period, a bipolar DC line outage shall be treated as a one or two-circuit outage depending on the following: To qualify for two-circuit outage performance (Category C), the owner(s) must show any party which would be adversely affected by a bipole outage that a specific criteria of no more than one bipole outage in three years (0.33 per year) was adopted in the design of the DC system. • Explanation for deleting: • This standard is redundant to the new PBRC Standards. • RS approved with one “no” vote: • Concern regarding design requirement for bipole outage. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

12. WECC III.A.M1 • Existing Standard: The power system impact of protection system trip misoperations shall be evaluated by computer simulation of such outages. In performing these studies the following two conditions must be considered: 1) Protection system trip (relay) misoperations that have actually occurred resulting in a multiple contingency outage, regardless of the severity of the actual disturbance. This is to allow studying the improper protection system trip (relay) operation under stressed system conditions to evaluate the potential for cascading. 2) Protection system trip (relay) misoperations that have not occurred but have the potential for initiating a multiple contingency outage that could result in cascading. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

13. WECC III.A.M1 (cont’d) If the results of such a study demonstrate cascading, the protection (relay) system shall be fully reviewed regarding its likelihood of misoperation. The member responsible shall submit evidence in a timely fashion, sufficient to demonstrate that misoperation of the protection (relay) system is of extremely low likelihood. The documentation submitted shall include information on any improvements that have been made to a protection (relay) system that has previously caused a misoperation. The report shall receive a comprehensive evaluation in a timely fashion by a group of WECC member protective relay engineers. If this evaluation indicates that the future likelihood of misoperation is probable, corrective action must be taken. Until corrective action is taken, performance for the subject multiple contingency must meet the Category C performance in DPT. If this evaluation indicates that the future likelihood of misoperation is not probable, no further action needs to be taken. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

14. WECC III.A.M1 (cont’d) • Explanation for deleting: • This Measure is redundant to the NERC Measures. • The content of this Measure is a procedure, which should be reviewed to determine if it is a response to the NERC Measure. • One RS member voted against deleting this item due to a concern regarding loss of the detail of this process. This concern has been forwarded to TSS and RASRTF for consideration. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

15. WECC III.B.S1 • Existing Standard: • If a control malfunction of a high speed control system, such as a DC link or a Static Var Control System, does not directly result in removal from service of the controlled facility, it should not expose other systems to loss of load, loss of generation, equipment damage or line outages. In general, such systems are not considered to be RAS. However, they are subject to the reliability philosophies contained in these criteria as is any other proposed or existing facility. • Explanation for deleting: • This standard is redundant to the NERC Standards. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

16. WECC III.F.S1 • Existing Standard: • The performance requirement for an undesired operation of a SPS shall be the more stringent of the Performance Category of either the disturbance that would correctly initiate the SPS or the action initiated by the SPS. For example, if the SPS is intended to operate for a double-line outage and the remedial action initiated is the tripping of a single generator, then its undesired operation would be required to meet Category B performance. However, if the SPS is intended to operate for a double-line outage and the remedial action initiated is the tripping of six lines, then its undesired operation would be required to meet the performance specified for Category C of the WECC Disturbance-Performance Table. • Explanation for deleting: • This standard is redundant to the NERC Standards. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

17. WECC III.F.S2 • Existing Standard: • If a SPS failure occurs, the system is required to meet the performance category assuming such a SPS failure until the owners of the facilities have demonstrated that the cause of the failure has been corrected. • Explanation for deleting: • This standard is redundant to the NERC Standards. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

18. B. Merged Standards Review - Status • Remaining items under review: • WECC I.A.S1: Footnote 1 • Review of MORC underway. • Table W-1: Voltage and frequency deviation performance consistent with NERC. • WECC I.A.S4: PCC deferred approval. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

19. C. UVLS Standard • RS has not reached consensus on a recommendation on this item. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

20. D. PBRC Status • Task 1 - Probabalistic Criteria Development • Phase I – Event Probability (implemented) • Phase II – Performance Impact Measures (in progress) • Phase III – Performance Risk Measures • Phase IV – Economic Risk Measures • Task 2 - Reliability Database Development (in progress) • Investigating what can be done on this task. • Task 3 - Disturbance Credibility Definition (in progress) • Investigating what is presently required for this task. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

21. E. Waiver of NERC Planning Standard • Letter requesting waiver sent to NERC on 7 January 2002. • NERC PC wants more information on WECC problems before granting waiver. • RS will be requesting WECC members identify problems with meeting the NERC Standard. • RS will determine a course of action when members reports are received. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002

22. F. Resource Adequacy Assessment • Coordinating with CEC SAM. • Selected PCC members are reviewing and verifying data. RS Report to PCC, 27 June 2002